Forgiveness and its reason by Jesson, S.N.
Jesson, S.N. (2011) Forgiveness and its reason. PhD 
thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12038/1/Forgiveness_and_its_reason.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
FORGIVENESS AND ITS REASON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stuart Jesson 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
September 2010 
 
  
  
  
  
 
Abstract 
 
Forgiveness might be said to involve a certain kind of intellectual suffering: we forgive, 
and are forgiven, whilst a great many questions remain undecided, and while it is far 
from obvious that they are unimportant.  This thesis explores the way in which the 
difficulties in submitting forgiveness to thought may be significant. Contemporary 
accounts of forgiveness are put into creative dialogue with the work of Simone Weil, 
Rene Girard and Jacques Derrida in an attempt to assess different forms of approach to 
the resistance forgiveness offers to thought. Utilising the work of Simone Weil in 
particular, and through a creative interpretation of some of the gospel sayings from 
which the modern notion of forgiveness originates, the argument is made that 
forgiveness can be seen to involve a process of transformation of understanding that is 
akin to spirituality of death and resurrection.  On this account, forgiveness is 
paradoxical and resistant to thought not because it involves a simple suspension of, or 
opposition to reasoned forms of judgment, but because it involves a way of holding 
together attitudes, concerns and insights that do not easily cohere. As such it calls for a 
µSRVWXUH¶WKDWFXOWLYDWHVDQGZDLWVZLWKWKLVWHQVLRQUDWKHUWKDQDWKHRU\WKDWDOORZVWKH
meaning and goodness of forgiveness to appear unambiguously.  In this sense 
forgiveness is an expression of a love that both hopes all things and bears all things; a 
way of accepting the worst whilst desiring the best.   
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Introduction 
 
Forgiveness and its reason 
 
  
I 
 
 The teachings attributed to Jesus of Nazareth concerning forgiveness do not at first 
glance form a harmonious whole.   
 Firstly, it seems that divine forgiveness hovers between being the ground of human 
giving and forgiving and a response to it.  The command to forgive is associated with 
the sun that rises on the evil and the good, and the love of enemies through which one 
becomes a child of the Father, perfect with his perfection.1  This perfection appears 
indifferent to human assessments of worth, or worthiness in general; it is a giving that 
needs no prior condition.  Nevertheless, this unreserved giving does in turn give rise to 
response, such that the measure with which one gives is an indication of how one has 
received: '[t]herefore, I tell you, her sins, which were many, have been forgiven; hence 
she has shown great love.  But the one to whom little is forgiven, loves little.'2  Slightly 
different again is the sense that forgiveness is given in response to faith. The son of man 
has authority on earth to forgive sins, but nevertheless it is faith in this authority that 
enables forgiveness to be given with the same ease that a lame man is made to walk.3 
But the relationship between divine and human forgiveness is also, somehow, a 
conditional one: 'if you do not forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your 
trespasses.'4 God forgives us as we forgive those who sin against us; we forgive those 
who sin against us so that God will forgive us. 
 Secondly, and perhaps more problematically, is the relation of forgiveness to human 
judgement.  Forgiveness is commanded alongside a withdrawal from judgement and 
fault finding, and is part of the reciprocal scheme in which one receives according to the 
measure one has given: 'do not judge, and you will not be judged'. As a result, it is 
recommended that one concentrate on the speck in one's own eye, not the plank in 
                                                             
1Matthew 5: 43 - 48. 
2Luke 7: 47 - 49. 
3Mark 2: 5 - 10; Matthew 9: 2 - 6; Luke 5: 17 - 26. 
4Matt 6: 12, 15. 
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another's.5  Yet it is also placed alongside the description of a careful process for 
addressing the wrongdoings of others, and if necessary expelling those who do not 
respond with repentance6  The giving or withholding of forgiveness is itself treated as a 
way of enacting judgement, such that the act of human forgiveness binds and releases 
not just on earth, but in heaven.7  More than this, forgiveness may also become a new 
criterion for judgement, and as such necessarily comes with an element of threat.  
Those who do not pass on to others the forgiveness they have received are punished all 
the more severely; it is a gift that heightens the logic of retribution when it is abused.8   
 The features listed above may each contain seeds of insight to be developed, but 
they do not at first glance sit harmoniously together.  Forgiveness, then, is not just 
difficult to practice, it is difficult to think: it offers resistance to thought.  How can 
forgiveness be pronounced as a sign of authority, freedom and gratuity, and yet also 
remain subject to certain conditions or requirements, which mean that it is received 
from God almost automatically when given to others? How are we to respond to the gift 
of divine forgiveness, when such forgiveness is itself conditional upon our own 
response to it - how can forgiveness be genuinely offered when it is accompanied by a 
threat?9  How can forgiveness be understood as a forgoing of judgement, a loosening of 
categories of judgement, and at the same time as itself a basis for judgement? How can 
forgiveness involve a willingness to act outside of reciprocal expectations as a sign of 
the indiscriminate love of the Father, and itself be the basis for a rule of forgiveness?  
There are various ways of bringing order to this picture.  Perhaps the key is to consider 
the qualitative difference between the forgiveness given by God and the forgiveness 
given to each other, and to describe the relationship between the two; or perhaps greater 
sense can be made if one distinguishes between forgiveness between two individuals 
and the sterner, but still forgiving, response of a community to the wrongdoing of one 
of its members.  More critically, the task may be to distinguish between material that 
authentically reflects words spoken by Jesus and material that reflects the needs of the 
early church, which may itself have struggled to outwork the more radical, original 
                                                             
5Matthew 7:1 - 5; Luke 6: 37 - 38, 41 - 42. 
6Matthew 18: 15 ± 20; Luke 17: 3 - 4 
7Matthew 18: 18. 
8Matthew 18: 23 ± 35. 
9The parable of the unmerciful servant as recorded by Matthew most forcefully demonstrates this 
difficulty.  Matt 18: 21 - 35. 
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command, or been perplexed by its openness to abuse. 
 It might be thought that this 'resistance to thought' is simply due to the fact that 
Jesus is not a philosopher and the gospels are not ethics manuals; it is hardly surprising, 
then, that there is no 'theory of forgiveness' to be found in them.  In the gospels, 
forgiveness is a command to be obeyed, rather than a principle to be understood.  But 
even in its simplest and perhaps earliest forms there is already the hint of reason: 
'forgive, and you will be forgiven';10 'forgive, if you have anything against anyone; so 
that your Father in heaven may also forgive you your trespasses';11 'forgive us our debts, 
as we also have forgiven our debtors';  'if you do not forgive others, neither will your 
Father forgive your trespasses.'12   Forgive and...,  forgive so that...,  forgive as..., 
forgive or... ; each of these words open up lines of reflection which are difficult not to 
follow, but equally difficult to tie together.   
 Perhaps, then, the easiest place to begin is with this difficulty.  Forgiveness is most 
fascinating and most problematic when it is most difficult.  It is the prospect of the 
survivor of  genocide forgiving those that pursued her with machetes every day for a 
month that perplexes or outrages the intellect, rather than the 'forgiveness' given and 
received daily for a host of mundane mistakes or misunderstandings.  It is in the 
extreme cases that we wonder whether this word can have any meaning, and if it does, 
whether it points to something that can be embraced alongside justice, and if it can, 
whether it will actually prove possible for humans in practice.  In the extreme cases, it 
is not obvious that 'forgiveness' is meaningful, just, or possible, let alone desirable.  And 
it appears that the gospel material deliberately brings the difficulty of forgiveness to the 
fore: 
Then Peter came and said to him, "Lord, if another member of the church 
sins against me, how often should I forgive? As many as seven times?" 
Jesus said to him, "Not seven times, but, I tell you, seventy-seven 
times."13 
 
Be on your guard! If another disciple sins, you must rebuke the offender, 
and if there is repentance, you must forgive.  And if the same person sins 
against you seven times a day, and turns back to you seven times and 
                                                             
10Luke 6: 37b 
11Mark 11: 25b 
12Matt 6: 12, 15. 
13Matthew 18: 21 - 22 (NRSV).  All subsequent biblical quotations are from the NRSV unless 
otherwise stated. 
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More generally, the message preached by Jesus seems to have been self-consciously 
difficult.   Perhaps the most notable saying that forces a confrontation with this 
difficulty is the following: 
For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their 
life for my sake will save it.15 
 
These sayings concern losing and saving: an attempt to save life that leads to, or 
produces, loss; a losing of life that leads to, or produces, its ultimate saving.  The 
invitation to follow Christ and be part of the kingdom of God is an invitation to lose 
oneself and save oneself,  and since forgiveness is a key component of life in the 
kingdom, we might well ask: what is the loss that one embraces when one forgives, and 
what is the life that this loss somehow leads to, or becomes? Or, to put a slightly 
different spin on things: what is it that cannot be kept if one wants the life that 
forgiveness promises?  And how does the loss become gain?  Moreover, since this 
saying is closely linked with the summons to 'take up one's cross', and so cannot be read 
without the narrative of death and resurrection in the background; how is forgiveness 
akin to dying, and how is it akin to coming alive - how is it death, and how is it birth? 
 Despite the appearance of simplicity, the saying above is also notable for the 
difficulty one finds in pinning down its meaning.  It articulates a reversal, and the 
symmetry involved seems to suggest some kind of principle; if those who want to save 
their lives lose them, then perhaps one would expect that those who lose their lives will 
save them.  But if there is a hint of intelligibility here  it is very difficult to say exactly 
what it is.  Perhaps there is some kind of exchange: one exchanges rights to one's own 
life in return for the fuller life of the kingdom, just as Paul considered whatever had 
appeared to be gain to be a loss compared to surpassing greatness of knowing Christ.  
Or perhaps the saying suggests that most  attempts to save one's life are really a form of 
destroying life, so that when one gives up this attempt and allows one's life to be lost, 
one finds oneself more alive than ever.  Perhaps it expresses a new understanding of 
                                                             
14Luke 17: 3 ± 5b.   
15Luke 9: 24.  This saying is notable for appearing in slightly different forms five times in the 
synoptic gospels. See Mattt 10:39, 16:25, Mark 8:36, Luke 17:33, plus the related saying in John 12:25. 
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what it is to really live, so that what one thought of as 'life' now appears to be a form of 
dying, and what one thought of as loss now appears to be a kind of gain.  But however 
much one may see hints of a profound and confrontational wisdom here, the element of 
promise cannot be suppressed, and this element interferes with the attempt to discern a 
new principle.  These sayings present a challenge and invite a risk - the 'for my sake' 
highlights the sense that these sayings concern a response to Jesus' announcement of the 
coming kingdom which interrupts history, rather than simply a hidden wisdom.  Put 
differently, it appears that whatever new understanding of life is given in these words is 
not given apart from a specific call and challenge, it does not 'detach' very easily from 
the narrative.  If what is expressed is primarily warning and promise, rather than a new 
wisdom or principle, then trust becomes the key response, as opposed to an upheaval of 
understanding.  It is not that one needs to re-think what 'life' is, what it means to save or 
lose it, but rather that one is called to entrust one's life to another, on the basis of 
promise.   
 These two interpretations - principle and promise - each have something to 
recommend them.  The discernment of a principle in the save-lose/lose-save formula 
seems to goes along with the sense that the kingdom involves a profound and socially 
subversive re-evaluation.  The invitation to follow is an invitation to see differently, so 
that one's ordinary ways of perceiving wealth, power and wisdom are transformed; tax-
collectors and sinners are entering ahead of the righteous because the righteous cannot 
bear this re-evaluation, having invested too heavily in their own.  But equally, there is a 
danger here, most notably perceived by Nietzsche.  This saying is susceptible of a 
reading that initiates a life-denying process of reversal and nourishes a resentment 
towards all that really lives: loss is gain, weakness is strength and death is life; this 
might be a revenge against life of the highest order.  Perhaps the temptation to discern 
an upside-down ethic should be refused, then, in favour of promise.  To interpret this 
formula more in terms of trust - and also warning - means not that one possess a new 
form of wisdom, through which one may plot one's own way to fulfilment and life, but 
rather that one trusts another, and remains in a posture able to receive.  The link 
between the losing of life, and a deeper, or delayed, saving of life is not itself given, 
only hinted at.  More importantly, on this reading, one is not being asked to deny one's 
desire for life, which in any case would be self-refuting (one cannot be commanded to 
abandon concern for one's life on the grounds that such abandonment is ultimately in 
one's best interests...).  But then, one might ask whether this produces a deferral of 
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judgement, and a shifting of responsibility, so that as long as one is promised that 
certain actions lead, ultimately, to a pay-off, one will be willing to obey, however 
counter-intuitive it sounds? The risk here is of a 'magical positivity',16 which cannot be 
taken on alongside another command: 'judge for yourselves what is right.'17 
 Correspondingly, we can say that a similar ambiguity surrounds the invitation or 
command to forgive.  There are a number of ways of understanding forgiveness as a 
loss, or a willingness to lose.  Perhaps one gives up one's rights to take revenge or 
receive compensation, that is, to some kind payment exacted from a wrongdoer.  In this 
case one would think of forgiveness as intimately related to the possibility of 
withholding punishment, whether retributive or reparative.  But forgiveness may also be 
construed as a change of one's emotional state, so that when one forgives, one gives up 
(or commits to giving up) resentment felt towards another.  And giving up resentment 
might be experienced as a difficult loss, because resentment can seem necessary as a 
protective reassertion of one's dignity in the face of being humiliated.  Or resentment 
might be difficult to give up because it feels good; the rather ambiguous pleasure that 
accompanies the recall of a familiar grievance after a while.  Forgiveness could also be 
understood as a giving up of one's hold on a particular memory, or the attempt to bring 
some kind of sense to past suffering.  The anger I may feel towards someone who has 
deeply wronged me can be understood not only as the reassertion of dignity in the face 
of humiliation, but also as the pain of senselessness ± to have suffered for no reason 
leaves me searching for significance.  Insofar as one's identity is gained through the 
continual recollection of one's past, and the self is only whole through a narrative 
synthesis of time, this search can be thought of as an attempt to 'save' one's life.  To 
forgive, then, might be to give up this search; to let the past remain stubbornly 
unexplained, and to accept its past-ness is in some sense to lose a part of oneself - to 
allow its significance to remain a mystery.   
 It is not difficult, either, to see how the act of forgiveness could be understood as 
gain of some kind.  Perhaps acceptance brings with it increased psychological 
wholeness and peace, and frees the victim from their fascinated hatred of their violator.  
People may become tied to one particular event, so that through endless rehearsal of 
their victim-hood they are defined and shaped by this particular wrong; either through a 
                                                             
16This phrase appears in one of John Milbank's essays, however I have been unable to track it down. 
17See Luke 12: 14, 57. 
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continued sense of diminishment that the act communicated, or through the never-
completed task of revenge.  Forgiveness may give the possibility of a future no longer 
determined by this episode; one gains a life one would otherwise have been unable to 
live.  To forgive involves a particular kind of initiative or power, and to be forgiven 
involves a particular kind of humility; roles are reversed.  This may bring with it a sense 
of restored dignity for the victim, because in any scene of forgiveness, the power lies 
with them: in order to be forgiven, I must entrust a particular episode of my life to my 
victim, so that there is an uncomfortable intimacy between us, as Pamela Hieronymi 
memorably describes: '[y]ou must allow me to creatively incorporate the scars that bear 
your fingerprints into the permanent fabric of my life, and trust that I can do so.'18  
From the other side, the humility of apology is also an instance of a kind of losing of 
one's life: 'we stand unarmed and exposed, relying, in a manner of speaking on our 
moral nakedness to set things right'.19  Although this nakedness may be immensely 
difficult, it may also be a tremendous relief, so that once the attempt to live the life of 
the innocent is given up, one can much more happily live the life of the forgiven.  
Finally, it may be that through forgiveness damaged relationships are opened to 
restoration, and insofar as one's life is always a matter of one's connection with others, 
if one is prepared to lose a life of protected isolation, one is open to gain a richer life of 
vulnerable connectedness. 
 In each of these cases, the form of life that is given up, or lost, in forgiveness would 
have a slightly different relation to the life that is saved, or gained.  If in forgiving one 
gives up resentment that one has nourished for years, and which has, without one 
knowing, involved a kind of toxic repetition of an increasingly biased and self-centred 
narrative, then it is not difficult to see how this loss is really a gain.  It may be felt as a 
loss of something essential at the time, but can be very quickly understood to have been 
a release; one may even feel that one has been saved from the hell of a particularly 
bitter and paralysing resentment.  In fact, some would want to say that one is morally 
bound to give up this kind of bitterness, so that it might be hard to see such forgiveness 
as a loss in any meaningful sense, since one only gives up something one never had any 
business keeping.  In other words, the difficulty that may be faced by someone who 
                                                             
18Pamela Hieronymi, 'Articulating an uncompromising forgiveness', in Philosophy and 
phenomenological research, Vol.  62, No.  3, pp. 529 - 555. 
19Nicolas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A sociology of apology and reconciliation, p. 18. 
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forgives will be very easy to justify - everyone is clearly better off ± and so it will not 
be very difficult to recommend forgiveness (not at all like recommending that someone 
give up their life, or take up their cross).  Forgiveness could simply be recommended as 
a form of human flourishing; once one understands that it is good, and how, it no longer 
appears as a sacrifice.   
 However, if forgiveness is understood simply as the giving up of unwarranted or 
excessive resentment, and therefore as only apparently a loss, this forgiveness may not 
really have much of a grip on the extreme cases.  Resentment may well be poisonous, 
but it could still be a far better poison than the despairing numbness that threatens the 
survivor in their inner world.  Where there have been considered, deliberate attempts to 
eliminate life, resentment might be understood as the feeling of life painfully 
reasserting itself, a surge of defiant moral protest against the torturers and all that they 
stood for, as Jean Amery, 'self-confessed man of resentment' suggests.20  Perhaps, as for 
Amery, to give up resentment may be to succumb retrospectively to the wishes of the 
executioners, or to those of a society rather too hasty to forget and move on.  And in this 
case, perhaps it is better to remain warped by resentment than to be non-resentfully 
'straight'.21  In this case, to preach forgiveness might very well seem like an invitation to 
lose one's life - one's energy, dignity and strength - not simply to lose a diminished form 
of life dominated by petty and self-obsessed grievances.  But this is the ambiguity of the 
sayings noted above: the life that is promised remains precisely that - promised.  When 
understood more in these terms - emphasising the 'for my sake' - the experience of loss 
may remain an experience of loss without obvious recuperation (a loss that apparently 
some felt the need to remind Jesus of: 'Lord, we have left everything to follow you!').  
Since it is not obvious that resentment is simply a mistake, or a diminishing poison to 
be rid of, it is not obvious that the saving is a result of the losing. 
 All of the above is to say that as the gospels present it, there is an intelligibility 
associated with forgiveness, but it is suggested rather than fully given.  Forgiveness 
necessarily involves thought, in that it involves considerations of justice, agency, 
responsibility, prudence, and safety.  One cannot forgive thoughtlessly.  And so 
                                                             
20See Jean Amery, 'Resentments' in At the minds limits: contemplations by a survivor on Auschwitz 
and its realities, tr. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1980), pp.63 ± 78.  Chapter one deals with the question of resentment in more depth. 
21See Amery, 'Resentments',  p.  68. 
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forgiveness might be said to involve a certain kind of intellectual suffering; we forgive, 
and are forgiven, whilst a great many questions remain in the air, and while it is far 
from obvious that they are unimportant.  To push this further, it might be said that the 
burden of this unresolved logic is a part of the difficulty that accompanies those who 
wish to enter the kingdom of heaven.   
The parable of the unforgiving servant provides a greater puzzle: 
For this reason the kingdom of heaven may be compared to a king who 
wished to settle accounts with his slaves.  When he began the reckoning, 
one who owed him ten thousand talents was brought to him; and, as he 
could not pay, his lord ordered him to be sold, together with his wife and 
children and all his possessions, and payment to be made.  So the slave 
IHOORQKLVNQHHVEHIRUHKLPVD\LQJ³+DYHSDWLHQFHZLWKPHDQG,ZLOO
SD\\RXHYHU\WKLQJ´$QG out of pity for him, the lord of that slave 
released him and forgave him the debt.  But that same slave, as he went 
out, came upon one of his fellow-slaves who owed him a hundred denarii; 
DQGVHL]LQJKLPE\WKHWKURDWKHVDLG³3D\ZKDW\RXRZH´7KHQKLs 
fellow-VODYHIHOOGRZQDQGSOHDGHGZLWKKLP³+DYHSDWLHQFHZLWKPH
DQG,ZLOOSD\\RX´%XWKHUHIXVHGWKHQKHZHQWDQGWKUHZKLPLQWR
prison until he should pay the debt.  When his fellow-slaves saw what had 
happened, they were greatly distressed, and they went and reported to 
their lord all that had taken place.  Then his lord summoned him and said 
WRKLP³<RXZLFNHGVODYH,IRUJDYH\RXDOOWKDWGHEWEHFDXVH\RX
pleaded with me.  Should you not have had mercy on your fellow-slave, 
as I had mercy on \RX"´$QGLQDQJHUKLVORUGKDQGHGKLPRYHUWREH
tortured until he should pay his entire debt.  So my heavenly Father will 
also do to every one of you, if you do not forgive your brother or sister 
from your heart.22 
 
The parable draws out the hearers' sense of justice; the failure to pass on the mercy that 
one has received is felt to be more contemptible than any initial state of debt, no matter 
how severe.23  The heavenly Father is resolutely unmerciful in response to such a lack 
of mercy.  This exemplifies the tension within the Matthean material on forgiveness.  
On the one hand, the perfection that bears the closest resemblance to the perfection of 
the Father is an indiscriminate love of friend and enemy, an uncalculated giving.  Debts 
are simply cancelled with no regard to the consequences of such suspensions of 
propriety.  On the other hand, it is forgiveness itself which is, finally, most subject to 
judgement; to refuse to forgive when one has been forgiven is to invite the most severe 
judgement.   The obvious question that this provokes is of whether the king ever really 
                                                             
22
 Matthew 18: 21 ± 35. 
23
 0\GLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVSDVVDJHGUDZVRQ8OULFK/X]¶VH[FHOOHQWcommentary on Matthew 18. See 
Ulrich Luz, Matthew 8 ± 20: a commentary, tr. James E. Crouch, ed. Helmut Koester (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2001). 
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released his servant from debt in the first place, since the story ends with the servant 
being tortured until he pays.  Does God ever actually forgive, when previously forgiven 
sins can still be punished if forgiveness does not issue in the appropriate response?  And 
how can the exhortation to forgive take the form of a threat, when the forgiveness it 
exhorts is to be 'from your heart'? The suspicion here is that this holds in place a scheme 
it purports to overcome.  Perhaps the king forgives the debt so that he can see what the 
slave really deserves, and then punishes him accordingly, or perhaps the original 
reckoning is confirmed as just by means of a detour through mercy - we are shown that 
it was always right that the slave be sold, since he was such an ungrateful, unforgiving 
wretch.  But equally, there may be something more profound here.  Since one will 
always be concerned with justice (with equality, appropriate measure and fair treatment 
in comparison to others), if there is to be forgiveness, it is these concerns that must be 
transformed.  To make forgiveness the criteria for judgement may then be a way of 
ensuring that one's sense of justice actually comes into contact with the subversive 
nature of grace; otherwise one may be left with adult rationality and child-like 
innocence in separate compartments, never interacting or challenging each other.24  In 
other words, it may be a way of ensuring that one contemplate justice and forgiveness 
together, in the same way that through Christ one might contemplate humanity and 
divinity in the same place at the same time, and hope that one's notions of each are 
transformed in the process.   
 Something similar seems to be true, also, of the save-lose/lose-save sayings 
discussed above.  One of the interesting features of these sayings is the way in which 
the key terms ± save, lose, life ± do not have a fixed sense.  In fact, part of the effect of 
the saying seems to be the way in one's sense of what is meant by each is altered by the 
way they are related.  The saying attracts interest because of the intense concern one has 
for one's life - to find it, keep it, or save it.  It is because one cares so much for one's 
life, because it would profit one nothing if one were to gain the whole world but lose 
RQH¶VOLIHthat one is prepared to consider the paradoxical suggestion put forward, 
which suggests that one leave hold of one's life.  The saying produces a reconsideration 
of what is meant by 'life'.    
 One of the central problems that arises in discussion of forgiveness is of how to 
                                                             
247KHOLQNEHWZHHQWKHVD\LQJVRQµOLWWOHRQHV¶DQGWKHLPSHUDWLYHWRIRUJLYHUHSHDWHGO\LV extremely 
suggestive. Perhaps the innocence that one must protect from stumbling is the trust that takes each 
VXEVHTXHQWµ,UHSHQW¶VHULRXVO\UDWKHUWKDQEHFRPLQJXQIRUJLYLQJVLPSO\WKURXJKZHDU\F\QLFLVP 
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avoid describing forgiveness in such a way that it either undoes the logic through which 
is meaningful at all, or in a such a way that it fixes in place, or even intensifies that 
logic (so that forgiveness is strictly governed by a prior notion of justice, or else 
conceptually dependent upon a notion of justice which it then disowns).  Either way, 
one does not progress very far from where one already was.  If forgiveness so undoes 
the concepts of judgement, condemnation, punishment, etc., that these ideas are no 
longer solid enough for forgiveness to appear in reference to them, or, on the contrary if 
forgiveness is really just a temporary detour leading back to or an unchanged moral 
landscape, then it is hard to see how or the idea is necessary, or why it is powerful. 
 In this thesis I show how forgiveness can be thought through more richly and deeply 
as being in a certain sense an ascent or transformation; it is not simply that certain ideas 
are exchanged for others, or that the same ideas are returned to, but that everything is 
changed.   And that this ascent is best thought in terms of descent: death and 
resurrection.  Put theologically, the point might be that forgiveness is theosis-as-
cruciformity.  To forgive, and to think forgivingly, involves a certain 'dying'; of one's 
judgement, one's expectations, one's sense of prudence and sufficient reason: 'those who 
wish to keep their justice will lose it, and those who lose their justice for my sake will 
save it.'  But forgiveness is also in some sense resurrection; one who has forgiven, and 
been forgiven, sees differently.  In other words, the concept of forgiveness can be 
thought of as part of a spirituality of death and resurrection. 
 I show that part of what this means is a certain ambiguity, a necessary impurity, in 
the language of forgiveness - it is perpetually unresolved both as to what it is, and why 
it is what it is.  If forgiveness is, in a sense, an invitation to 'die' to certain ways of being 
± the desire to judge, label or confer a simple, final description another of person, the 
desire to definitively prevent one's own exploitation - then it is also an invitation to 
learn how to judge, how to construe the significance of the past, how to respond to the 
question 'what now?' that all suffering or injustice asks.  What this also means is that 
someone trying to follow the teaching on forgiveness can expect to be subject to 
criticism coming from two directions.  Firstly, forgiveness can be accused of being 
irresponsible, unjust, hollow, and so on; in other words, too forgiving.  Secondly, 
forgiveness can be accused of being not forgiving enough: one only forgives those who 
seem to deserve it, when it poses little risk. Part of what I want to claim is that attempts 
to safeguard forgiveness from these or similar criticisms tend to lose the force and 
significance of the idea, so that in a certain sense, forgiveness must remain defenceless, 
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open to accusation, just as the LORD looks kindly only upon Job, his accuser.  And so 
the question of how to recommend forgiveness becomes crucial, and at this point my 
Christian bias is most obvious: however illuminating intellectual reflection may be, I 
think that forgiveness can only really be held up as a good when held up by those who 
have undergone the suffering of forgiveness, whether through the pain of impotent 
remorse or the pain of the love of one's enemies.  
 
II 
 
 This thesis is situated in relation to a number of different currents of thinking that 
together make up the contemporary interest in forgiveness.  Firstly, over the past three 
decades a collection of articles and books treating forgiveness as an explicit topic has 
been slowly accumulating within Anglophone moral philosophy.  This includes analytic 
examinations of the logical coherence of the concept,25 descriptions of forgiveness as a 
speech act,26 as well as treatments influenced by the resurgence of interest in 'virtue 
ethics'.27  Closely related to this is a recent surge of interest in the role of forgiveness in 
public life, prompted to some extent by the prominence of the language of forgiveness 
in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.  The work of Jeffrey 
Murphy, a philosopher of law, both independently and alongside Jean Hampton, a 
political philosopher, drew attention to the way in which our understanding of 
forgiveness and the retributive emotions is a vital part of the understanding of social 
and political life, and a number of articles and books express a growing interest in 
forgiveness, not just as an intriguing topic at the margins of moral philosophy, but as a 
crucial point at which moral, political, social and religious concerns intersect, and so as 
a subject of concern for 'public intellectuals'.28  In addition to these trends is the 
                                                             
25Notable examples include  Aurel Kolnai
µ)RUJLYHQHVV¶LQProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
1973-4  vol. 74,  P. Twambly,  'Mercy and forgiveness' in Analysis,  vol. 36, 1976, and Pamela 
Hieronymi, 'Articulating an uncompromising forgiveness' in Philosophy and phenomenological 
research, vol. 62, no. 3, 2001. 
26See Joram Haber, Forgiveness (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1991). 
27Charles Griswold, Forgiveness: a philosophical exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), and Tara Smith, 'Tolerance and forgiveness: virtues or vices?' in Journal of applied 
philosophy,  vol. 14, no. 1, 1997. 
28Examples of treatments of forgiveness as a point of intersection, all of which intend to be fairly 
accessible, include Jeffrey Murphy's Getting even: forgiveness and its limits  (Oxford: Oxford 
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attention given to the subject by Jacques Derrida in two essays published towards the 
end of his life, as part of his exploration of themes such as gift, justice and 
responsibility.  Because of Derrida's prominence, and the controversial nature of his 
work, these two relatively short essays have proved to be an essential part of the surge 
of interest in forgiveness, both as a source of new ways of approaching the subject, and 
as a perspective to be countered.  These essays have also been an important part of 
attempts to articulate an 'ethics of deconstruction', and have provided further stimulus 
for theological engagement with deconstruction.  Alongside each of these currents runs 
an increased theological focus upon forgiveness, as a number of theologians have taken 
the increased interest in forgiveness and related issues as an opportunity to demonstrate 
the relevance and coherence of theology.  Whether it is through interaction - with 
economics,29 psychology,30 reconciliation and conflict resolution,31 - or as a theological 
topic in its own right,32 the subject of forgiveness has become one way in which 
theology might play an active part in public discourse.  As such, it is one part of a 
'religious turn' in which active theological engagement with issues of public concern 
has become more widespread.  More than this, new publications are emerging all the 
time.  This year saw the publication of Jill Scott's The poetics of forgiveness: cultural 
responses to loss and wrongdoing, which engages with contemporary questions of 
forgiveness within literary studies, and as I write, David Konstan's account Before 
forgiveness: the origins of a moral idea, which focuses on classical antiquity, is being 
published.   
This thesis attempts to explore some of the central philosophical and theological 
problems that lie at the heart of this resurgence indirectly.  The intent is to contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
University Press, 2003), Trudy Govier's, Forgiveness and revenge (London: Routledge, 2002), Richard 
Holloway's On forgiveness (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2002) and Avishai Margalit's The ethics of memory 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
29Dan Bell, 'Forgiveness exceeding economy' in Studies in Christian ethics 20.3, 2007. 
30Forgiveness in context, ed.  Fraser Watts and Liz Gulliford (London and New York: T&T Clark 
International, 2004). 
31
 Forgiveness and reconciliation: religion, public policy and conflict transformation, ed. Raymond 
Helmick and Rodney L. Petersen (Philadelphia and London: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001). 
32Gregory Jones, Embodying forgiveness: a theological analysis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1995);  Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and embrace: a theological exploration of identity, 
otherness and reconciliation  (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), and Anthony Bash, Forgiveness and 
Christian ethics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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the discussion not through defending one particular approach, or modifying an existing 
formulation, but by exploring a new connection: between the conceptual difficulty 
involved in these kinds of discussions, and the sense that forgiveness might involve a 
deep change in one's perspective.  In theological terms, this can be understood as an 
exploration of the nature of Christian learning, and as already indicated, this can be 
understood as a meditation on the logic of the death and resurrection implied in the 
saying discussed above.  Nevertheless, I am also making a particular claim that pertains 
to any attempt to talk about the subject.  I argue that forgiveness cannot be affirmed 
straightforwardly, or put differently, that the goodness of forgiveness cannot appear 
without ambiguity.  Since this argument is formed through theological reflection, this 
aspect of the thesis could be understood as a theological critique of secular attempts to 
make forgiveness intelligible, but since I do not try and show that theological accounts 
can avoid this same difficulty (although I do think the difficulty can take on a different 
significance), I would rather frame what follows as an extended comment on what 
seems to happen when one talks about forgiveness, from a theological perspective.    
 Most discussions of forgiveness acknowledge that there is something difficult about 
defining it or evaluating it, and broadly speaking, three approaches to this difficulty can 
be seen. First, a fairly common sense approach which assumes that careful distinctions, 
measured assessment and good examples will either remove or greatly reduce these 
difficulties.  Second, an approach emerging from Vladimir Jankelevitch and Jacques 
Derrida suggests that an embrace, or indeed, heightening, of these tensions, gives access 
to the heart of the subject. Finally, theological approaches that suggest, one way or 
another, that forgiveness belongs with Christianity, so that the conceptual tensions find 
a place alongside the paradoxes that are embedded in Christian belief, or the practices 
that make up Christian life.  The thesis attempts to stage an encounter between these 
currents of thought and the concerns they express. In this sense the method is closely 
connected to the argument, since what I am claiming is that forgiveness has something 
to do with dwelling in tension, with holding together competing insights, and with a 
willingness to be judged.  If forgiveness has something to do with the experience of 
conflict between valid claims to attention, and between different concerns, as I argue it 
does, then it is appropriate that the method should involve an attempt to experience 
something similar. The sense that the argument has as much to do with competing 
concerns as it does with competing claims relates to another characteristic of the thesis: 
on the whole I have avoided giving surveys of a wide range of arguments, and instead 
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focused on the texture of individual accounts, so as to focus upon the way that different 
imperatives are felt within the formation of an argument or position, or put differently, 
the way that the definition is shaped by the defence of forgiveness. 
 I have also chosen to focus on thinkers who are particularly concerned with paradox 
or aporia; hence the space given to Simone Weil and Jacques Derrida, who in very 
different ways are concerned with what we might call the suffering of thought.  Both 
contribute to an understanding of forgiveness specifically, but at the same time, my 
examination of them is to do with how thought, and in particular what I have called the 
suffering of thought, is related to ethical, or spiritual life.  In this sense I am not simply 
examining their notions of forgiveness, but also their understanding of the nature of 
ethical thought.  
The purpose of the first chapter is to lay out the problems that will be considered 
throughout. If forgiveness, as I will argue, involves a mingling of perspectives, and the 
presence of conflicting imperatives, this can be brought out most clearly through a 
comparison between two very different accounts. In the first part of chapter one, I 
explore the difficulties found in the attempt to examine forgiveness directly, through 
interaction with one primary example of this approach, namely Charles Griswold's 
Forgiveness: a philosophical exploration.  Griswold's book is the most recent, and the 
most thorough attempt to outline and defend a secular notion of forgiveness.  Some 
theological accounts have argued that the notion of forgiveness examined by secular 
thinkers are often fairly 'thin', revolving around the abstraction 'agent-wrongdoing-
victim', and assessing the meaning and worth of forgiveness in relation to isolated 
events.33 This is not the case with Griswold, who presents forgiveness as an exercise of 
a number of virtues in a balanced way, comprehensible only as a commitment to certain 
values over time.  The point of this chapter is to explore the way in which describing 
forgiveness is always a struggle to show its goodness, and so in the second part, I 
employ the model outlined by Charles Taylor in the recent A secular age to shed some 
light on the broader tensions that the discussion of forgiveness embodies.  My claim is 
that the struggle to defend and justify forgiveness influences the shape of the arguments 
in ways that are not always obvious, and that in a sense, these kinds of discussions of 
forgiveness can be considered the secular equivalent of theodicy.  7D\ORU¶VDFFRXQW
                                                             
33See in particular L.  Gregory Jones, Embodying forgiveness, pp. 210-219  and Dan Bell, Liberation 
theology after the end of history (London: Routledge 2001), pp.  86-88, 144. 
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provides important clues concerning how this works out in practice. In the final part of 
the first chapter, I consider the embrace of paradox that Vladimir Jankelevitch 
expresses. Here the issues at stake become clearer: are we to prefer the intoxication of 
grace or the sober necessities of justice? Jankelevitch provides a powerful articulation 
of one intuition which seems to be fundamental to getting to the heart of the issue. 
Jankelevitch powerfully expresses the intuition that forgiveness has something to do 
with the unaccountable energy of love, an intuition which is perhaps a legacy of the 
Hebrew scriptures, particularly the prophetic portrait of a God whose wrath is overcome 
by compassion: 'How can I give you up Ephraim? How can I hand you over, O Israel? 
...  My heart recoils within me; my compassion grows warm and tender.'34 Although 
there is some detailed engagement with the arguments here, the first chapter is intended 
to outline the conflict between intuitions, as much as arguments. It is the difference 
between the tone of the two arguments that is, in a sense, the most interesting. 
Chapter two details the use I have made of the work of Simone Weil in considering 
WKLVVXEMHFW:HLO¶VZRUNKDVSURYHGDZD\RIH[SORULQJWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIconflict 
within thought, and in this chapter I try to draw out some of the most important 
resonances between her work and the discussion of forgiveness. Some of the problems 
ZLWK:HLO¶VWKLQNLQJDUHTXLWHREYLRXVDWHQGHQF\Wo express things in as extreme a way 
as possible, the sheer ambition which at times becomes arrogant or ridiculous, and of 
course, the sense that there may have been self-destructive tendencies in her life which 
can be felt in her writing.  However, the sometimes astonishing sense of clarity and 
conviction that emerges in her works is sufficient impetus to make use of her legacy in 
this area. If forgiveness is concerned, one way or another, with paradox and conflict, 
then Weil is an indispensable resource for considering the significance of this difficulty.  
More particularly, part of what the thesis is concerned with is the claim (made by 
Jankelevitch and Derrida) that the force of forgiveness is located in a momentary crisis 
RIWKRXJKW:HLO¶VZRUNLVLQVWUXFWLYHEHFDXVHLWSURYLGHVDUDWKHUGLIIHUHQWZD\RI
considering WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHµWUHPEOLQJ¶RIthought that Levinasian deconstruction 
is concerned with, one that gives a sense of duration, rather than instantaneousness.  In 
RWKHUZRUGV,KRSHWRXVH:HLOWRVKRZWKDWVRPHRIWKHLQWXLWLRQVWKDWWKHµLPSRVVLEOH¶
forgiveness of Derrida, Jankelevitch and others attempt to make sense of may be 
interpreted and given voice rather differently.   
                                                             
34Hosea 11:8. 
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 Chapter three turns to the cross, and in particular the attempt to incorporate René 
*LUDUG¶VZRUNLQWRDWRQHPHQWWKHRORJ\ Here I focus on the question of necessity, since 
if the cross is to have something to do with the meaning of forgiveness, then this will 
concern the connection between the necessity of the death of Christ, and the necessities 
that on some accounts make up the conditions of forgiveness.  The suspicion that 
DWRQHPHQWWKHRORJ\LVQRWYHU\µIRUJLYLQJ¶LQLWVDIILUPDWLRQRIWKHGHSHQGHQFHRI
redemption upon brutal execution is a powerful one, and the work of Girard has given 
impetus to the search for a more peaceful approach to atonement.  However, *LUDUG¶V
work is chosen not simply because of its relevance to this question, but equally because 
Girard may be said to have pursued a purification of Christianity.  The brief comments 
above about the parable of the unforgiving servant suggest that this is an important 
aspect of the understanding of forgiveness: is there a logic of forgiveness, and if so, can 
we purge it of all vengeful, retributive or economic elements?   
 Since the question of forgiveness and exchange is unavoidable here, chapter four 
IRFXVHVRQ'HUULGD¶VZRUNZKRVHDVVHUWLRQWKDWIRUJLYHQHVVLVERWKideally aneconomic, 
and necessarily compromised through inevitable exchange represents another intuition 
concerning forgiveness: that we never really forgive, that forgiving is ahead of us. 
However, my focus here is again to examine the sense that the difficulty of thinking 
forgiveness is part of its essential force.  As a result, I focus to begin with on the 
EDFNJURXQGRI'HUULGD¶VWKRXJKWWKHDSRUHWLFVWUXFWXUHWKDWUXQVWKURXJKKLVZRUNI 
DWWHPSWWRUHDG'HUULGDLQWHUPVRIWKHµSRVWXUH¶WKDWLVVXSSRVHGE\KLVZRUNWKHZD\
that one has to suffer in the right way in order to think ethically. The question of the gift 
KDVEHHQFUXFLDOLQWKHZD\WKDW'HUULGD¶VZRUNKDVEHHQWDNHQXSE\those outside of 
the philosophical or literary circles in which it began, and this theme is also crucial for 
the debate over the nature of forgiveness, and in particular the way in which forgiveness 
PLJKWH[FHHGWKRXJKW,QWKHILQDOSDUWRIWKHFKDSWHU,HPSOR\-RKQ0LOEDQN¶V
affirmation of reciprocity to, again, explore the sense in which forgiveness may be 
situated on a fault line between different ways of thinking, motivated by different 
concerns. 
 Throughout these chapters my concern is not to establish a particular solution to the 
difficulties encountered in this subject, but rather to suggest that these difficulties might 
hold a particular significance.  I have, throughout, been guided by an intuitive sense that 
the subject brings up questions that are destined to be ongoing, and that the task may 
well be simply of knowing how to continue to ask them.  In a sense, then, these 
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chapters, and my conclusions, are reflexive; they are attempts to probe into my own 
reluctance to settle into a definitive position, they articulate my own sense of perplexity, 
and try to fathom its meaning. 
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Chapter one 
 
Forgiveness within and without reason 
 
This chapter explores two very different approaches to the subject of forgiveness.  The 
first proceeds through a careful process of definition and elucidation, with the aim of 
presenting the coherence and justice of forgiveness as clearly as possible; the second, 
through a more intentionally paradoxical and poetic form of articulation, aims to 
capture something elusive but essential about the heart of forgiveness.  These 
approaches correspond to two basic assumptions about forgiveness. Firstly, that if it is a 
good, an expression of virtue, it must be basically comprehensible; that it has fairly 
clear reasons, and so is within reason.  Secondly, that forgiveness is an excessive and 
mysterious phenomenon, one that stretches and challenges our capacity to reflect upon 
experience; that it may be without reasons, and so beyond reason.  Through a close 
analysis of the contours and inner tensions of two particular treatments of forgiveness, 
this chapter explores two issues. Firstly, whether forgiveness can be presented so as to 
satisfy certain criteria of rationality or justice, and if so, how this process of justification 
affects the shape the concept takes.  Secondly, whether forgiveness has its own 
particular rationality, and if it does, how might this be related to more ordinary patterns 
of thinking.  Although there are many attempts to provide a comprehensive or direct 
treatment of the subject, this chapter's restrictive focus on two particular thinkers is 
deliberate, because the intention is to observe what happens in the attempt to reason 
with forgiveness.  Rather than survey the issue through a wider range of material, the 
point here is to witness the dynamics of the engagement, in the hope that this will shed 
some light on the particular challenge that forgiveness presents. 
 
 
I 
Justifying forgiveness 
 
The attempt to justify forgiveness could easily result in a circularity such as the 
following.  Being a good Christian, one assumes that it is good to forgive.  However, it 
seems that there is some difficulty or resistance to forgiveness in practice, or doubt 
expressed when it is recommended or praised.  Perhaps one is then led to seek greater 
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understanding or to make the goodness of forgiveness more apparent so as to persuade 
those who doubt it: 
 'It is good to forgive because...'  Now the virtue of forgiveness becomes more 
substantial and persuasive by an appeal to its characteristics, its benefits, or the moral 
norms which it fulfils.  We know that forgiveness is good because it manifests certain 
characteristics, which are also good (for example, the tendency to be generous,  to show 
mercy, or to trust; openness to the future rather than a fixation with the past; the ability 
to accept reality as it is, compassion for human weakness) or because it produces 
conditions which themselves are beneficial (restored relationships, psychological well-
being, social harmony).  However, the increased specificity of the characteristics that 
make forgiveness good can then become criteria for its approval: 
 'It is good to forgive if...'  Since the features that the goodness of forgiveness 
consists in - the character traits it is a manifestation of, the objective benefits it may 
lead to - do not infallibly accompany the practice, one is led to conclude that 
forgiveness is more ambiguous than previously thought, its goodness dependant on 
certain conditions.  Here it is not that there is anything good about forgiveness as such, 
more that it is an outworking of other virtues or duties, or else a necessary route to 
certain states of affairs.  But there is nothing good about the forgiveness that the victim 
of domestic abuse offers repeatedly to their violent partner; nor in the forgiveness 
offered to a priest found to have abused children in his care by a bishop eager to avoid 
scandal.  But this position has a correlate: 
 'Forgiveness is bad if...'  Since the appeal to forgive can be made for bad reasons, by 
people displaying dishonesty, self-interest or disinterest, one admits that 'forgiveness' 
itself may on occasions actually be a bad thing, something to be avoided.  Forgiveness, 
in other words, is a practice that needs to be regulated or guided by a more substantial 
ethic; it does not on its own tell us what to strive or hope for, and it is not enough 
simply to say 'forgive'.  One could only forgive well if one had learned, or was learning, 
to live well, which may include the development of other habits like discernment, 
judgement, moral protest, etc.  However, there is something slightly counter-intuitive 
about this conclusion, and one might be led to conclude that the 'bad' forgiveness 
wrongly recommended to the victim of domestic violence or offered to the abusive 
priest is not really forgiveness at all.  In this case, one might prefer to say: 
 'Forgiveness is only forgiveness if...'   The concept is now more tightly regulated so 
that there are a set of criteria with which to judge between authentic and inauthentic 
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forms of forgiveness. For example: one does not really forgive if there has not first been 
a clear recognition that an offence has been committed, or if there are injustices still 
awaiting intervention.  However, this formulation could equally be expressed 
differently: 
 'Forgiveness is only forgiveness if it is good.'  But this begs the question with which 
the whole process began: how is forgiveness good? 
 To claim that investigation into forgiveness will be inescapably circular is hardly 
original.  There will be an element of reflexive circularity involved in any ethical 
reflection, since we are only able to critically interrogate our understanding of certain 
concepts through reliance on assumptions which are not at that moment themselves 
subject to interrogation (for example, in order to concern ourselves with whether 
forgiveness is psychologically beneficial we assume certain things about psychological 
well-being).  However, forgiveness does seem to occupy this position in a particularly 
distinctive way, because forgiveness necessarily concerns imperfection, moral failure, 
the difference between ideals and life.  It seems necessarily to involve some kind of 
change in our orientation to judgement.  As a result the question of how forgiveness 
itself submits to judgement is far from straightforward.  As already suggested, my 
argument will be that forgiveness is best understood as a certain kind of giving up of 
judgement, or in Pauline language, that it is to 'die to' judgement. But at the same time, 
this giving up is not itself a judgement - forgiveness is not a condemnation of the 
judgement it responds to - and this lack of resolution is part of what constitutes the 
suffering of forgiveness. To forgive is not to exchange a moral scheme that condemns 
for another that shows mercy, rather it is a change in one's relationship to moral 
schemes.  This is what the ambiguity of the gospel sayings, and the ambiguity brought 
out and intensified by philosophical discussion, suggests. This structure in a sense 
implies what might be called a sacrificial logic, one that is very difficult to describe. 
What I hope to do in what follows is to provide a number of hints that gesture towards 
describing this logic through an examination of the inner tension in a number of 
treatments of forgiveness. 
 
 
The immorality of forgiveness 
 
Like God, forgiveness is never without its doubters, or ev
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of theodicy arises because the reality of evil makes it difficult to believe in the 
goodness, power and existence of God at the same time, and even more difficult to 
rationally justify such belief, so we might say that the task of exploring forgiveness 
arises and proceeds in a similar way.  It is not obvious that forgiveness is meaningful, 
and if it is, that it is good.  Is not forgiveness simply a retrospective capitulation to evil, 
or a weary indifference, the absence of vigorous moral judgement?  Or might it be the 
case that forgiveness is an incoherent notion, a cloud of insubstantial mystification 
created by a trick of language, its meaning not much more than the residue of bad 
linguistic habits, much like the word 'God'?  If one asks 'what do I do when I forgive?' 
the answers tend to be rather long, tortuous, and evasive, like those given by nervous 
theologians, and in any case, few of the respondents agree with each other.  Just as 
theodicy has the rather difficult task of describing and justifying its object at the same 
time, so it seems that intellectual reflection upon forgiveness always contains an 
element of defence, or justification, so that whenever one asks 'what is forgiveness?' 
one is also asking 'what would forgiveness have to be, in order to be good?' or 'what 
would forgiveness have to be, in order to be meaningful?' 
 Although not explicitly intended as a discussion of forgiveness, Jean Amery's essay 
on resentment provides one of the most thought-provoking means of approach to the 
subject, because it articulates so forcefully a perspective from which forgiveness 
appears vacuous and immoral, and because in the process it makes some profound 
suggestions about the meaning of resentment, which  will become more important as 
the discussion unfolds.  A member of the Belgian resistance during the second world 
war, Amery was arrested in 1943 and tortured by the Gestapo before being sent to 
Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and finally Bergen-Belson, from which he was liberated in 
1945.  Writing two decades later, he addresses the German nation, exploring and 
defending his continued (and growing) resentment towards a nation too eager to move 
on.  He notes that in the years following liberation, survivors like himself did not 
necessarily feel resentful, due to the sense of relief and 'resurrection' that accompanied 
the liberation, as well as the sense of being united with the rest of Europe in 
condemnation of the Nazis: 
For quite some time there lasted what was for me a totally unprecedented 
social and moral status, and it elated me to the extreme: being what I was 
- a surviving Resistance fighter, Jew, victim of persecution by a 
universally hated regime - there was mutual understanding between me 
and the rest of the world.  ...  There was much talk of the collective guilt 
23 
 
of the Germans.  It would be an outright distortion of the truth if I did not 
confess that this was fine with me.  ... For the first time in my life I was in 
tune with the public opinion that surrounded me.1 
 
 However, in the years that followed, this sense of being in tune began to dissolve, as 
talk of remorse became less and less common, and as Amery began to sense a certain 
wariness of survivors like himself, and their preoccupation with the past.2  Amery 
describes his sense of gradually becoming a minority again, at odds with public 
opinion, which demanded of him a peace of mind that was unthinkable: 
The Germans no longer had any hard feelings toward the resistance 
fighters and the Jews.  How could these still demand atonement?  Jewish 
born men of the same stamp as Gabriel Marcel showed themselves most 
eager to reassure their German contemporaries and fellow human beings.  
Only totally obstinate, morally condemnable hate, already censured by 
history, they said, clings to a past that was clearly nothing other than an 
operational mishap of German history and in which the broad masses of 
the German people had no part. 
 But to my own distress, I belonged to that disapproving minority with 
its hard feelings.  Stubbornly, I held against Germany its twelve years 
under Hitler.  I bore this grudge into the industrial paradise of the new 
Europe and into the majestic halls of the West.3 
 
 The account of resentment that follows is as startling as it is clear.  Amery notes that 
the 'moral truth' of the crimes can only come from the victim.  Evil is not felt in the 
heart of the criminal, as Simone Weil also notes, it is felt in the suffering of the 
innocent.4  A starving inmate does not work very fast, and when they do not work very 
fast, they are beaten; the objective events are obvious, but the moral truth of the blows 
only 'roar in the skull' of the one beaten.  Neither can the social body adequately register 
the damage done to the survivors, since it is concerned with them only insofar as it is 
concerned to ensure that such things do not happen again.  In a chorus of peace it 
proposes to look forward, together, but neglects this ongoing division, the fact that the 
                                                             
1Jean Amery, 'Resentments' in At the mind's limits: contemplations by a survivor on Auschwitz and its 
realities, trans. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1980), pp. 64-5. 
2Amery, 'Resentments', p. 66. 
3Amery, 'Resentments', p. 67. 
4Amery, 'Resentments', p. 70.  See also Simone Weil, Waiting on God, tr. Emma Crawford (London: 
Harper Collins, 1977), p. 65.  Amery is also close to Weil in his description of the reduction of the 
inmate to a tool, which echoes Weil's description of the slave as an extension of the body of the slave-
master. 
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survivor still lives in isolation, with a consciousness of the world that is  permanently 
altered.5  Testimonies from survivors of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 resonate with 
Amery's description of this moral isolation.  In the first volume of Jean Hatzfeld's 
extraordinary collection of interviews with both survivors and perpetrators of the 
genocide, Into the quick of life, one of the recurrent themes is mystification, and a 
related isolation.6  This sense of separation means that, for Amery, the demand of 
resentment is deeper than its moral critics (for whom resentment is a primitive lust for 
revenge) or the pragmatic critics (for whom it is a paralysing preoccupation with the 
past) suppose. The dissatisfaction of the 'man of resentment' demands not simply that 
history be written properly, so that all the victims become visible and all the criminals 
named, nor does it simply cry a resolute 'never again!'.  It is not a matter of a desire for 
a punishment that would return the evil given back to the criminal, or an atonement that 
would attempt to 'make up' for what was lost.  Rather, it is a demand that the truth that 
'roars in the skulls' of the survivors be shared: 
                                                             
5Amery, 'Resentments', p. 69.  See also his essay on the experience of torture in the same volume, pp. 
21-40. 
6Jean Hatzfeld, Into the quick of life: the Rwandan genocide: the survivors speak, tr. Gerry Feehily 
(London: Serpant's Tail, 2008).  Many of the interviewees express sentiments along these lines, but the 
following serve as good examples.  Janvier Munyaneza: 
 'If I try to come up with an answer for these massacres, when I try to know why we had to be hacked, 
my mind comes in for a rough ride; and I am no longer sure of anything around me. I will never be able 
to grasp our Hutu neighbour's way of thinking.' (p. 38) 
Jean-Baptiste Manyankore: 
 'What happened in Nyamata, in the churches, in the marshes in the hills, are the supernatural doings 
of ordinary people. ...  These learned people were calm, and they rolled up their sleeves to get a firm 
grip on a machete.  So for people like me who have taught the Humanities their life long, criminals such 
as these are a terrible mystery.'  (p. 50) 
Innocent Rwililiza notes that there is even an embarrassment attached to speaking of the genocide, 
and a fear of the resentment of the survivors towards continued protest and the search for explanation: 
 'I see today that there is still embarrassment in talking of the survivors, even amongst Rwandans, 
even amongst Tutsis.  I think that everyone wishes, in certain ways, that the survivors would move 
aside from genocide.  As if they wished to leave to other people, who had not directly run the risk of 
being cut by machete chops, the task of taking care of it.  As if we were now in the way. ...  Foreigners 
and returned exiles say that the survivors are becoming bitter, withdrawn, almost aggressive.  But this is 
not true, we are simply a little dispirited because little by little we allowed ourselves to be isolated.  We 
survivors have become more foreign, in this our own land we never left, than all the foreigners and 
expatriates who look on us with worried eyes.' (pp. 79-83) 
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But if I have searched my mind properly, it is not a matter of revenge, nor 
one of atonement.  The experience of persecution was, at the very bottom, 
that of an extreme loneliness.  At stake for me is the release from the 
abandonment that has persisted from that time until today.  When SS-man 
Wajs stood before the firing squad, he experienced the moral truth of his 
crimes.  At that moment, he was with me ± and I was no longer alone with 
the shovel handle.  I would like to believe that at the instant of his 
execution he wanted exactly as much as I to turn back time, to undo what 
had been done.7 
 
 Resentment, on Amery's account, is a demand that victim, perpetrator and society be 
united in a hatred of evil, and join in an impossible desire to undo what should not have 
been done.  Amery implies his own account of the logic of punishment here: 
punishment somehow unifies criminal and victim, it heals the fracture between them - 
the incommensurability of their experiences - by allowing the criminal insight into the 
truth he produced in another but remained outside of himself.8  From this perspective, it 
is as though only the criminal can free the victim from their crippling attachment to the 
past, through being united with them in remorse (although Amery displays what 
Thomas Brudholm calls a 'cautious hope' here: he 'would like to believe' that at the 
moment of execution the SS officer is thinking of victims suffering, rather than his own, 
but one might easily object that this is unlikely).9  Resentment, then, acquires a further 
moral dimension: as well as being an expression of protest, in a strange way it is also 
other-focused, as a desire for communion with one's oppressor, to be together with them 
in the truth.  However, the kind of solidarity that punishment produces is subtly but 
crucially different from most commonly accepted expressions of the link between 
resentment and retribution.  For example, for Adam Smith the punishment that 
resentment envisages differs from the desire for private revenge in that the imposition 
of pain is not an end in itself: 
the object, on the contrary, which resentment is chiefly intent upon, is not 
so much to make our enemy feel pain in his turn, as to make him 
conscious that he feels it upon account of his past conduct, to make him 
repent of that conduct, and to make him sensible, that the person whom 
                                                             
7Amery, 'Resentments', p. 70. 
8Once again, Amery is very close to Weil here, see First and last notebooks, tr. Richard Rees 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 116 and 152. 
9See Thomas Brudholm, Resentment's virtue: Jean Amery and the refusal to forgive (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press 2008), pp. 65 - 80 for a discussion of this essay and its context. 
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he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner.10 
 
 The resentful person desires that the wrongdoer be brought back into line with 
justice, so that the claims of justice are reaffirmed, and the pain involved is a way for 
the otherwise mute violation of justice to 'speak'.  Amery also wants the imposition of 
punishment to forge a link between suffering (in this case, the prospect of death) and 
the past, but not so that the wrongdoer re-enter the moral sphere, so that moral order is 
restored, but so that the wrongdoer step out of a complacent sense of order so as to enter 
into the desolate experience of the survivor, who has been, and remains, abandoned by 
justice.  In other words, although Amery writes in the name of morality, the educative 
punishment he envisages is more a symbolic making-wrong than it is a symbolic 
making-right, it is to awaken to a reality that is not just, which is the reality the survivor 
already lives in. 
 As a result, talk of forgiveness - in this context, at least - remains immoral, a failure 
to oppose reality in the way that morality demands, and in a sense, a failure to fully 
envisage what reconciliation really means: 
In two decades of contemplating what happened to me, I believe to have 
recognised that a forgiving and forgetting induced by social pressure is 
immoral.  Whoever cheaply and lazily forgives, subjugates himself to the 
social and biological time-VHQVHZKLFKLVDOVRFDOOHGWKH³QDWXUDO´RQH
Man has the right to declare himself to be in disagreement with every 
natural occurrence, including the biological healing that time brings 
about.  What happened, happened.  This sentence is just as true as it is 
hostile to morals and intellect.  The moral power to resist contains the 
protest, the revolt against reality, which is rational only as long as it is 
moral.  The moral person demands annulment of time ± in the particular 
case under question, by nailing the criminal to his deed.  Thereby, and 
through a moral turning back of the clock, the latter can join his victim as 
a fellow human being.11 
 
 Amery is well aware that what he is proposing is impossible, that time keeps going, 
and that the necessities of communal life demand that attention be directed to tomorrow 
and the next day, not  past injustices and humiliations however unresolved or unspoken 
they might remain.  What resolution is possible, then?  Amery suggests that resentment 
should be stubbornly maintained on  one side, and put up with on the other, until such a 
time as the overpowered and those that overpowered them are unified in the desire that 
                                                             
10Adam Smith, The theory of moral sentiments, II. iii. I. 5 
11Amery, 'Resentments', p. 72. 
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time be turned back, that the past not have happened.  If the perpetrator and survivor 
were ever unified in this impossible longing, and in an expression of this demand, then 
somehow, it would be as if it were already fulfilled in the asking.12  Presumably, at this 
point, forgiveness would be acceptable (or perhaps irrelevant? or already 
accomplished?).  Forgiveness, if it is meaningful at all, would be a secondary response, 
or a further unfolding of the moment of unity in condemnation ±  possible as a result of 
the lack of tension that results.  But the scenario Amery presents as the aim of 
resentment is deliberately eschatological, so that resentment is an inner disposition that 
holds out for something that cannot appear in time.  Which also means that it is an 
ongoing, never-completed task, and that those whose task it is should not be resented.  
This perspective does not so much pronounce a verdict upon forgiveness, as express 
some fairly severe objections to the possibility of forgiveness being publicly affirmed, 
and the prospect of resentment being subject to social pressure as a result.13  To resent 
those carrying the kind of moral  (and quasi-eschatological) resentment that Amery 
defends for their lack of forgiveness is to move even further away from the possibility 
of forming a shared understanding concerning the past, and to confirm them in their 
existential loneliness. 
 Of course, Amery's essay addressed an extreme situation, which may make it 
difficult to apply these insights to other contexts.  Indeed, there are advocates of 
forgiveness who would question whether forgiveness is the kind of thing that can 
meaningfully apply to crimes committed by regimes.  Who would forgive? who would 
be forgiven? who can be held responsible? - each of these questions is so complex that 
perhaps one is better avoiding the term altogether for the sake of clarity.14  There is 
undoubtedly much that is ambiguous and provocative in Amery's perspective, and some 
of the issues raised will be returned to indirectly.  However, the point for now is to note 
                                                             
12Amery, 'Resentments', p. 78. 
13See Thomas Brudholm, ''Revisiting resentments: Jean Amery and the dark side of forgiveness and 
reconciliation', Journal of human rights, vol. 5: 1, pp. 18, 22 ± 23. 
14Although as Amery notes, his suffering felt as though it was imposed by 'Germany', rather than any 
individual.  One can certainly resent a corporate entity, on Amery's account, and if forgiveness is 
defined as the giving up, or letting go of, resentment, then presumably one could also 'forgive' a 
corporate entity.  On this question, see Charles Griswold, Forgiveness: a philosophical exploration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 134-168 and Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and 
revenge (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 78-99. 
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that his argument is not simply that resentment is understandable or defensible given the 
severity of the past, but that in this context resentment is an expression of a moral 
vigour that is lacking in those who call for forgiveness.  And the moral opposition to 
forgiveness produces an interesting dynamic, which in part is the focus of this 
discussion.  On what basis would forgiveness be justified against the accusation of 
moral weakness?  Put differently: what, or who, does forgiveness answer to? 
Presumably, if one is to defend forgiveness, then one will have to do this on the basis of 
the same norms, rules or ideals that cause us to judge some actions as intolerable, and 
therefore in need of forgiveness.  Can the same perspective impel us to judge and allow 
us to forgive or be forgiven?  Or put differently, can we contemplate the justice of 
resentment and the good of forgiveness at the same time? 
 
 
Charles Griswold: resentment and the conditions of forgiveness 
 
Charles Griswold¶V recent book, Forgiveness: a philosophical exploration, is perhaps 
the most thorough direct philosophical treatment of the topic to date. In what follows I 
would like to highlight some of the main contours of Griswold's account in reference to 
the question of how forgiveness is described and justified at the same time, and the way 
in which these tasks impact upon each other.  In Griswold's account, the justice of 
resentment does not conflict with the goodness of forgiveness, so that if one gets 
resentment right, one will find oneself able to forgive (when it is appropriate to do so), 
and if one gets forgiveness right one will not be subject to judgements such as Amery's.  
In other words, the justice of resentment and the goodness of forgiveness can  appear 
together and be mutually illuminating.  My argument will be that despite the many 
merits of Griswold's account,  something important is lost in the attempt to take the 
tension out of forgiveness.  This is apparent in one of the outcomes of Griswold's 
account: forgiveness is described as a finely balanced exercise of virtue, a response to 
wrongdoing that requires that one know both how to condemn where condemnation is 
warranted and judge leniently when lenient judgement is appropriate, as well as how to 
allows one's emotions to be subject to rational guidance.  But this means that one has to 
be fairly virtuous in order to practice forgiveness  in a way that is authentically 
forgiving: as a practice, forgiveness is for the righteous, not for sinners. 
 Before exploring in more detail why this is, it is interesting to note that Griswold 
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specifically states that the process of forming his notion of forgiveness was shaped by 
consideration of what would be responsible to recommend.  In discussing Bishop 
%XWOHU¶VDQDO\VLVRIIRUJLYHQHVVDVµWKHIRUVZHDULQJRIUHVHQWPHQW¶*ULVZROGH[DPLQHV
the question of whether  we  should think of forgiveness as an instantaneous giving up 
of resentment, or as a commitment to give up resentment that may take time to fully 
outwork.15  *ULVZROGDUJXHVIRUWKHODWWHUZKHQVRPHRQHVD\Vµ,IRUJLYH\RX¶WKH\
should not be understood to be claiming the ability to make their resentment disappear 
in an instant, but rather expressing an intention to allow and encourage their resentment 
to dimLQLVKDQGXOWLPDWHO\WRGLVDSSHDUDOWRJHWKHUµ)RUJLYHQHVV¶WKHUHIRUHUHIHUVERWK
to a process and to an end-state; it is an act with a teleology, defined by its progress 
WRZDUGVDJRDOQRWVLPSO\E\DSHUVRQV¶FRJQLWLYHRUHPRWLRQDOVWDWHDWRQHPRPHQt in 
time.  The merit of this description is that it remains true to some of our intuitive 
suppositions concerning forgiveness, which is important in preserving the credibility of 
DUDWLRQDODFFRXQWRIIRUJLYHQHVV,WSUHVHUYHVWKHLQWXLWLRQWKDWµIXOO\DFKLHYHG¶
forgiveness would let go of resentment altogether, whilst acknowledging these kinds of 
emotions do not respond immediately to the will - an insight that may only be brought 
out fully through the process of intellectual reflection.16  However, it is not only more 
faithful to reality to define forgiveness in this way, it is also the more prudent thing to 
                                                             
15
 See Griswold, Forgiveness, p38 ± 47. 
16
 See Griswold, Forgiveness, pp. 42 - 3.  For further comments about the relationship between 
intuitions concerning forgiveness and the consistency sought by rational reflection  see also 
'Forgiveness, secular and religious: a reply to my critics' in Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association, vol. 82, 2009, especially pp. 307 ± 308.  Here Griswold notes the difficulty 
of responding to criticisms that are based on supposedly 'intuitive' ideas concerning forgiveness.  
Responding to the objection that his account leaves behind the intuitive idea that forgiveness 'should' be 
unconditional, Griswold points out that any intellectual consideration of one's instinctive convictions 
changes them: 'considered convictions do not, and cannot, leave all convictions in place.'  If the 
objection is simply that his account revises certain supposedly instinctive beliefs, the objection would 
have to be applied to the religious conception espoused by those criticising him.  However, elsewhere, 
Griswold assumes that 'the tie between forgiveness and the moral anger one feels at being unjustly 
treated is unbreakable' (Forgiveness, p. 39); i.e. certain unconsidered convictions cannot be lost without 
completely losing track of the subject in hand.  This is why some conceptions of forgiveness are ruled 
out.  For example, this would rule out the use of the word 'forgive' in the suggestion made by Simone 
Weil: 'men owe us what we imagine they will give us. We must forgive them this debt.'  This 
'forgiveness' is a kind of elimination of resentment ahead of time, rather than any actual engagement 
with resentment. 
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teach: 
Still further, this approach recognizes that forgiveness may be a difficult 
achievement for a whole host of reasons having to do both with the wronged and 
the wrongdoer, while encouraging us to undertake the project with the assurance 
that it is not an all-or-nothing affair.  Forgiveness will require other virtues, such 
as self-command, understanding, and trust, exercised over time.17 
 
It is not only important for the theory to be right, it must also be sensitive, and 
responsible; it must be a good teacher, encouraging and assuring us. The theoretical 
account needs to acknowledge the existential difficulty faced by someone who actually 
has something to forgive, and present the task in a way that encourages them to embark 
on it.  This means acknowledging that it may not be easy (so that that the shock of it 
being difficult does not cause one to give up) without making it appear too difficult (so 
that one would never begin).  This concern for an account that can be justified - both 
theoretically in relation to retributive emotions, and practically in relation to the impact 
of the social pressure to forgive - continues through the rest of the book, and exerts a 
significant pressure on the shaping of the account, as will become clear. 
For Griswold, since the responses that go under the name 'forgiveness' differ so 
widely in substance and significance, the task is to define which characteristics make a 
particular response to wrong-doing authentically forgiving, rather than something else 
altogether.  As a result, it is meaningless to speak of an entirely unconditional 
forgiveness, since every account implicitly affirms that there are some responses that 
are not forgiveness, but may be called forgiveness.  The simplest way of describing 
forgiveness is as 'the letting go of resentment for moral reasons'.18  This description 
qualifies forgiveness in two ways.  Firstly, since resentment itself is explored very 
thoroughly, and defined clearly, it qualifies what kinds of emotion forgiveness can be 
thought to supersede or let go.  Forgiveness is not concerned simply with the giving up 
of hostility or anger in general, since these may be felt regardless of whether the person 
they are felt towards has actually done any wrong.  Rather, forgiveness is the letting go 
                                                             
17
 Ibid., p 43. 
18Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 40.  Compare with Jeffrey Murphy's nearly identical definition: 'A person 
who has forgiven has overcome these vindictive attitudes and has overcome them for a morally credible 
motive.' Getting even: forgiveness and its limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 13.  The 
contrast between 'overcoming' and 'letting go' is suggestive; for Griswold the active moment in 'letting 
go' is due to the lag between a change in rational judgement and one's affective state. 
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of an emotion that it is specifically concerned with judgement, and which, in its time 
and place, is both beneficial and justified.  Secondly, and more importantly, to forgive is 
to let go of resentment for particular reasons, and under particular circumstances - 'for 
moral reasons'.  One does not forgive if resentment is diminished or disappears for 
reasons that have little to do with one's judgement of a particular action; for example, if 
one simply ceases to regard someone as worthy of one's attention, resentful or 
otherwise, or if - out of concern for one's own well-being - one is able to alter one's 
emotional state through some kind of therapy,  or simply through distraction.  This 
second condition ties in with one of the main emphases of Griswold's book: that 
forgiveness is primarily concerned with a relation between two people, and it is this 
moral interdependence that exemplifies the scene of forgiveness: 'each party holds the 
other in its power, in this sense: the offender depends on the victim in order to be 
forgiven, and the victim depends on the offender in order to forgive.'19  These two 
conditions together mean that authentic forgiveness is the embodiment of a nuanced 
moral sensitivity which includes resentment and the letting-go of resentment: if one is 
resentful in the wrong way, one does not forgive; if one lets go of resentment in the 
wrong way, one does not forgive. 
Griswold explores resentment in great detail and with considerable insight, and his 
discussion is too in depth to be fully engaged with here.  However, the main contours 
are as follows.   Resentment is a cognitive, or quasi-cognitive state; that is '[i]t is . . . not 
MXVWD³UDZIHHO´but embodies a judgement about the fairness of an action or of an 
intention to do that action.'20  However, nor is it simply a result of cognitive judgement.  
It is also 'an affective, bodily state', and as a result, there can be considerable 'lag' 
between abandoning the judgements that give rise to resentment, and a change in one's 
affective state, and this, in turn is linked with the way in which effort may be involved 
in the 'letting go' of resentment (indeed, effort may be required even when it is not a 
question of forgiveness, as for example, if a long grievance is discovered to have been 
based upon faulty information).21  In other words, the affective state of resentment is 
closely related to rational judgement, without being straightforwardly subject to it.  
Griswold engages critically with Bishop Butler's sermons on resentment (which have 
                                                             
19Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 49; see also xvi. 
20Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 26. 
21Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 37. 
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become central to these kinds of discussions), taking the idea that resentment is an 
'inward witness to virtue' as the basic point.22  While anger may flare up and pass very 
quickly in response to being hurt in some way, and not include any particular desire for 
retribution, resentment is a longer term, settled and deliberate anger, and includes desire 
for punishment of some kind.23  In this respect, resentment is also a witness to the way 
in which the individual is dependent upon the community, in that it can be understood 
to include a desire for public vindication.  Wrongdoing of various kinds can be 
understood not simply in terms of the harm one suffers, but as the communication of a 
message about one's worth, and since one's worth is linked to one's sense of social 
presence, resentment and forgiveness are not simply concerned with a two-way 
relation.24  Although for Griswold forgiveness has a basically dyadic form, it 
nevertheless involves a 'morally tinged exchange with the community'.25  Resentment is 
not a perfectly clear concept, and a variety of emotional and cognitive states can be 
given this name.  However, Griswold assumes that it is possible to discern an authentic 
core: it is a reaction aroused by the perception of unwarranted harm, one that includes a 
judgement concerning fairness, that is aimed at the author of an action, that instinctively 
protests and looks for some kind of due punishment or revenge.26  Resentment is how a 
virtuous person feels and thinks when injured: to feel the right kind of anger for the 
right kinds of reason.  In other words, there is a 'proper' response to wrongdoing, even 
evil, and this response includes something called 'resentment'; a proper response to the 
improper. 
If resentment, when properly understood, and not subject to excess, is a moral 
response, why would there be a case for the letting go of it? Griswold's answer is 
simple: '[f]orgiveness does not attempt to get rid of warranted resentment.  Rather, it 
follows from the recognition that the resentment is no longer warranted.  And what 
                                                             
22Griswold, Forgiveness, pp. 19 - 37, especially p. 26. 
23Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 24. 
24The idea that the actions most strongly felt as wrong are those that communicated a 'message' about 
one's worth has proved quite useful for authors discussing these issues. See Jean Hampton and Jeffrey 
Murphy (eds.), Forgiveness and mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 24 - 25 and 
44 - 45. 
25Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 29. 
26Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 39. 
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would provide the warrant can be nothing other than the right reasons.'27  One would be 
letting go of resentment for the right reasons only if the following conditions had been 
fulfilled by the wrongdoer: condemnation of their own behaviour, acceptance of 
responsibility for it, the experience and expression of regret, commitment ± 
demonstrated through action if necessary ± to becoming a different sort of person, 
demonstration that they understand the damage they have done, and provision of an 
account of how it was they came to do whatever it was that they did.28  To learn how to 
forgive, then, one would have to learn how to discern the presence of these criteria, and 
of course, this is not easy, since contrition can be faked for the sake of convenience.29  
More than this, one would have to have the kind of disposition that is willing to give 
forgiveness where these are present, and withhold it where they are not.  Similarly, there 
are conditions that must be met if the victim can be understood to have forgiven.  The 
first three are concerned with how one engages with one's sense of hostility towards the 
wrongdoer: one must 'forswear' revenge, moderate resentment, and commit to giving up 
resentment altogether.  Fourthly, the injured party must be willing to revise their 
judgements concerning the wrongdoer, such that they are no longer defined simply by a 
particular act, nor assumed to be incapable of future change.  In this sense, to forgive 
implies a trust in the future, and a willingness to understand the whole person in a 
narrative framework.30  Fifthly, the injured one must modify their understanding of 
themselves in relation to the wrongdoer, so that they no longer presume a definitive 
moral superiority, and instead recognise their shared humanity.  Finally, just as remorse 
and repentance should be expressed in apology, so forgiveness should, ideally, be 
expressed or pronounced, not simply assumed, so that there is a 'symmetry in address'.31 
These conditions together make up 'paradigmatic forgiveness'; a case of fully 
realised forgiveness.  However, Griswold acknowledges that this description leaves him 
with the old metaphysical problem of how imperfect instances relate to the ideal form: 
since very often forgiveness does not conform to these conditions, how can these cases 
be said to be forgiveness at all?  For example, someone may be remorseful and 
repentant but still not show that they have understood the perspective of the one they 
                                                             
27Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 43. 
28Griswold, Forgiveness., pp. 49-50. 
29Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 59. 
30Griswold, Forgiveness, pp. 98-110. 
31Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 53-9. 
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have wronged, so that their remorse is focused more upon their own regret and 
discomfort, rather than the suffering they have imposed.  Or the injury was such that the 
victim still feels strong resentment when the memory of the event in question arises 
particularly strongly, despite a desire and commitment to let go of such feelings.  Do 
these limitations mean that we cannot apply the term, and if so, does this not mean that 
- ironically - the discourse on forgiveness has turned out to be rigidly perfectionistic in a 
way that seems absurd when dealing with a virtue necessarily concerned with 
imperfection?  This objection is dealt with as follows.  The quite detailed conditions 
laid out should be understood as 'forgiveness at its best'.  This ideal does not exclude 
instances that do not fully conform, but it does give a sense of what one is aiming for 
when one embarks upon forgiveness - what one should want forgiveness to be, or what 
it would be when fully achieved, a goal that animates and shapes the actual task.32  
Paradigmatic forgiveness is the telos of non-paradigmatic forgiveness.33  In addition to 
the conditions above, then, Griswold, gives conditions for each party that serve as a 
threshold for forgiveness - the level below which one is no longer talking about 
forgiveness at all.  These are the willingness on the part of the victim to lower their 
resentment and not seek revenge, and the willingness on the part of the offender to take 
minimal steps to qualify themselves for forgiveness, i.e. to show their opposition to 
their action in some way.34  Since the first of these is somewhat obvious, it is the second 
that is important; without some kind of movement towards repentance on the part of the 
wrongdoer, one is not forgiving if one puts aside resentment arising from the act in 
question.  Forgiveness cannot be 'unconditional' in this sense; without a change of heart 
- however incomplete - as a prior condition, forgiveness cannot be distinguished from 
morally suspect responses - resignation, condonation, excuse, justification, etc.; it is 
simply some kind of combination of these.  In fact, to 'forgive' without any reference to 
a change of heart on the part of the wrongdoer is to neglect their potential, to fail 'to 
hold him or her to his or her best self.'35  Forgiveness has to pass through judgement, 
and since it is a fundamentally interpersonal affair, both parties must pass through. 
 
                                                             
32See the further clarification in 'Reply to my critics', p. 305 on this point. 
33Griswold, Forgiveness, pp. 113-7. 
34Griswold also adds a third condition: that the injury be 'humanly forgivable', but I will not discuss 
this here, since the issues it raises take us too far from the argument.  See p. 110 and pp. 114-5. 
35
'A reply to my critics', p. 306. 
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Forgiveness as virtue 
 
To examine some of the specific claims Griswold's approach makes I would like to 
consider in more depth the way in which forgiveness may be an expression of virtue.  
For Griswold, forgiveness is not simply a discrete component of moral life, but is rather 
the expression in particular circumstances of  different but related values.  Forgiveness 
at its best is a virtue that 'both expresses and promotes the ethical excellence of its 
possessor';36 and it is underpinned by the ideals of 'responsibility, respect, self-
governance, truth, mutual accountability, friendship, and growth'.37  Insofar as 
forgiveness involves an engagement with both cognitive and affective aspects of 
resentment, it involves learning how to judge, how to feel the importance of certain 
values, so that one's defence of oneself is not just an end in itself but also a way of 
continuing to affirm the value and dignity of all.  To forgive is to come to understand 
that resentment has an important, but limited, role to play, and to let it go in due course.  
However, Griswold also notes that the virtue of forgiveness is linked in some way with 
acceptance; it is 'a model virtue for the project of reconciliation with imperfection'.38  
Forgiveness, then, combines both active and passive modes of being in the world; it is 
part of a life that defends, strives, and shapes; and part of a life that bends, 
accommodates and accepts. 
 However, the question remains of whether the internal tension that this results in 
means that the virtue of forgiveness is impossible to simply specify in the way that 
Griswold would like.  In order to assess the value of forgiveness one already has to 
know where to 'draw the line' between those imperfections with which one might justly 
reconcile oneself, and the violations and shortcomings which should only be protested 
and changed.  In other words, one has to already know what to accept and what to 
reject.  Griswold proposes in Aristotelian fashion that the virtue of forgiveness lies on a 
narrow band of a spectrum, which ranges from an excess of servility to an excess of 
                                                             
36Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 70.  Early on in the book, Griswold defines virtue in terms of 
responsiveness: '[v]irtues express praiseworthy or excellent ways of being responsive to the world, 
given the sorts of creatures we are.' (p. 19) 
37Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 213. 
38Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 110. 
36 
 
anger or resentment.  'The forgiving person, then, will experience anger in the right 
way, at the right time, and toward the right object.'39  However one is harmed, one is not 
in a position to forgive if one's anger is always excessive, concerned with the wrong 
things, for the wrong reasons, and of disproportionate duration.  He goes on to argue 
that something similar is true of the characteristics required to request and receive 
forgiveness: 
A person who incessantly and compulsively expressed contrition, at times 
with cause and at times not, would very probably not be a credible 
candidate for forgiveness.  She would exhibit the excess of the requisite 
virtue.  And one who regularly failed to show appropriate contrition 
would express a defect of the requisite virtue.40 
 
 To forgive, and to be forgiven, one needs to already possess the right amounts of the 
requisite virtues; that is, forgiveness is a secondary moral exercise, only really 
appropriate for the well practised.  As a result, one learns to forgive by first learning 
how to judge, which in turn means that judgement must - if there is to be any 
forgiveness - already include this possibility.  And this is in fact what Griswold 
assumes: judgement in its ideal form contains the possibility of forgiveness for certain 
situations.  Alongside this assumption is another: that there is no basic conflict between 
the seemingly different dispositions - moral rigour versus acceptance; vigilance versus 
trust - that are necessary to forgive.  That is, that cultivation of the virtues that make up 
'forgivingness' may  not be easy, but if it is difficult, it is difficult in a fairly 
straightforward way.  Although, as Gregory Jones notes, an important difference 
between secular philosophical and theological accounts of forgiveness is found in the 
way that theologically forgiveness is meaningful as part of a much broader narrative of 
transformation, involving concrete communal practices through which to 'unlearn' sin, 
as well as a Trinitarian conception of God,41 here the most important difference seems 
                                                             
39Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 18. 
40Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 18. 
41See L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness ( Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1995), especially pp. 207 - 225.  In some respects, Griswold's account is less susceptible to the kind of 
critique that Jones offers of secular, philosophical treatments of forgiveness, in that Griswold is quite 
wary of treating the topic in terms of isolated moral scenarios, and instead keen to address the question 
of the relation between forgiveness and ongoing patterns of judgement, cultivation of moral sense, etc.  
Jones argues that attention given to forgiveness in modernity makes three mistakes: firstly, the 
assumption that a philosophical account can be offered without reference to theological assumptions; 
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to centre on the way that in the gospels, the command to forgive goes along with the 
sense that the gospel message is not for the righteous, but for sinners.  Forgiveness is 
one of the commands that most centrally characterises life in the kingdom of God, and 
the command is a gift for those who are needy, and hungry for justice rather than full of 
it already.  Forgiveness is the kind of command that sinful people can obey, rather than 
an exercise of morally confident judgement.  In fact, this is one of the paradoxes of the 
Christian understanding of forgiveness: forgiveness is not just for sinners to receive, but 
for sinners to give, whilst at the same time it is claimed that to forgive the unworthy is 
to become perfect as the Father is perfect.  For Griswold, in contrast, forgiveness is 
defined so that it is only accessible to those who are already able to judge well; both as 
received and as given.  This, I suggest, is a more significant divergence than the 
question of religious metaphysic, context, or narrative, however important these are. 
 The difficulties of the approach that Griswold takes in this regard can be seen more 
clearly in Tara Smith's article 'Tolerance and forgiveness: virtues or vices', which 
presses some of the same assumptions further and gives a significantly less appealing 
description of forgiveness as a result.  Smith explores the relationship between 
judgement, tolerance and forgiveness, asking if the latter two can really be considered 
to be complementary with the former.  The tension is heightened because of the way 
that justice is understood: justice is most basically a form of observation, one that 
'requires scrupulously objective evaluation and treatment of others'.42  Justice involves 
observation, evaluation and appropriate response, whereas tolerance appears to involve 
a tension between one's opinions concerning another person's conduct and one's 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
secondly, that where such accounts have referred to the theological roots of the concept, they assume a 
theistic, rather than Trinitarian perspective; thirdly, the Kantian or Utilitarian roots of post-
Enlightenment moral philosophy tends to mean that the act of forgiveness is focused upon, rather than 
the character traits, outlook or disposition that such acts express.  With regard to the first point, rather 
than simply assume its coherence apart from theological assumptions, Griswold explicitly argues that 
the concept makes sense in secular terms, being fundamentally dyadic in structure, and acknowledges 
that this gives rise to a less transformational notion than theology presumes.  With regard to the third 
point, Griswold agrees, and himself takes an Aristotelian approach (as opposed to Jones' Thomist-
Aristotelianism), acknowledging that the concept is only meaningful in relation to more fundamental 
assumptions concerning human flourishing and the habits necessary to cultivate justice.  See Jones pp. 
210-19 for a summary and critique of a number of  important contributions to the discussion. 
42Tara Smith, 'Tolerance and forgiveness: virtues or vices?' in Journal of applied philosophy, vol. 14, 
no. 1, 1997, p. 33. 
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response to them. As a result, tolerance can only be held as valuable when its 
teleological necessity can be demonstrated; i.e. if there are situations in which 
refraining from active censure actually promotes justice in the long run (for example, in 
the way a parent may tolerate behaviour they know to be damaging in their teenage son 
or daughter, in the hope that this will allow to discover for themselves what is 
beneficial, and ensure they learn the lesson more deeply as a result).  Tolerance does not 
have any particular value in itself, but when properly understood, 'is to be judiciously 
employed on occasion for the purpose of best serving morality's telos.'43  Noting - quite 
rightly - the way in which the vague notion that there is something good about 'being 
tolerant' is often simply a way of avoiding 'the strain of moral confrontation', Smith 
goes on to say that the dangerously seductive thing about the notion of tolerance is the 
way in which it appears to offer a cost-free morality: the 'self-satisfaction from having 
moral positions' and 'the tolerance-blessed convenience of not having to live by them'.44  
Although tolerance might sometimes be commended as a corrective to the fact that 
people often come to hasty judgements about others based on instinctive suspicion of 
differences, for Smith this simply indicates that judgement necessarily involves 
evaluating carefully and dispassionately: the solution is better judgement, not more 
tolerance. 
 In the light of this interrogation, forgiveness is given a very restricted meaning: 
'forgiveness is a kind of moral estimate.  It is the conclusion that one should understand 
and respond to another person's breach less harshly than would normally be 
appropriate.'  To forgive is to dispassionately decide to make a justified exception, this 
decision 'rests on one's interpretation of what the breach reveals about the agent'; the  
judgement that in this particular case genuinely immoral conduct does not reveal 'a 
grave moral defect or an irremediably bad character.'45  When one forgives, one remains 
in the position of judge that morality, on this reading, demands that one adopt.  The 
'aura of flexibility' that surrounds forgiveness is a result of the fact that the 
complications of particular cases require insightful interpretation rather than 
straightforward application of a rule.  Forgiveness involves a sophisticated capacity to 
evaluate motive, character, context, etc., so that in a sense, forgiveness represents a 
                                                             
43Smith, 'Tolerance and forgiveness', p. 35. 
44Smith, 'Tolerance and forgiveness', p. 36. 
45Smith, 'Tolerance and forgiveness', p. 37. 
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more advanced form of judgement than that found in 'more routine occasions of 
evaluating others'.46  It is this sophistication that gives the concept the unfortunate 
appearance of 'flexibility'; to the untrained eye, it appears that one is bending the rules, 
when really one is applying the rules with increased insight into this particular situation.  
Perhaps the least appealing aspect of this description of forgiveness is the contradiction 
at the heart of the conception of justice: on the one hand, justice involves an eye for 
detail, complexity, particularity, rather than a mechanical application of certain rules; on 
the other hand, the upshot of all this nuanced evaluation is a straightforward, either/or 
verdict.  The wrongs we do are either evidence of a bad character, in which case, we 
cannot be forgiven; or they are out of character, in which case, we should be forgiven.  
In other words, forgiveness is defined entirely in reference to a single moment of 
verdict-pronouncement: saying yes or no.  The cultivation of a sophisticated ability to 
evaluate complex situations involving complex actors is necessary so that one can come 
to perfectly simple verdicts. 
 It is obvious that Smith's interpretation of forgiveness is a long way from the 
Christian origins of the concept: there is no sense that forgiveness involves any kind of 
compassion for sinners (an idea expressed most forcefully in the parable of the prodigal 
son, or through the prophet Hosea), that human judgement might be in dire need of 
deep challenge or correction, or of the idea that forgiveness has the form of gift, as a 
manifestation of love.  Given that these aspects are intentionally eradicated from the 
account, the more interesting contrast is with Griswold's similarly secular account, and 
what it is that stops Griswold's account exhibiting the same degree of sterile moralism.  
Perhaps most significant is Smith's assertion that there is no reason for forgiveness to be 
prescribed or affirmed in its own right.  Since judgement, if done carefully and well, 
will, under certain conditions direct a person to forgive, there is no place for an 
affirmation of forgiveness itself as something to aspire to; if anything, such an 
affirmation is only likely to nourish the tendencies towards the unvirtuous forms of 
tolerance already mentioned.  For Griswold, however, there is a sense in which 
forgiveness should be actively affirmed, and a sense that it occupies its own unique 
place in our conceptual landscape.  Given the dangers associated with forgiveness, 
especially the risk of forgiveness being 'hijacked' by tolerance, moral weakness, 
injustice, etc., why should it be affirmed?  What do we gain by speaking of forgiveness 
                                                             
46Smith, Tolerance and forgiveness', p. 39. 
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that we could not gain simply through speaking of justice, accuracy and appropriate 
response?  Although not clearly spelt out, the sense is that forgiveness expresses a level 
of compassion towards the frailty of 'embodied, affective, and vulnerable creatures', a 
compassion that goes along with our reconciliation with imperfection.47  The emphasis 
throughout the book on the dangers of perfectionistic modes of ethics, which tend to 
give rise to an aspiration to leave the realm of human interaction and openness (the 
'circle of sympathy'), suggests that for Griswold, forgiveness is a part of our acceptance 
of our condition - an acceptance not always manifest in the formation and 
communication of ideals.  Whereas Smith seems to envisage a world in which the most 
significant and serious aspect of human existence is moral evaluation (primarily of 
others, rather than oneself) and basically instrumental efforts to make what progress we 
can towards the ideals we are committed to, Griswold is more aware of the role of 
forgiveness in supporting aspects of human existence that exceed the moral horizon: 
friendships and intimate family relationships; the actual living of life, rather than any 
particular goal or duty. 
 Although forgiveness is defended and justified through very careful definition, it is 
actively commended for reasons that have little to do with this definition: the 
continuing presence of resentment may damage one's capacity for love, compassion and 
sympathy for others, and to forgive is to exhibit the belief that a future of renewal and 
growth is possible.48  In fact, the link between forgiveness and the possibility for 
transformation is an aspect that Griswold states he wishes was brought out more 
strongly in the book.49  But the tone of the book, on the whole, is much more focused 
on the care with which the concept must be handled, the way that abuses must be 
foreseen and headed off, the sense that forgiveness needs to be very well hemmed in, if 
it is to be of any use.  So, the concern that shapes the account offered is for security: 
how can we understand forgiveness so that the practice does not become corrupt, 
misleading or inhuman?  But the appeal of forgiveness, the thing that means we need 
forgiveness, not simply fairness, or understanding, is something to do with the way that 
it embodies trust and vulnerability.  What Griswold does not explore in any depth, 
though, is the way there may be conflict between the two, and whether there may be a 
                                                             
47Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 19. 
48Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 70. 
49See Griswold, 'Forgiveness, secular and religious: a reply to my critics' in Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 82, p. 306. 
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more basic difficulty in reconciling - in life - the capacity for love, compassion and 
sympathy with an unyielding vigilance towards the ways that selfishness and stupidity, 
cruelty and compromise damage our lives.  Further to this, the question is whether the 
difficulties involved in making sense of forgiveness may have something to do with 
these kinds of conflict; that is, what kinds of concerns motivate our understanding of 
the subject, and how do these concerns shape our understanding? 
 If part of the human goodness of forgiveness is something to do with trust, if it 
means to step towards a future that is not certain -  hoped for rather than guaranteed - 
how does this willingness affect our understanding and pursuit of justice?  Does our 
willingness to trust affect our concern for justice?  In a sense Griswold's account is 
designed to demonstrate more fully that forgiveness does not have to involve an 
exposure to exploitation, or an ambiguous leaving hold of the concern for justice.  The 
conditions specify the way in which forgiveness can be prudent, and suggest that where 
forgiveness is not prudent, it is something else.  Forgiveness is the giving up of 
resentment that is no longer warranted; the 'no longer' implies that the job that 
resentment is 'designed' to do has been done; one forgives only when it is safe to do so.  
The detailed nature of these conditions prevent forgiveness from ever appearing as risk, 
and if it does not appear as risk, in what way could it be said to be a cultivation, or 
manifestation, of trust? 
 
 
II 
Forgiveness, aspiration and affirmation 
 
If forgiveness cannot be fully justified according to rational or moral criteria without 
losing significance, then an alternative approach may be necessary.  Before turning to 
this question, I would like to engage with Charles Taylor's recent book, A secular age, 
which attempts a sweeping diagnosis of the inner struggles of contemporary ethical 
reflection. Taylor's diagnosis seems particularly relevant to the questions above, and 
will help to frame the discussion that follows. 
A secular age attempts to provide a different ± and more comprehensive ± account 
of the development of secular forms of thinking in the West in terms of the ambiguous 
QDWXUHRIWKHGULYHWRUHIRUPWKHLPSXOVHWRµUDLVHWKHOHYHO¶RIKXPDQOLIH7D\ORU¶V
book, and in particular the description of the contours of contemporary ethical 
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reflection, could be said to be an examination of the complex and problematic 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQDVSLUDWLRQDQGDIILUPDWLRQ$WWKHKHDUWRI7D\ORU¶VGLVFXVVLRQLVD
description of an ineradicable tension within the Christian account of human life, a 
tension which exerts a greater and greater pressure as secularity advances and develops.  
On the one hand, there is the emphasis on ordinary human flourishing; to put it crudely,  
that God is in favour of everyday life and the rhythms, expectations and desires that 
uphold it.  This is in continuity with the Axial insight that true religion does not depend 
simply upon ritual observance, but rather requires justice and acts of kindness directed 
WRRWKHUKXPDQV³,GHVLUHPHUF\QRWVDFULILFH´2Q7D\ORU¶VDFFRXQWWKHVHUHOLJLRXV
insights bequeath a restless impulse that strives for completion: to fully convert 
religiosity into benevolence, to draw out all the implications of the affirmation of 
ordinary human life and flourishing.50  On the other hand, although the Christian God is 
revealed to will ordinary human flourishing, there is nevertheless an equally strong 
sense that the fullest human desire aims at something beyond this, at love of or union 
with God, at something not straightforwardly identical to a decent life occupied by 
ordinary human concerns.  For a Christian, to pray 'your will be done' is, somehow, not 
TXLWHWKHVDPHDVVLPSO\VD\LQJ³OHWKXPDQVIORXULVK´LQIDFW
\RXUZLOOEHGone' is 
often linked with renunciation or sacrifice of the finite and earthly.  In other words, 
there is something necessarily unstable in the Christian world-view: on the one hand, 
affirmation of ordinary human life and concerns; on the other, aspiration for the 
transcendent, which involves aiming beyond ordinary human life.  As Taylor sees it, 
this tension is essential to understanding the Christian sense of sacrifice or renunciation, 
which is the giving up of the genuinely good for the sake of something beyond, 
something higher, rather than leaving behind that which was largely insignificant 
DQ\ZD\-HVXV¶GLVWUHVVLQ*HWKVHPDQHFRQWUDVWHGZLWK6RFUDWHV¶LQGLIIHUHQFH51 
 Of course even the simplest articulation of this tension involves making assumptions 
about what we mean by ordinary human life, what counts as a 'transcendent' goal, and 
so on.  Nevertheless, it is, Taylor says, a useful distinction to make, especially in 
examining the history of Western Christianity, within which this distinction has become 
so important.  Another way of articulating this tension is in terms of attention: does the 
                                                             
50Charles Taylor, A secular age (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 772-4. 
51
 Taylor, A secular age, p16-18. 
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highest and best life involve seeking and acknowledging a good which is some sense 
beyond, or independent of ordinary human flourishing?  The Axial movement seems to 
be towards directing attention onto the concerns of human life, and the question 
therefore becomes one of competing claims for attention; can one be fully attendant 
towards the needs of other humans whilst understanding flourishing through reference 
to that which lies beyond or outside of the ordinary human sphere? 
7KHFHQWUDOWKUXVWRI7D\ORU¶VDFFRXQWLVKLVHPSKDVLVRQZKDWKHFDOOVWKHµGULYHWR
UHIRUP¶,QODWHPHGLDHYDO/DWLQ&KULVWHQGRPWKLVPDQLIHVWVLQDQLQFUHDVLQJGHVLUHWR
µUDLVHWKHOHYHO¶RIWKHODLW\DWWHPSWVWRPDNHRUGLQDU\&KULVWLDQVPRUH&KULVWLDQDQGLW
intensifies during and after the Reformation, in both Protestant and Catholic churches.  
With the Reformation arrives an increased suspicion towards monastic spirituality, 
which appears to confine full bodied religious devotion to a specialised group, as well 
as a changed relation of the individual to communal religious practice.  Salvation no 
longer depends on properly regulated participation in church life but on individual 
response to God, and the location for whole-hearted Christian life is now emphatically 
ordinary life.  The important point here is that the suspicion of the elitism of clerical and 
PRQDVWLFVSLULWXDOLW\DVVXPHVDQDQWDJRQLVPEHWZHHQWKHµKLJKHU¶DQGWKHµORZHU¶ there 
is a feeling that affirmation of the ordinary goes hand in hand, or even requires, the 
repudiating of these higher callings.  The sense  is that the reforming tendency begins to 
construe this difference in more competitive, antagonistic terms, such that pushing 
down on one side is felt to raise the other side, and vice-versa.  Taylor does not make 
this point explicitly, but the implication is that along with the drive to reform and the 
affirmation of ordinary life comes an increasingly one-dimensional sense of progress 
and competitive sense of attention.  For Taylor, the drive to reform is malleable; it could 
be to re-emphasise the importance of the transcendent, to re-assert the priority of the 
love of God over lesser goals, or it could be to re-focus the energy of religious devotion 
onto mundane, every day concerns, to insist upon the priority of benevolence, to 
HPSKDVLVHWKHQHFHVVDU\µGHWRXU¶RIORYHRIQHLJKERXUHWF2URIFRXUVHLWFRXOGEHWR
insist on complete secularization, the sacrifice of religious impulses for the sake of an 
enlightened and fully-immanent conception of human life.  In other words, the higher 
aspiration could be for the removal of reference to transcendence, and the affirmation of  
µRUGLQDU\OLIH¶FRXOGLQYROYHDUH-asseUWLRQRIµUHOLJLRXV¶LPSXOVHV 
This narrative, in which one has a latent tension between immanent and 
transcendent notions of flourishing, and a desire to reform that can end up sharpening 
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the distinction and competition between the two, leads Taylor to a particular 
characterisation of contemporary ethical reflection.  It is this picture which is of 
LPSRUWDQFHKHUH2Q7D\ORU¶VDQDO\VLVWKLVWHQVLRQWKDWFKDUDFWHULVHV&KULVWLDQLW\LVQRW
removed in the move towards a 'self-sufficing humanism' rather, he wants to claim that 
it remains in various mutated but frequently unrecognised forms.52  In his description of 
DµWKUHH-FRUQHUHGGHEDWH¶7D\ORUQRWHVWKDWDOOLDQFHVEHWZHHQGLIIHULQJSHUVSHFWLYHVFDQ
be made for the sake of convenience: 
There are secular humanists, there are neo-Nietzscheans, and there are 
those who acknowledge some good beyond life.  Any pair can gang up 
against the third on some important issue. Neo-Nietzscheans and secular 
humanists together condemn religion and reject any good beyond life.  
But neo-Nietzscheans and acknowledgers of transcendence are together 
in their absence of surprise at the continued disappointments of secular 
humanism, together also in the sense that its vision of life lacks a 
dimension.  In a third line-up, secular humanists and believers come 
together in defending an idea of the human good, against the anti-
KXPDQLVPRI1LHW]VFKH¶VKHLUV53 
  
The crucial point here is that there is a common dilemma to each of these perspectives: 
how to affirm the goodness of ordinary human life without draining humanity of any 
real depth and vital energy; how to articulate higher aspirations without degrading or 
PXWLODWLQJWKHµORZHU¶OHYHO7KLVGLOHPPDZLOODSSHDUYHU\GLIIHUHQWO\GHSHQGLQJRQ
where one draws the line between forms of behaviour that are fairly ordinary, and can 
be expected, and those which are only possible through some kind of higher, more 
energetic aspiration.  For example, the question of how to see the human propensity 
towards violence appears very differently depending on where one draws this line.  One 
might see peaceableness as a higher goal, achieved perhaps only with some difficulty 
by those pursuing a certain kind of life, something in some sense ahead of us; or one 
might see it as a given, part of what ordinary life becomes when left to its own devices 
and allowed simply to flourish.  If peaceableness is a good, and yet violence natural, 
then some kind of disciplining of nature is appropriate; violent tendencies must be 
controlled, suppressed, or transformed.  But if the difference between natural tendencies 
and the goal of peaceful co-operation becomes too great, then the practices through 
which we progress may themselves seem to exert a kind of violence on natural instincts.  
The question then becomes of how these impositions can be framed; what justifies 
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 Taylor, A secular age, p. 618-675. 
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 Taylor, A secular age, p. 637. 
45 
 
WKHPKRZGRZHPHDVXUHWKHFRVWWKDWWKH\PD\UHTXLUHXVWRSD\"7D\ORU¶VSRLnt here 
is that where the affirmation of ordinary life has itself become a kind of moral 
imperative, there is a great difficulty in admitting the ordinariness of violence; violence 
is seen as pathology, or the remnants of a more barbaric age, and of course, this in turn 
may legitimate all kinds of dehumanising, controlling measures against the violent.54  In 
other words, certain conceptions of the human good produce certain conceptions of the 
kinds of effort that are acceptable (so that the difficulty involved in the progress does 
not count as regression) and these in turn determine our perspective of human life, 
insofar as they influence what we are willing to perceive.  The third corner of the debate 
that Taylor tries to describe - the neo-Nietzschean - highlights that this kind of 
restriction of vision and stress that nature, and human nature, may be more disturbing 
and violent than the humanist vision is prepared to admit.  More than this, there is also 
the possibility that the aspiration to peace is itself a kind of imposition, a failure to fully 
recognise the force and struggle inherent in existence.  In this case, the affirmation of 
violent struggle as an ineradicable part of existence is assumed to possess a kind of 
power; when liberated from the reactive, slavish goals that restrict and mutilate its 
energy, violence is revealed as, or can become, will to power, self-affirmation and 
joyous overcoming.55 
 What Taylor tries to highlight, then, is the great difficulty of meeting what he calls 
WKHµPD[LPDOGHPDQG¶ µhow to define our spiritual or moral aspirations for human 
EHLQJVZKLOHVKRZLQJDSDWKWRWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQYROYHGZKLFKGRHVQ¶WFUXVK
PXWLODWHRUGHQ\ZKDWLVHVVHQWLDOWRRXUKXPDQLW\"¶(WKLFDOGLVFXVVLRQLVIUHTXHQWO\
conducted in bad faith, simply because the difficulty of achieving this demand from any 
particular perspective is suppressed, and this produces an inability to recognise the 
effects of the tension when they do appear.  Indeed, in this sense, Taylor seems to want 
to introduce a note of tragic wisdom into ethics: 
We have to face the possibility that [satisfying the maximal demand] may 
not be realizable, that squaring our highest aspirations with an integral 
respect for the full range of human fulfilments may be a mission 
impossible.  That, in other words, we have to scale down our moral 
                                                             
54
 See the discussion of violence on pp. 656 ± 675.  On this point, see also Oliver O'Donovan, The 
ways of judgement (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), pp. 86-8. 
55However, as Taylor notes, Nietzsche is crucially different in that there is no sense that there are 
universal human aspirations or means of progress; there is no progress that includes all, nor should this 
be desired.  The tension is resolved somewhat through the removal of the demand for inclusion. 
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aspirations in order to allow our ordinary human life to flourish; or we 
have to agree to sacrifice some of this ordinary flourishing to secure our 
higher goals.  If we think of this as a dilemma, then perhaps we have to 
impale ourselves on one horn or the other.56 
 
Negatively, the point is that aspiration is dangerous but essential, and that no single 
ethical insight, or conceptual scheme, gets us out of this predicament.  We have no 
guaranteed way of purifying our ideals, so that they no longer contain the risk of being 
pursued in ways that mutilate the ordinary patterns of life.  More positively, his 
contribution is to suggest that this predicament is the realm of ethics, and therefore that 
simply pointing it out, again, cannot honestly serve as a substantive criticism of any 
SDUWLFXODUSHUVSHFWLYH7KHFKDOOHQJHLVQRWWRHVFDSHWKHVHNLQGVRIGLOHPPDVµ>U@DWKHU
it appears as a matter of who can respond most profoundly and convincingly to what are 
XOWLPDWHO\FRPPRQO\IHOWGLOHPPDV¶57  Ethics is not simply the business of deciding 
what are the characteristics of human flourishing, which aspirations are most in 
KDUPRQ\ZLWKOLIH¶VLQKHUHQWSRWHQWLDODQGWKHQKRSLQJWKDWWKHVHWZRWDVNVZLOOWurn out 
WRQRWWRLQWHUIHUHZLWKHDFKRWKHULWLVDOVRWKHµKRZ¶RIFRPELQLQJWKHPDQGRI
negotiating the risk that there may be significant losses (on either side) in the process.  
The underlying sense here is that there is a moment of difficult acceptance involved in 
any genuine ethical reflection, a moment of 'counting the cost', and the implication is 
that many forms of contemporary ethical reflection fail to do this.  It is here that Taylor 
sees that the 'acknowledgers of transcendence' have the advantage, potentially at least.  
The Christian sense that that our notion of progress or ascent is formed through 
memories of particular itineraries towards God - the saints - holds the potential for 
acknowledging how fragile, fallible, and at times ambiguous all our progress is.  This 
allows us to recover a sense of the way in which progress is not fully manifest as such 
except eschatologically, i.e. it is not, for us, unambiguous, personally or corporately. 
My itinerary crucially includes my existence embedded in a historic 
order, with its good and bad, in and out of which I must move towards 
*RG¶VRUGHU7KHHVFKDWRQPXVWEULQJWRJHWKHUDOOWKHVHLWLQHUDULHVZLWK
their very different landscapes and perils.58 
 The indispensable step forward can in its concrete form impose 
unacceptable sacrifices.  This is a reason to be wary of these mainline 
narratives of simple, cost-free supersession, whether narrated by 
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 Taylor, A secular age, p. 640. 
57Taylor, A secular age, p. 675 
58Taylor, A secular age, p. 754. 
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Christians, or by protagonists of the Enlightenment.59 
  
The difficulty that a Christian ethics of transcendence has is of how to remain articulate 
without resorting to forms of defence that collapse the tension which is at the heart of 
Christianity.  Any attempt to definitively avoid criticism coming from one direction is 
likely to take us into the path of another, and either way, we lose sight of the actual 
predicament we are in.60  But ethics concerns the predicament we are in; we cannot 
fully engage with this predicament whilst our reflection is shaped by the desire to evade 
it. 
 
 
Cross-pressures: forgiveness, cost and trust 
 
This diagnosis of a 'cross-pressured' intellectual landscape has a particular relevance to 
the discourse on forgiveness, especially insofar as the latter involves the evaluation of 
cost.  As we have seen, one of the key questions in these kinds of discussions is the way 
that as an ideal forgiveness asks us to interfere in some way with impulses and 
emotions, or the cognitive judgements that they are intimately entwined with.  If one 
wants to affirm forgiveness as an unambiguous human good, one would first have to 
show how the aspiration to forgive in response to wrongdoing does not damage us by 
interfering with other responses which, although they may be less attractive, do seem to 
be fairly natural, and by implication, to have something to do with human flourishing.  
Here one defends against the sense that perhaps we contort ourselves in the effort to 
forgive.  But then, if one is aiming to fulfil the 'maximal demand' one would also have 
to show that it aims high enough, that it does not fail to aspire, and is not a form of 
accommodation based on a too-rosy conception of human life.  Here one defends 
against the suspicion that forgiveness is simply too easy, too convenient, and that the 
harsh realities of human behaviour require a sterner attitude towards life, for the sake of 
individuals and the social body.  In other words, understanding forgiveness seems to 
involve the evaluation of very different - almost opposing - kinds of cost, that are 
nevertheless intimately related.  Forgiveness could be an ethical aspiration that fails to 
accept ordinary human limitations by demanding too much; or else a weakened 
                                                             
59Taylor, A secular age, p. 772. 
60See Taylor, A secular age, pp. 624-5. 
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tolerance through which we accept too much and aim for too little; at once too difficult 
and too easy.  It appears that in the gospel material, both of these possibilities appear to 
be confronted and accepted in advance, as part of the challenge that forgiveness 
presents.  Forgiveness is part of an ethic that exceeds ordinary reciprocity and seems to 
ask us to draw on far deeper reservoirs of generosity than we usually have access to 
('give, expecting nothing in return', etc.); but is also linked to a willingness to remain 
exposed to violence, rather than defend oneself or retaliate (even if such exposure 
should be understood as a form of active resistance, a refusal of the imposition of victim 
status, as Walter Wink suggests)61 and awkwardly related to the need to hold others 
accountable for the sake of community, and the demand for repentance (as is apparent 
in the internal tensions of the material in Matthew chapter 18). 
Charles Griswold's account (as one of the best examples of the secular interest in 
forgiveness) for all its subtlety, insight and scope, might be said to suffer from what in 
Taylor's terms is an unwillingness to be 'impaled'; a desire for unambiguous, cost-free 
progress, or a perfectly affirming aspiration, particularly in its attempt to describe what 
it is to forgive in relation to the meaning of resentment.  The understanding of the 
relationship between forgiveness and resentment is shaped by both sides of the cross-
pressured affirmation/aspiration complex described above.  An obvious response here 
would be that this is simply to describe the process of consideration that lies behind a 
detailed presentation such as Griswold's.  That is, this kind of negotiation of different 
concerns is simply what is involved in thinking something through to the best of one's 
ability.  We consider possible responses to any particular way of expressing an idea, as 
                                                             
61See Walter Wink, Engaging the powers: discernment and resistance in a world of domination 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 175-194. On Wink's understanding, the injunctions in the 
Sermon on the Mount (to turn the other cheek) should be read not as injunctions to refuse to refuse 
violence at all costs, so as to remain outside of violence, but as ways of non-violently responding to 
violence, so as to act creatively within violence.  The key point is that those who follow the way of 
active non-violent engagement learn to see the futility of violent exertion of power - its essential 
powerlessness.  This involves what Wink describes as the 'rehearsal' of non-violence; that is, the 
employment of one's capacity to imagine one's own exposure to violence to learn, with great difficulty, 
to perceive the possibility of a 'third way'; a response to violence that refuses the either/or that violence 
presents: either be a victim or mirror the violator.  We are always, compulsively, asking 'what if...?', and 
on Wink's reading, the gospel material should encourage a redeeming of this usually reactive tendency, 
so that the power and possibility of non-violence is learned and gradually trusted in advance. See pp. 
231-240. 
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well as its inner coherence, and both of these may include combining different kinds of 
concerns: how likely is a particular idea to be motivational, how plausible does it seem 
from a variety of perspectives, how acceptable are the main lines of interpretation it 
allows, etc.  Griswold perceives, quite rightly, that forgiveness is tremendously 
ambiguous and open to both abuse and vacuousness, and more than this, assumes that at 
present the balance has swung in one particular direction, so that there is a tendency 
towards an over-enthusiastic embrace of its virtues without consideration of its risks.  
As a result, he presents an account that substantially qualifies the concept, and aims to 
redress the balance to a certain extent.  An awareness of the potentially 'mutilating' 
nature of ethical aspirations - especially those that have religious overtones - is simply 
part of this process, and goes alongside a desire to present ideals and corresponding 
practices that combine rigour and hope as convincingly as possible.  However, the 
suggestion that runs through Taylor's analysis is that these 'cross-pressures' may 
adversely affect our capacity for ethical reflection (particularly when it comes to 
reacting to religious ideas), because it may mean that in the course of defending against 
certain accusations our assumptions shift, and if this is not owned or admitted to, it 
allows us to evade the possibility of confronting the real limitations and costs of ethical 
life.  What seems to be missing from Griswold's account, then, is the sense that we 
evaluate forgiveness, and especially the costs of forgiveness, with a somewhat 
conflicted gaze.  We interrogate the subject with concerns that do not easily cohere, and 
consideration of forgiveness is one of the ways in which this conflict, or lack of resolve, 
becomes obvious. 
The 'cross-pressures' outlined above necessarily concern openness to the future, to 
our anticipation and negotiation with possibilities.  Although Griswold, in his definition 
of forgiveness, focuses primarily on the moral implications of a discrete act of 
forgiveness, the note of caution has more to do with the implications of an ongoing 
commitment to forgiveness: what does a forgiving life produce,  encourage, or permit; 
in oneself or in community life?  There is an affirmation that forgiveness is virtuous 
because it expresses a hopeful commitment to certain values, that it fosters trust: 
Forgiveness rests in part, I argued above, on trust that the projected 
narratives about the offender, as well as oneself, will become true.  
Forgiveness is, so to speak, a vote for the victory of such values as 
respect, growth and renewal, harmony of self and reconciliation, affection 
and love.  ... Acting on the basis of these ideals may also have a 
constitutive character, such that treating oneself and the other as capable 
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of ethical growth may in itself help to promote that growth.62 
 
However, what this highlights is the way in which forgiveness necessarily eludes the 
kind of justification that Griswold attempts to provide through his careful definition.  
The actual moment of forgiving is very carefully defined and framed, but the conditions 
that are outlined involve some level of judgement concerning the future.  The crucial 
distinction between warranted and unwarranted resentment, is only visible after a 
judgement concerning the future, because assessing the authenticity of another's 
remorse, resolve, understanding, commitment, etc., all rely on anticipation.  Resentment 
will only seem to be 'no longer warranted' if another's repentance seems to be genuine; 
but it will only seem to be genuine if I no longer imagine them repeating their hostility 
towards me.  But this is not, surely, simply a matter of assessment, because at this point, 
our evaluation of another is intimately bound up, one way or another, with a much more 
basic sense of our own vulnerability - our ongoing response to our exposure to others.  
In other words, the judgement we use to discern whether it would be good to forgive is 
already intimately bound up with trust, but trust cannot be subject to the same kind of 
definitive assessment and safeguarding that this definition of forgiveness aims to 
provide.  We cannot know whether treating oneself and the other as capable of growth 
will help promote that growth, or whether our 'vote' for respect and renewal will lead to 
victory or not.  Our exposure to the possibility of being hurt by another, and our 
response to this possibility, already conditions our thinking; we ask whether it is wise, 
acceptable or profitable to forgive in part because of the need to respond to this 
exposure.  The assumption in Griswold's treatment of resentment is that since it can be 
shown that resentment is not simply an unpleasant reaction, but has an important 
cognitive aspect, and is in many respects a central part of our capacity to stand for 
certain values, and since forgiveness must also be a 'vote' for these values, that there 
should be a basic harmony between them.  So that on Griswold's account, the (properly) 
resentful person wants the same thing that the (properly) forgiving person wants.  But 
this is precisely what is at issue in the question trust: whether it involves a different way 
of desiring - and therefore of hoping - for the best.  If there is something virtuous about 
trust, then it is surely something to do with how we desire what we desire; trust involves 
a more peaceful desire, a kind of hopeful openness.  The relationship between trust and 
                                                             
62Griswold, Forgiveness, p. 71. 
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the character of resentment, then, appears to be important.  What Griswold does not 
bring out in his discussion is the way in which resentment may include a demand for 
security; that is, a demand for it to be no longer possible to be hurt in the way in which 
one has been hurt: one resents not simply the actuality (which is focused upon a 
particular person, their actions and intentions), but the possibility of the hurt one has 
suffered.  This is perhaps why there is a strong tendency for resentment to become 
excessive; one cannot exclude, except through violence to oneself or another 
(physically or emotionally), the possibility of further violation, and so the demand is 
necessarily insatiable. In this case, forgiveness would not simply be a norm-governed 
shift out of resentment at the right moment, or, as Griswold wants to rule out, an other-
focused giving up resentment (which might imply a judgement of one's resentment), but 
rather would be allied to a realisation of the futility of resentment. In other words,  
whatever it is that we - consciously or unconsciously - desire when we resent is now 
desired differently. 
As already suggested in the introduction to this thesis, trust - whether it is in 
another's sincerity; in one's own capacity to develop a different attitude towards them; 
or in the giving and forgiving of God that lies behind and ahead of our own forgiveness 
- appears to be central to the gospel sayings.   More than this, the call to trust seems to 
be  a central aspect of Jesus'  proclamation of the kingdom of God, and to be part of its 
particular challenge.  Jean Hampton, in the influential book co-authored with Jeffrey 
Murphy, develops these ideas, arguing that forgiveness necessarily involves having faith 
in another's decency, and is coherent even where the behavioural evidence weighs (or 
seems to weigh) against such faith.63  Interestingly, this suggestion is specifically 
countered in Tara Smith's account of the virtue of forgiveness.  Smith argues that this 
would be to counsel blindness to known facts on the basis of a sunny optimism, and 
conflicts with the teleological aspect ethics she espouses.  There is no reason to think 
that forgiveness offered to the malevolent in the absence of any signs of them having 
recognised their wrongdoing will do anything other than confirm their sense of freedom 
to act as they please.  Forgiveness in these circumstances does not get us any closer to 
our ideals.64  For Smith, if forgiveness is to appear as fully just, it must be purged of any 
                                                             
63Jean Hampton, 'The retributive idea' in Forgiveness and Mercy, ed. Jean Hampton and Jeffrey 
Murphy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 ), p. 155. 
64Smith, 'Tolerance and forgiveness', p. 39. 
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uncertain risk-taking or trust.  However, Hampton's view is far more subtle that Smith 
allows.  She observes that where the movement towards reconciliation is based in an 
attempt to believe in the decency of another, it is more than likely to fail at the first 
hurdle.  How, then, is the command to have faith in the possibility of forgiveness not 
simply an injunction to make oneself believe something (which is surely self-
defeating)?  Or put differently, what is the difference between real hope and naive 
optimism?  Hampton suggests that hope concerning the possibility of real repentance 
(even when pronounced for the seventy seventh time) is linked to reflections on our 
own character: '[t]o the extent that we reflect on how the evidence of our own actions 
indicates a poor state of character, then if we would wish for a more generous reading 
of our character in spite of those actions, we should respect others' wish that we be 
generous with them.'  Thus far, one might say that the command to trust in another's 
repentance (or their capacity for forgiveness) and so continue to offer forgiveness is a 
case of 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you'; and if this means letting 
someone else off the hook in the same way that I hope to be let off the hook, it seems a 
morally dubious form of hope or trust.  However, there is a further point, which is 
perhaps more important.  Our faith in the decency of another is intimately linked to the 
kind of hope we have regarding our own state of being.  Our trust that the fragile and 
flawed repentance expressed by another may become the grounds for real change is less 
likely to be self-deception if we know the presence of something similar within 
ourselves.  And here, Hampton argues, is another reason for actively resisting moral 
hatred: our judgements and evaluations of others tend to fall back on ourselves, so that 
if we refuse to trust in the way that forgiveness requires us to trust, we are liable to end 
up unable to forgive ourselves.  For Hampton, this is a more helpful reading of the 
parable of the unforgiving servant: the one who refuses to act mercifully cannot show 
themselves mercy, and as the gospel saying suggests, one is judged with the form of 
judgement one uses ('the measure you give will be the measure you get', etc.).65  The 
one who says 'Raca' is in danger of 'the hell of fire', because the contempt they heap on 
another immerses them in self-contempt, and nothing can rescue one from this burning, 
since there is no-one well respected enough to put it out with an encouraging word.66  
                                                             
65Hampton, 'The retributive idea', p. 155-6. 
66See also Hampton, 'Forgiveness, resentment and hatred', in Forgiveness and mercy, pp. 64-5 on this 
point. 
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For Hampton, then, the decision to extend forgiveness involves a deeper trust than that 
with which we take a calculated risk that something might work out well (which is the 
way that Smith seems to envisage evaluation of the propriety of forgiveness).  It is a 
trust that emerges from a sense that there is forgiveness; that is, that we can be forgiven, 
as we forgive. 
 In a memorable passage at the end of her 'Articulating an uncompromising 
forgiveness' Pamela Hieronymi suggests that allowing oneself to be forgiven also 
involves an act of trust: '[y]ou must allow me to creatively incorporate the scars that 
bear your fingerprints into the permanent fabric of my life, and trust that I can do so.'  
When seen in this light, the importance of supplication, apology, expressions of 
remorse, and other aspects of the offender's role in the scene of forgiveness can be seen 
as tests of our ability to trust in this way.  To approach one's victim with pleas of 
ignorance, or excuses, or pointing out one's own victim status may not simply be signs 
of a dislike of rebuke or the burden of responsibility - a lack of moral fibre - but more 
deeply, may be the result of doubt that our wrongdoings can be 'borne' in this way, 
without mitigation.  In fact, to develop this suggestion further, one might say that if this 
is what forgiveness is, then to undergo punishment, or vindictive reprisal may in one 
sense be easier than being forgiven, in that such responses are attempts to do something 
about the wrong suffered, whether through reparation, retribution or revenge.  But to 
ask forgiveness may be to acknowledge a deeper powerlessness, and so to contemplate 
the sheer unchangeable givenness of what one has done, and along with this, the sense 
of one's own exposure to such acts.  So long as one remains unforgiven, and subject to 
another's hatred, resentment or revenge, there is the sense that one's action naturally 
issues in some kind of response, whether proportional or excessive.  In other words, 
there is a pre-existing answer to the question 'what now?', even if it is a harsh and 
unpleasant answer.  But to simply be forgiven - even if this is a task that has two sides, 
and is not without some level of give-and-take - may be to contemplate the plain reality 
of one's actions. 
 These are brief suggestions, and require further exploration, some of which is 
attempted in chapters three and four.  However, the point I hope to have made above is 
that the qualities and costs of forgiveness appear to be necessarily beyond moral 
justification, insofar as we can never fully justify what we are prepared to trust in and 
hope for, however much we may be held accountable for the results of our trust and 
hope.  The meaning and justice of forgiveness do not appear harmoniously together, 
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such that to definitively defend the reality of the one seems to remove the other from 
sight.  As a result, forgiveness is never simply the subject of our ethical reflection, but 
always at the same time a trial and test of it. 
 
 
III 
Forgiveness without reason 
 
The first part of this chapter expressed dissatisfaction towards the attempt to make 
forgiveness fully intelligible, to express its various aspects and meanings as a 
harmonious whole free of tension. Whilst there are  important insights to be gained 
through such attempts, and clarification is to be found through them, there nonetheless 
remains a sense of something missing, as if, despite the ground gained, one had still 
managed to miss the heart of the matter.  Taylor's analysis further emphasises the way in 
which reflection on forgiveness is shaped by concerns which do not easily cohere with 
each other.  The question this leaves is of what alternatives there may be, and whether 
such alternatives are any more satisfying.  The conclusion above is that the attempt to 
make forgiveness fully coherent and just - to defend forgiveness - has the effect of 
making it subject to assumptions that are pre-rational and that we cannot, in any case, 
demonstrate.  In particular, the process of justification involves our sense of whether, 
and how, trust is warranted, our sense of how benignly the current of time flows.   
This chapter approaches similar issues from a slightly different direction. If instead 
of trying to explain or justify forgiveness through reference to moral and rational 
criteria, Vladimir Jankelevitch argues that forgiveness has its own reasons, so that the 
discourse which articulates forgiveness is involves pursuit more than careful scrutiny.  
The question that begins to emerge in consideration of this approach is of how the 
'moment' of forgiveness is related to the rest of life, and the forms of thinking which 
sustain it.  This question has already been touched upon in the discussion of how a 
forgiving life might be said to combine different virtues, but here the issue is of how 
different forms of thinking cohere, or not, as the case may be. 
 A number of different conceptual tensions or difficulties can be discerned within our 
understanding of forgiveness.  Different streams of thinking respond to these difficulties 
in different ways. One can present them as paradoxes, and through conceptual 
clarification try to show that the paradox arises through a fault of reasoning, and so does 
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not hold.  Alternatively, one might take the difficulty as an opportunity for thought, or 
an articulation of a real existential difficulty, so that the suffering of the dilemmas of life 
finds a corollary in a form of intellectual suffering.  Finally, one might relate the 
particular paradoxes, tensions or aporias of the particular topic of forgiveness to a 
metaphysics of paradox, such that the intellectual difficulties have a home in a 
framework which resolves to keep certain issues unresolved, and takes this as a positive 
and constitutive element of thinking.  Very roughly, this is one way of characterising the 
analytic, continental and theological approaches to the subject.  Although Charles 
Griswold does not look for a simple, logically resolved formula, he is interested in 
showing the basic coherence of forgiveness in reference to certain intellectual norms 
and generally accepted ethical ideals.  In contrast, this chapter will begin with an 
exposition of Jankelevitch's attempt to articulate a fundamentally paradoxical - and so 
confrontational - account of forgiveness and then move to a discussion of the limits of 
this approach. 
 
 
Paradox and the moment of forgiveness 
 
A particularly succinct expression of the conceptual difficulty of forgiveness is found in 
Aurel Kolnai's essay on the 'logical paradoxy' of forgiveness, which has become a key 
point of reference for philosophical discussions of the subject.  Kolnai puts it very 
simply: '[b]riefly, forgiveness is either unjustified or pointless.'67  If I am unrepentant, 
unremorseful and malevolent, then to forgive is simply to condone my behaviour, and is 
unjustified; if I am humble, weighed down with remorse and eager to make amends in 
any way I can, then to forgive is simply to give me what I, in my sorry state, warrant, 
and is no more than the application of justice.  Kolnai presents this difficulty as the 
difficulty of defining forgiveness in such a way that its necessary components do not 
render it incoherent.  For Kolnai, the nuance which rescues forgiveness from this 
unforgiving either/or is found in the mystery of personal identity.  If I sin, and then 
sincerely repent, then I both am and am not the same person: I am the person who did 
                                                             
67Aurel Kolnai, 'Forgiveness' in Proceedings of the Aristotelian society 75, p. 99. In Taylor's terms, 
we might say that the telling part of Kolnai's formulation is the word 'pointless'; the concern is that we 
sanitise or diminish the force of forgiveness so that there is no real energy left in it. 
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such and such, and will always have been this person; and yet insofar as my repentance 
is genuine, I am not the same person I was.68  As Nicolas Tavuchis notes, this tension is 
reflected in the complexities of apology: to apologise convincingly, I have to show that 
I accept the unalterable fact of responsibility, whilst showing that the act in question 
does not reveal a previously hidden and ongoing malevolence, i.e. I have to somehow 
communicate that 'it was me, but it wasn't me'.69  The 'either unjustified or pointless' 
paradox is loosened by showing how the object of forgiveness is not the past-sinner, but 
the now-repentant sinner.  This means that there is still enough of the sinner left to 
forgive, but not so much that forgiveness would condone the hostility expressed through 
his or her action.70  As we have seen, Griswold negotiates this paradox through his very 
careful definition of what is let go of in forgiveness; that is, through a focus on what is 
done by the one forgiving rather than the identity of the one forgiven.71  Although 
initially expressed as 'the letting go of resentment for moral reasons', more fully, it can 
be expressed as 'the letting go of no-longer-warranted resentment for moral reasons', 
which as we have seen, leaves forgiveness for the morally cultivated, who know why 
and when and for how long to be resentful.  The nuance here, therefore, is that there is a 
moment - the kairos moment of forgiveness -72 when resentment is no longer needed, 
                                                             
68Kolnai, 'Forgiveness', p. 101. 
69Nicolas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: a sociology of apology and reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991), p. 26. 
70See P. Twambly, 'Mercy and forgiveness' in Analysis 36, 1976, pp. 84-90 for a short response to 
Kolnai published not long after Kolnai's.  Twambly criticises Kolnai for the attempt to make 
forgiveness something earned, and for the way in which his discussion conflates blame and resentment.  
Twambly (very briefly) suggests that it is the failure to understand the role of gift in human interaction 
that weakens Kolnai's approach: '[m]any highly regarded moral actions are not demanded of one; they 
are not earned by their recipients, nor are they acts to which one is bound.  Rather they are gifts, actions 
freely performed, sacrifices freely made.  Eminent among these are the gifts of mercy and forgiveness.' 
(p. 90)  See Marilyn MacCord Adams, 'Forgiveness: a Christian model' in Christian theism and moral 
philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty and Mark Nelson (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1998), for a 
discussion of both. 
71Griswold does explore the question of identity - primarily in the section on narrative - but this is not 
the primary location of his defence/description of forgiveness. 
72See Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, pp. 86 - 88 for a description of a 'kairos' moment in the timing of 
apology.  As Tavuchis describes it, the purpose of apology is 'to retrace the offence and convert it into 
an occasion for sorrow, expiation and forgiveness'; if offered too soon, it may indicate indifference, and 
self-interest - it becomes an unconsidered reflex; if offered too late it becomes more and more difficult 
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and yet not yet a morally objectionable residue. 
 Griswold assumes that the emergence of this moment is governed by moral norms, 
and so is largely dependent on the wrongdoer.  There is a passage, which takes time, 
between a situation in which there is no place for forgiveness, only defensive 
resentment and moral indignation, and a situation to which the best response (although 
not necessarily the only one) is forgiveness.  The person forgiving must possess the 
discernment necessary to judge that this passage has taken place, and it is their 
willingness to see this that makes forgiveness possible, but forgiving is primarily a 
response to what is already given.  Vladimir Jankelevitch's book Le Pardon, translated 
as Forgiveness, is given almost entirely to consideration of this moment, and in stark 
contrast to Griswold, concludes that this moment is one of madness, when the force of 
love pierces through the surface of our understanding: 'a fleeting shock', or an 
'imperceptible flickering of charity'.73  Jankelevitch concludes that forgiveness is 
necessarily creative, and this creativity consists in a form of response that is not 
governed by the reality of the offender or what has been.  In other words, to forgive is 
to create the moment of forgiveness, in an act of 'drastic positing'.74  Without this 
momentary interruption one does not have forgiveness at all. 
 As a result Jankelevitch treats much of the detail that is found in our descriptions or 
justifications of forgiveness to be evidence of the rarity of the real thing, which means 
that his account quite deliberately challenges some of the intuitions that Griswold 
attempts to account for, or revise as gently as possible.75  The tradition in which 
Jankelevitch is situated is quite distinct, and takes a very particular approach to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to call up the past convincingly, and apology becomes more and more complicated.  Tavuchis' point is 
that effective apology relies on a very subtle judgement concerning these things, but the point could 
equally be made for offering forgiveness.  The necessity for a delay in apology should seen in relation 
to the delay in gift-exchange, whereby to offer a return gift too soon indicates an insulting failure to 
receive, and to leave the return too long indicates a refusal of the invitation the initial gift represents. 
73Vladimir Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, tr. Andrew Kelly (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), p. 4. 
74See John Llewelyn, 'In the name of philosophy', in Research in phenomenology 28, p. 41. 
Jankelevitch was Emmanuel Levinas' doctoral examiner, and on Llewelyn's account, the sense of 
rupture that runs throughout Levinas's work owes much to Jankelevitch, although for the former, the 
rupture originates in ethical responsibility, and the face of the other, rather than an act of creation prior 
to predicative judgement. 
75On this point, see Griswold, 'A reply to my critics', pp. 307-8. 
58 
 
philosophical task in general. However, the perspective on forgiveness that Jankelevitch 
expresses has resonance regardless of the set of philosophical commitments it belongs 
to.   In particular Jankelevitch's account  gives  rigorous yet poetic expression to the 
intuition that forgiveness has something to do with the miraculous or mysterious, as we 
will see.  This intuition is itself an important part of the discussion, and disagreement as 
to its significance has an effect on the discussion (as is reflected by the encounter 
between Herbert Morris and Jeffrey Murphy, for example).76 
 For Jankelevitch, the only valid discourse on forgiveness is one which proceeds 
primarily negatively: one can speak easily and at length about an 'impure, opaque 
forgiveness', but pure forgiveness is so simple that its 'limpid transparency' resists 
description.77  However, this sense of force, of almost violent interruption should not be 
taken to indicate that forgiveness is an exercise of sheer will; on the contrary, 
forgiveness is a moment of 'tender agape' and a whole world away from the indifference 
of the Stoic sage, who is never concerned enough about the other to be insulted by 
them, or the cost-free generosity of a mad billionaire, who throws her money out of the 
window to random passers-by.78  Nevertheless, forgiveness is an act, not an emotion; 
whereas pity has a 'because' in the condition of the afflicted one, forgiveness is not 
prompted or explained by any such 'because'.  In fact, forgiveness forgives 'even 
though'.79  Just as for Jankelevitch forgiveness is difficult to describe, so is his book, 
because although in one sense it is utterly simple, the simplicity of the central point is 
returned to again and again, and each time the exposition grows deeper.  The broad 
outline is that real forgiveness is distinguished by its lack of reliance on the temporal 
decay which means that everything is always being forgotten, becoming gradually less 
significant, and by its indifference to the task of assessing the complexity of events so 
as to understand them better.  In both senses, then, forgiveness goes against the grain in 
some way. 
 Firstly then, forgiveness must not be dependent upon the passing of time.  The 
                                                             
76See Herbert Morris 'Murphy on forgiveness' in Criminal justice ethics, vol. 7, issue 2, Summer 
1988, especially pp. 16 and 19.  Morris argues that Murphy neglects the sense that forgiveness carries a 
sense of transcendence and grace, and then suggests that one of the characteristics of forgiveness is the 
way in which it seems beyond the simple operation of the will, and yet happens through us nonetheless. 
77Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, pp. 5-6. 
78Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p.  7. 
79Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, pp. 129-130. 
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constant becoming of time appears to lend a certain natural impetus to forgiveness.  In 
time, regardless of the force of one's resentment, everything will be forgotten, and is 
therefore irrelevant.  Just as time gradually erases the actual effects of a misdeed, so it 
erases the clarity of the memories in which it is preserved, and even someone who 
nurtures their resentment lovingly will eventually succumb like everyone else to 
fatigue, and all will be forgotten.80  But if forgiving is something that can be made 
easier by the increasing distance of the offence from the offended, it becomes an act 
with no ethical significance, for the nature of the ethical is to be unnatural.81  There is a 
certain immortality in wrongdoing related to 'the fact of having-done'.82  For 
Jankelevitch, there is no relationship between 'axiology' and chronology, that is, value is 
atemporal.83  Although the event of any offence is part of the continual becoming of 
time, and this flux exercises a corrosive force upon the reality of sin - successive 
moments drive each other back into forgetting, memories become more vague, 
repercussions abate - at the same time, the reality of offence is imperishable.  If there is 
to be forgiveness, it must somehow access, or confront, or change, the atemporal - the 
fact of having done, the very thing that time leaves intact.  Where forgiveness is 
conceived of as being in some way harmonious with the passage of time, so that a 
backward looking resentment is overcome by a forward looking forgiveness, one 
simply fails to recognise the kind of thing we are talking about when we talk about 
wrongdoing, because ethics 'wants to be scandalously, paradoxical antireal.'84  The heart 
of forgiveness has nothing to do with progression or erosion; where there is really 
something to be forgiven, time is of no use. 
 Secondly, there is something about the notion of forgiveness that opposes the careful 
and complex task of understanding.  Forgiveness cannot look for reasons to forgive in 
the circumstances of the original misdeed, nor in the current disposition of the offender, 
nor in any possible future outcome.  In the first case, this might involve looking for 
mitigating circumstances that render the intention and act less serious; in the second, the 
presence of remorse which asks for forgiveness, or the loveability of the offender; and 
in the third, the possibility that forgiveness may aid moral transformation, or that the 
                                                             
80Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 54. 
81Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 51. 
82Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 42. 
83Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, pp. 44 and 47. 
84Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 51. 
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VLQQHUPD\µFRQWLQXHWRH[SUHVVKLPVHOIDQGWRUHQHZKLPVHOIEH\RQGWKHPLVGHHG¶85  
Jankelevitch's analysis of the relationship between excuse, understanding, sympathy 
and forgiveness is extremely subtle, but the basic point is fairly simple: forgiveness can 
have nothing to do with the perspective that increased understanding offers.  
Understanding may exonerate the innocent (meaning there is nothing to forgive), or 
encourage increased leniency where appropriate (so as to make justice kinder), but 
either way, the logic is of giving what is due, responding to a condition that is already 
present, and it is here that Jankelevitch opposes forgiveness to even the most perfect 
combination of rigour and empathy in judgement.  Forgiveness pays no attention to 
justifying itself or giving reasons.86 
 This means that even where judgement is construed as a process that necessarily 
involves compassion, so that mercy or leniency is an expression not of a dismissive or 
amoral attitude towards wrongdoing, but of a genuinely moral wisdom, it is still not to 
be thought of forgiveness.  In a particularly insightful passage, Jankelevitch notes the 
way in which comprehension and love are mutually conditioning: 
Love, by dint of loving, finishes by understanding, and by dint of 
understanding, finishes by loving.  By virtue of a veritable circular 
causality, sympathy is at the same time the consequence and condition of 
intellection.  One sympathises by dint of understanding, but in order to 
understand, it is already necessary to sympathize, the two at the same 
time; intellection, effect and cause of love, is wholly penetrated by love.87 
 
One only understands if one wants to understand, and to want to understand already 
implies love.  Therefore judgement, strictly speaking, is impossible without love, and 
the compassionate gaze.  Forgiveness is a giving which is unmotivated, and involves 
something like a 'facing-down' of the truth, rather than a response to it.  Forgiveness is 
its own ground and cause, and in a sense produces the innocence it pronounces: 
Above all, forgiveness obeys neither the causality of the loveable, nor the 
causality of the detestable; it is unleashed neither by a pre-existent value, 
nor by a counter-YDOXHLWWUDLOVEHKLQGQRWKLQJ«1RWRQO\LVLWQRW
                                                             
85Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 81.  This is almost exactly how Trudy Govier presents forgiveness: as 
response to the intrinsic worth of the person.  To conclude that someone is a 'moral monster' and 
therefore unforgivable is to assume the worst, and assume that someone is swallowed up by the 
significance of one act and no longer open to moral transformation.  See Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and 
revenge, (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 70, 110, 112, 124. 
86Jankelevitch, Forgiveness., pp. 92-5. 
87Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 88. 
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because the accused is innocent that forgiveness receives him (innocence, 
on the contrary, rendering forgiveness superfluous), rather it is much 
more because forgiveness forgives that the guilty person becomes 
innocent.88 
 
 As we have seen above, the desire to present the goodness of forgiveness as 
unambiguously as possible seems to go along with a rather cold and uninspiring 
definition of forgiveness, that seems somewhat at odds with the virtues it is thought to 
express.  Here, the risk that that approach tries to neutralise (that the forgiving person 
has to set aside what they should not set aside) is embraced as the whole truth of 
forgiveness.  Or in Taylor's terms, forgiveness is thought to be a good by virtue of its 
transcendent madness or danger.  In a sense, Jankelevitch does not even attempt to 
argue this basic conviction, it is simply presumed that it will appear as self-evident as 
each distinction between pure forgiveness and everything else is described.  It is very 
much like an apaphatic theology (as he himself realises)89 with the focus on the 
distinction between the transcendent deity and everything else, rather than the question 
of whether there is any reality to fill the place that the negative gestures mark out.  Here 
I am concerned not simply with the arguments presented but with this assumption; the 
sense that somehow, forgiveness is, and should be, drastic.  Jankelevitch's book could 
be explored endlessly, and a full critique would be needed to engage with his whole 
philosophy, which I cannot do, but two very closely related issues can be drawn out in 
the concluding discussion: the relationship between forgiveness and the temporal 
processes of understanding involved in judgement, and the relationship between 
forgiveness, anticipation and hope. 
 
 
Love and understanding: the future of forgiveness 
 
The comment above about the 'veritable circular causality' of sympathy and 
'intellection' is echoed in Martha Nussbaum's essay 'Equity and mercy'.  Through 
interaction with Aristotle and Seneca, as well as Andrea Dworkin's novel Mercy, 
Nussbaum explores the question of whether appropriate situational judgement can 
include mercy.  Aristotle proposes that the equitable person is characterised by a 
                                                             
88Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 145. 
89See, for example Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, pp. 5, 119. 
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forgiving attitude towards human things, so that one can perceive motives and 
intentions, and says that this means the ability to see 'with' the other.90  However, this 
does not lead to an affirmation of mercy, because for Aristotle, the point is still to 
separate out the truly guilty from those who superficially resemble them, rather than be 
lenient towards those who are found truly guilty.  Compassionate judgement leads one 
to classify offences with more discernment, but not necessarily to alter the appropriate 
response once a final verdict has been reached.  However, Nussbaum notes that mercy 
seems to refer to something more than this; 'a gentleness going beyond due proportion, 
even to the deliberate offender.'91  In On anger, Seneca initially notes that a closer look 
at the complexity of human situations may provoke increased leniency or harsher 
condemnation, but then goes on to suggest that human errors and crimes are more the 
result of 'yielding to pressures that lie very deep in the fabric of human life.'92  
Circumstances are at the origin of vice, not innate propensities.  Furthermore, the 
retributive tendency to become preoccupied with assigning just punishments hardens 
the spirit, and turns it against humanity, so that one begins to mirror the callousness of 
those one judges.  The cultivation of humanity that Seneca proposes involves an 
imaginative exercise of putting oneself in the narrative of another's life, so as to feel 
how the particular pressures of circumstances they faced contributed to their actions, 
responses, and even the formation of their intentions.  'Seneca's bet is that once one 
performs this imaginative exercise one will cease to have the strict retributive attitude to 
the punishment of the offender. ... And the punishments that one does assign will be 
chosen, on the whole, not for their retributive function but for their power to improve 
the life of the defendant.'93  Nussbaum goes on to argue that this implies that narrative 
sensibility is an intimate part of merciful judgement, and that the novel in particular is a 
construction based upon the capacity and need for mercy: [t]he novel's structure is a 
structure of suggnome - of the penetration of the life of another into one's own 
                                                             
90Martha Nussbaum, 'Equity and mercy' in Judging and understanding: essays on free will, narrative, 
meaning and the ethical limits of condemnation, ed. Pedro Tabensky (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 
2006), p. 13. 
91Nussbaum, 'Equity and mercy', p. 15. 
92Nussbaum, 'Equity and mercy', p. 17. 
93Nussbaum, 'Equity and mercy', p. 20.  This capacity is, in turn, cultivated by a daily practice of self-
examination, in which one honestly notes one's errors and, fearing nothing from them, says to oneself 
'see that you don't do that again, this time I pardon you.' 
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imagination and heart.'94  The practice of entering into the complex sequence of events 
that act as pressures upon action necessarily involves and in turn produces what might 
be called a merciful gaze. 
 Despite the very similar sense that love, understanding and judgement are intimately 
linked in this way, this is not, for Jankelevitch, an indication that the cultivation of 
forgiveness goes along with the cultivation of the humility of judgement just described.  
Forgiveness is an event of love in a way that has nothing to do with this tendency to 
judge mercifully, even though this understanding is dependent upon love.  This in turns 
means that 'forgivingness' is not the kind of thing one cultivates through the kind of 
self-examination Seneca recommends, or through compassionate imaginative efforts to 
see from the other's perspective.  Forgiveness does not emerge from, or sustain an 
underlying or ongoing attitude.  The understanding just outlined may well involve a 
costly sacrifice or painful renunciation (of the self-centred perspective), but this 
renunciation is not the event of forgiveness.95  The reason for this is that forgiveness is 
dependent upon a notion of offence which could not appear through the processes of 
understanding described by both Nussbaum (via Seneca) and Jankelevitch himself.  The 
'fact of having done' refers to the way in which malicious intention flashes in an instant 
which never has any duration, but nevertheless is then immortal; this is what one first 
has to see, or rather, this is how one must first see, in order to forgive.  The object of 
forgiveness is not the damage done in time, which can sometimes be amended, 
sometimes forgotten, sometimes excused, but the meaning, which exists atemporally 
even though it arises in time.  It is this that forgiveness responds to, with a similarly 
'tangential' moment.  But this also means that in a sense, the moral wrongness that 
forgiveness is concerned with is only recognised as such in a similarly pure instant of 
condemnation.  If forgiveness has no duration, and can only be 'brushed against', then 
                                                             
94Nussbaum, 'Equity and mercy', p. 24.  The conclusion about the ethical significance of the novel can 
be compared with Gillian Rose's rather enigmatic comments about the 'sympathy of the ultimate 
predator' which seems to be referring to film watching in particular.  One can sympathise with the 
spider, or with the fly, given the right presentation.  'Since she is the ultimate predator, she can be 
VHQWLPHQWDODERXWWKHYLFWLPKRRGRIRWKHUSUHGDWRUVZKLOHRYHUORRNLQJWKDWYLFWLP¶VRZQYLROHQW
predation; and she may embellish her arbitrary selectivity of compassion in rhapsodies and 
melodramas.'  See Gillian Rose, Mourning becomes the law: philosophy and representation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 48. 
95Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 82. 
64 
 
the condemnation which it confronts should, equally, be only negatively described, by 
its utter difference from our usual ways of understanding, judging or condemning, 
which always involve some level of process, and take time.  However, Jankelevitch 
does not draw this conclusion.  Despite the extremely elegant description of 
understanding as a labour of love rather than a search for objective accuracy, 
Jankelevitch does not explore the obvious problem that his conception of the truly 
ethical perspective produces: the recognition of wrongdoing remains just as beyond us 
as true forgiveness.  And more than this, in order to forgive one must in fact cultivate a 
way of seeing the utter simplicity of evil that is in some sense opposed to the judgement 
of love. 
 The conception of pure forgiveness offered tends to assume that the perception of 
complexity is likely to be complicit in a deferral of judgement.  If forgiveness emerges 
from this kind of perception (that things are always more complicated that 
condemnation allows) then forgiveness is not pure, because it may be motivated by 
one's desire to avoid conflict or receive similar judgement oneself.  But what is not 
sufficiently noted is the way that simplicity in judgement is equally open to abuse, so 
that the abstraction of sinner/sin/sinned against can be a resource for manipulation, 
coercion, deception, etc.  And as a result 'I forgive you' can be impure in its purity, so to 
speak, insofar as it presumes a completed verdict that it then suspends or abandons in 
some way.  'I forgive you' is always a judgement of one kind or another, and in the 
worst cases it may be 'a particularly clever form of vengeance,' a way of judging 
without judging (all of the benefits but none of the risk or difficulty).96  But because the 
ideal of forgiveness is only creative, and not at all responsive or responsible, the 
moment of judgement is disowned, so that it is either presumed that someone, or some 
aspect of the person, will be able to produce a solid recognition and naming of evil. In 
fact we can 'brush against' the purity of forgiveness only within the sphere of simple 
judgements97 
 However, there is an asymmetry in the two moments of simplicity. Jankelevitch 
argues that we cannot take up residence in the moment of forgiveness, since its purity 
makes its point 'infinitely fine'.  However, the whole structure of the book indicates that 
he assumes that we can take up residence within the condemnation of evil; its simplicity 
                                                             
96See James Alison on this point in On being liked (London: Darton, Longman and Todd), pp. 32-46. 
97Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, pp. 115-6. 
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is much more habitable.98  In the case of forgiveness, Jankelevitch assumes that 
although there is no process of translating the instant of forgiveness into habitual forms 
of understanding or ways of living, the effects of these moments may, nevertheless, be 
observed, and felt: '[t]he miracle is that the instantaneous advent is capable of 
inaugurating a future, of founding a new life, of instituting new relations among men; 
the miracle is that an era of peace could outlive the joyous instant.'99  Perhaps, then, we 
might also conclude that the instantaneous moment of condemnation (the 'jolt' of moral 
hatred)100 has no real duration, but nevertheless gives certain possibilities that are 
manifest in temporal forms of understanding.  But here Jankelevitch's presentation gets 
stuck, because both the sacrificial process of compassionate-yet-moral judgement and 
the pure instant of forgiveness are said to be agapeic.  The  truly understanding 
judgement, which proceeds in humility, patience, compassion, etc., necessarily has 
duration.  To judge in this way is a particular way of taking and giving time: one gives 
up time in order to consider the complexity of another person.  If this kind of 
understanding is an expression of love, it means that love takes time, love is given in 
the spending of time.  There may be no single moment where judgement is fully 
agapeic - free from fearful concern for oneself, personalised resentment towards the 
other, unseen individual bias, etc. - but love is in the duration of the effort itself, the 
openness that this supposes. 
 Why, then, is Jankelevitch so committed to the instant, to an uninhabitable point that 
gives no habits?  A full engagement with this question would require interaction with 
Jankelevitch's work as a whole, which I cannot offer.  John Milbank offers a brief but 
extremely dense critique of this position, in terms of the immanent conception of time 
that lies in the background.  For Milbank, it is because the past only is through memory 
                                                             
98This is particularly evident in his essay 'Should we pardon them?', where he rages against the 
presumption that the guilt incurred in the Shoah is subject to any erosion.  Here Jankelevitch argues that 
forgiveness is meaningless without the request for forgiveness, and that some evils are so beyond 
human comprehension that they become unforgivable.  In a sense, Jankelevitch actually confirms his 
own point here: the fine point of forgiveness is uninhabitable, even for someone who is able to affirm 
this.  See 'Should we pardon them?' tr. Ann Hobart in Critical Inquiry, vol. 22, no. 3, 1996.  Derrida's 
discussion of the relationship between the two works is crucial, but discussion of Derrida's position is 
reserved for the final chapter of this thesis. 
99Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 117. 
100On this point, see John Milbank's particularly dense discussion of the aporia of forgiveness and 
time in Being reconciled: ontology and pardon (London, Routledge, 2004), pp. 51-6. 
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that it can be forgiven, in that if even the worst evil can be re-narrated by grace, then 
what should have been the time of gift can become the time of mercy.101  For 
Jankelevitch, the past is real and yet inaccessible; this means that the past as such is 
unforgivable.  The only forgiveness, then, can be of the unforgivable, in opposition 
(unjustified and inexplicable opposition) to temporality.  Milbank offers Augustine's 
conception of time as a way of showing how temporality and forgiveness are not so 
starkly opposed: '[t]he past, on this understanding, only is through memory, and while 
this does not abolish the ontological inviolability and irreversibility of pastness, it does 
mean that the event in its very originality is open to alteration and mutation.'  Just as a 
note in a piece of music is situated by its place in the flow, such that it may be changed 
by what follows (in particular the conclusion of the piece), so any event, whilst always 
remaining the same, may also come to have a very different significance, given future 
developments or interpretation. 
 However, it appears that there is a reason for Jankelevitch's insistence on the instant 
that is rather more to do with a conviction about the nature of our orientation to the 
future than it is to do with the philosophical conception of the past which lies in the 
background. This concerns the way in which forgiveness is risky, and never certain of 
the future.  In his discussion of various kinds of impure forgiveness, Jankelevitch notes 
that not only might forgiveness be seen as an optimistic anticipation of innocence (one 
forgives in the hope the apparently guilty will be shown to be innocent) it may also be a 
way of exerting influence upon someone.  To forgive, then, would be a way of 
developing the 'infinitesimal good will' that, we hope, lies behind the bad will.  We 
pardon in the hope that gratitude will produce reform, and trust in the existence of a tiny 
seed of goodness.  But Jankelevitch notes that this could also be expressed in a more 
extreme way, so that 'speculation no longer speculates about an independent chance; 
speculation itself creates a destiny by speculating.'  Here forgiveness would imply the 
power of a transforming will, and 'to have an influence on the guilty person by the 
power of its radiance alone.'102  Obviously, there is a similarity here with what is 
conveyed in the parable of the unmerciful servant, because the parable relies on the 
expectation that the shock or relief of mercy should produce mercy in turn, and the 
sense of indignation that is provoked then serves as a caution to those listening: 'so my 
                                                             
101See John Milbank, Being reconciled, pp. 53-4. 
102Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 110. 
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Father will do to you if you do not forgive each other from the heart.'  Here the 
suggestion is that it is by being radically different that forgiveness produces radical 
difference. 
 Jankelevitch's objection to this is 'the lack of innocence of this tactical forgiveness'.  
If it is focused upon the future at all, this focus means that forgiveness is not a gift to 
the other, attention is divided between what could be and what is.103  The importance of 
the instant for Jankelevitch appears - in part,  at least - to be connected with the idea of 
an undivided attention to the other.104  His objection is not entirely consistent, however; 
it wavers between this sense of giving full attention to what is  present, which is in turn 
linked to the sense that love involves a loss of self in the other, and a sense of the purity 
of disinterest being tarnished by motivated action.105  The conflict here is between love 
as 'tender agape' and love as disinterestedness, and this conflict is part of the reason 
why there is both an affirmation of the likeness between forgiving and compassionately 
judging, and a disavowal of this continuity. 
 What Jankelevitch does not consider, however, is that the difficulty of forgiveness - 
the reason that forgiveness 'flickers' in a perplexing instant - is not so much that it 
involves a straightforward giving up of concern towards the future (and with it, concern 
for the future well-being of this particular other), but because it involves both concern 
for the future and a total acceptance of what is.  But this is exactly what seems to be 
effected in the 'he who wishes to save his life...' saying  considered above.  It would 
perhaps be easier to give up one's life if one no longer desired it, or if it were shown to 
not be worth desiring.  Similarly, it would perhaps be easier to forgive if this meant to 
abandon - for a miraculous instant - one's concern for the future (one's own future 
security, recognition, the future of the other, as well as of one's relationship with them).  
The embrace of the instant would then mean a well-bounded suspension of normality.  
But if the difficulty of forgiveness - the reason it may be encountered in a drastic 
moment - is due to the encounter between one's essential and continual concern for the 
future (for justice, for intimacy, for security, etc.) and an unconditional acceptance of 
what is. 
Interestingly, a few pages after this discussion, Jankelevitch invokes the Jesus-
                                                             
103Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, pp. 112-3. 
104Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 125. 
105Jankelevitch, Forgiveness pp. 113 and 120. 
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saying above to describe the acceptance of forgiveness, after an admission that the 
radical grace of forgiveness may well convert the sinner.  In doing so he comes very 
close to the approach just outlined, which appears to render the straightforward 
negativity of his approach suspect: 
And nothing prevents, either, the grace of forgiveness from converting the 
sinner, provided that this grace did not aim expressly at this conversion 
like a recompense that was due on account of its generosity, provided that 
forgiveness did not have the express intention of saving the immortal soul 
of the guilty person! ...  There is then a relation between forgiveness and 
the transfiguration of the guilty person ... but transfiguration does not 
need to be devised; and this relation is entirely undeliberated and indirect. 
...  In these matters, the pretension to efficaciousness is, then, the most 
common cause of failure, whereas the innocent acceptance of the failure 
alone renders forgiveness and remorse efficacious. For whoever wants to 
find salvation will miss it.106 
 
 
What is striking here is the affirmation that forgiveness contains some kind of uniquely 
efficacious power precisely through its 'innocent' lack of concern for beneficial 
outcomes (although little is said about why this might be).  Here, in contrast to much of 
the book, there is a relation between the embrace of the paradoxical instant and future 
possibilities, but it is a relation the one forgiving is not permitted to know of, or 
anticipate.107  But this insight could be much more fully developed if it was 
acknowledged that the lines between forgiveness and judgement are blurred, so that the 
command to forgive is not simply to exhort one to adopt an 'innocent' attitude towards 
the present, but equally to provoke a re-thinking of our processes of judgement.  In 
other words, to forgive is sometimes to renounce judgement, sometimes to submit our 
judgements to judgement, and since we do not know ourselves fully, we may not always 
know which.108  This is also to say that forgiveness is a way of being concerned with 
the future, a way of hoping and desiring.  This is exactly what the quotation above 
suggests; because the relation between forgiveness and its effects are never determinate, 
                                                             
106Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p. 121. 
107As we will see, a very similar notion appears in Simone Weil's work, so further discussion of this 
point will be reserved for chapter two. 
108See Oliver O'Donovan for a description of forgiveness as a 'judgement of judgement', in The ways 
of judgement (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), p. 94.  O'Donovan insists that 
forgiveness should be understand in terms of its forward looking objectives, as well as a particular form 
of recollection, meaning that forgiveness always has some relation to public norms of judgement.  See 
pp. 85-100. 
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in order to forgive one must in 'innocence' renounce control over the future of one's 
forgiveness.  It is not to cease to desire, but to desire differently, to desire without the 
element of certainty or control. 
 What I have attempted to do is to reinterpret Jankelevitch's emphasis on the instant 
of forgiveness, based on certain openings within his own presentation.  Rather than 
being simply in the gratuity of the instant, and in its competition with temporal 
processes of understanding, the heart of forgiveness is in the way in which these are 
held together.  On my reading, this holding-together is, as Jankelevitch suggests, not a 
moment which easily submits to evaluation or explication, since to forgive is to accept 
the worst whilst desiring the best. It is in this sense that forgiveness involves the 
suffering that characterises the love that 'bears all things, believes all things, hopes all 
things, endures all things'.109 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
What I hope to have shown, through the exploration of Charles Griswold's work in 
particular, is that forgiveness does not submit to reasoned judgement, because in an 
important sense, forgiveness involves the question of how we relate to our ideals, and 
the thinking that upholds them.  The difficulty encountered in articulating the meaning 
of forgiveness demonstrates that the concerns that are operative in any evaluation of the 
good of forgiveness do not necessarily cohere, or pull in the same direction.  In this 
sense, discussion of forgiveness exposes what Charles Taylor has called the 'cross-
pressures' of our thinking.  Central to this dynamic is the way in which trust is 
evaluated: if trust is valuable in some way, how can its goodness appear unambiguously, 
without requiring a sacrifice of other ideals?  Perhaps because of this, the idea of 
forgiveness seems to be intuitively connected to a sense of excessive, or even irrational 
gratuity, so that forgiveness does not submit to reason but is found through the 
abandonment of the need for reasons.  However, the attempt to fully articulate this 
sense, through a more poetic and enigmatic discourse, produces in turn a very different 
restriction: forgiveness may be excessive, gratuitous and even a little mad, but it is, at 
the same time, unable to exert any challenging or destabilising effect on ordinary 
                                                             
1091 Corinthians 13: 7. 
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patterns of thinking, and this in turn produces the suspicion of a form of complicity 
between the two.  Utilising some of the inconsistencies in Jankelevitch's very rich 
presentation, I have attempted to articulate the intuition that forgiveness is not 
straightforwardly within reason in a rather different way.  This may be described in a 
number of ways: to forgive is to accept what is, and has been, without diminishing one's 
desire for a better future; to forgive it is to somehow incorporate the worst whilst 
hoping for the best. 
 This formulation suggests that forgiveness concerns a way of dwelling within 
certain tensions - the adoption of a particular posture - and furthermore that the meaning 
of forgiveness will not be accessible from any single perspective, since it necessarily 
concerns a process of re-learning.  In the next chapter, these insights will be extended 
through interaction with the thought of Simone Weil, who reflects on these issues in 
ways that are both illuminating and problematic. 
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Chapter two 
 
Simone Weil: acceptance, protest and desire 
  
Herbert Morris, who wrote a response to one of Jeffrey Murphy's early articles on 
forgiveness used the following passage from one of Simone Weil's notebooks to hint 
towards the sense that forgiveness has a mysterious and transcendent dimension.1 
A beloved being who disappoints me.  I have written to him.  It is 
impossible that he should not reply by saying what I have said to myself 
in his name.  Men owe us what we imagine they will give us.  We must 
forgive them this debt. 
To accept the fact that they are other than the creatures of our imagination 
is to imitate the renunciation of God. 
I also am other than what I imagine myself to be.  To know this is 
forgiveness.2 
 
These lines are typical of Weil's writing in their simplicity and force.  Here forgiveness 
is linked with transformation of perspective, in that 'we must forgive them this debt' 
does not simply mean a tempering of unrealistic expectations of others, but aims at a 
perspective completely purified of 'imagination'. 
 In what follows I wish to explore in greater depth the kind of tensions that are 
produced in the attempt to articulate forgiveness as an aspect of transformed perspective 
through an examination of Simone Weil's notebooks and late essays.  As we have begun 
to explore, forgiveness involves both acceptance and desire, and to forgive is to live 
through the conflict between the two.  Simone Weil is, in Gillian Rose's words, a 
'phenomenologist of conflict',3 and so proves a provocative example here, because of 
                                                             
1Herbert Morris, 'Murphy on forgiveness' in Criminal justice ethics 3, p.  16.   
2Simone Weil, Gravity and grace, tr. Emma Crawford and Marion von der Ruhr (London: Routledge, 
1999), p.  9.  Quotations are from Gravity and grace where the relevant entry could not be found in the 
Notebooks.  Gravity and grace is a small selection from the notebooks, edited by Gustav Thibon, with 
whom Weil lived for a short period of time before she left France. 
3Gillian Rose, 'Angry angels: Simone Weil and Emmanuel Levinas' in Judaism and modernity: 
philosophical essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.  220.  Rose compares Weil to Levinas in the sense 
that both use philosophical means to highlight the essentially ethical nature of the religious impulse (p.  
212). 
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her willingness to think in extremes, and for the way in which the conflict within her 
thinking is so obvious, indeed, consciously reflected upon.  If, as suggested, the height 
of forgiveness would be an unrelenting hope for the best alongside an incorporation of 
the worst, then in many respects Weil's notebooks and essays are examples of the 
tension that this involves and produces.  In particular, I will focus upon the attempts she 
makes to reflect upon suffering, and the (sometimes contradictory) insights she forms in 
the process.  Through an exploration of how she believes that a compassionate and 
attentive recognition of suffering is expressed in the texture of one's thinking itself, I 
will suggest that Weil is faced with a difficulty in knowing how to articulate the truth 
that compassion sees.  Any positive statement of what suffering means may collude 
with one's desire to evade attending to it, just as, for Jankelevitch, when one gives 
reasons for one's graciousness, one betrays.  However, I hope to demonstrate that Weil's 
thinking moves beyond the limitations that are found in an exclusive emphasis on the 
momentary nature of grace, because the posture of 'waiting' that she describes is a way 
of dwelling in time.  In the second half of  the chapter I turn to Weil's understanding of 
the cross as the perfect instance of 'waiting', and so as the basis for an account of 
redemptive suffering.  Here I compare the virtue that Weil saw in acceptance with 
Miroslav Volf's discussion of 'strict justice'.  This comparison highlights the importance 
of Weil's thought for our understanding of forgiveness.  I will begin, however, with 
further consideration of some of the synoptic material that relates to forgiveness. The 
issues raised will frame the discussions that follow. 
 
 
Introduction: promise, principle and reversal 
 
What follows is a rather schematic presentation of some of the theological issues that 
hover in the background, given so as to situate Weil's sometimes idiosyncratic work in 
relation to more familiar ethical and theological concerns. 
We can begin with further consideration of the text already noted: '[t]hose who want 
to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will save it.'4  
                                                             
4
 Mk 8:36 (NRSV). See also variants in Mt 10:39, 16:25, Lk 9:24 and 17:33, plus Jn 12:25. 
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Although it is immediately and powerfully suggestive, the precise meaning of this 
saying remains elusive.  As already suggested, this saying conveys both the difficulty of 
entering the kingdom of heaven and the nature of the life within it, just as forgiveness 
may be taken both as a condition of entry ('if you do not forgive...') and a characteristic 
of the lives of those who receive it ('forgive, and you will be forgiven').  Two obvious 
ways of understanding this text present themselves: firstly, eschatologically, as an 
expression of a promise; secondly, ethically, as an articulation of a principle.  If it 
expresses something like a promise, and an invitation to trust, then the important thing 
is that there is a relationship between the saving and the losing, the losing and the 
saving.  What is important is that the one follows the other, not the nature of this 
connection or development.  But if it articulates something like a principle, then the 
nature of the connection is vital: why is it that the attempt to save one's life can lead to 
its loss?  And why should loss, under particular circumstances, lead to gain?  It is the 
place of the desire to save one's life in this saying that proves most difficult to interpret.  
One assumes that concern for one's life is not really in question, as the verse that 
immediately follows in Mark's version suggests: 'For what will it profit them to gain the 
whole world and forfeit their life? Indeed, what can they give in return for their life?'  
Life's importance is such that it cannot be measured by any comparison, or be the 
subject of any exchange.  Indeed, it is the concern for one's life that makes one listen: if 
one did not care about losing or saving one's life, the warning and the promise would be 
of no interest.  And yet the desire or pursuit that the immeasurable value of one's life 
inspires is ambiguous, and subject to warning and scrutiny.  The question, then, is not of 
whether or not to desire one's life, but of how. 
The question of the relation between promise and principle relates closely to the 
shaping and directing of this desire; each gives rise to a different kind of pursuit, a 
different relation between means and end.  If there is a way of wanting to save one's life 
that endangers it, a principle that made fully intelligible the connection between loss 
and gain may only feed and encourage this form of desire, through providing a 
guaranteed progression from means to ends.  Such a principle may have the power to 
transform one's understanding of where to look for one's life, but not to transform how 
one looks.  Perhaps instead of looking for riches and power, one may look for ways to 
incur loss through acts of giving; that is, for sacrificial opportunities.  Either way, one's 
way of searching may remain unchanged.  Furthermore, a fully intelligible principle 
74 
 
that showed how loss produces gain would simply prevent real loss from ever appearing 
or being felt.  If loss is instantly transformed, through the comprehension of some 
principle, into gain, one would never have the time in which it would be necessary to 
accept it as loss.  However, if we are wrong to look for a fully present principle behind 
these words, accepting them as pure promise is just as problematic.  If one really saw 
that the value of one's life is such that it cannot be measured against anything else, what 
could possibly act as a sufficient impetus to simply accept the promise that its loss 
could somehow lead to gain? Perhaps a complete trust in the one who makes the 
promise, and a dim apprehension that this is, in some sense, how things work.  But both 
of these ultimately appeal to some kind of intelligibility; that is, to the beginnings of a 
principle.   
A similar problem emerges in any reading of the beatitudes.  Although the repetitive 
structure of these sayings gives the impression of a common pattern, the nature of the 
pattern is not obvious.  Some of the initial characteristics relate to actions or attitudes 
commanded elsewhere (to show mercy, to hunger for righteousness), whereas others are 
more or less passively borne as a result of circumstance (to mourn, to be persecuted, to 
be poor in spirit).  Similarly, the relationship between the present condition and 
'blessedness' could be construed in a number of ways.  Perhaps most obviously, some of 
these sayings seem to affirm that despite their condition the poor in spirit, the meek, the 
grieving, the persecuted are, or will be, blessed.  The blessing that is the coming of the 
kingdom does not respect the distinctions that usually distinguish the fortunate from the 
unfortunate, just as the sun shines on the just and the unjust.  And so blessedness may 
be hidden at present beneath the veil of good or bad fortune, but it is nevertheless still 
obvious ± it consists in receiving the kingdom of heaven, in inheriting the earth, in 
being comforted.  One does not have to be told why one is blessed in inheriting the 
earth, or in being comforted; such things are a blessing.  However, another logic also 
suggests itself through some of the sayings.  The merciful will receive mercy, surely, 
because of the mercy they have showed; the pure in heart will see God because that was 
what they desired above all else; those that hunger for justice or righteousness are 
rewarded according to their hunger.  These sayings, then, may announce a completion 
in which the full significance of present actions or attitudes is fully developed and 
recognised; the peacemakers are finally named as the children of God they always were.   
Finally, and perhaps most problematically, the first and last of the beatitudes end 
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with 'for theirs is the kingdom of heaven', suggesting, perhaps that the kingdom of 
heaven is already present in poverty of spirit and persecution, and that the values of the 
kingdom are plainly and simply opposed to earthly values.  But if poverty of spirit and 
persecution can be manifestations of the kingdom (persecution in particular, is 
described as being a sign of one's inheritance of the kingdom, the mark of an authentic 
prophet), what is it that makes inheritance of this kingdom a blessing, rather than a 
curse?  If the persecuted are receiving the kingdom of heaven in and through their 
persecutions, why should one desire this kingdom? The Lucan version of the beatitudes 
renders this problem more acutely: it is not simply the poor in spirit to whom the 
kingdom already belongs, but simply the poor; wealth, satiety and laughter are signs 
that one has nothing good left to receive, that one has already received one's reward.  
But proclaiming an inversion of human values, affirming that wealth is poverty, 
weakness is strength, and suffering, joy, is far from straightforward.  If this is to be the 
case, if poverty can manifest a kind of wealth, what is it that makes this poverty wealth, 
if not wealth? Speech rebels against the attempt to simply invert values, because 
articulating such an inversion requires an affirmation: if all values are reversed, on what 
basis does one affirm anything - what is it that one is doing when one affirms?  If the 
blessings of the kingdom appear as paradoxically opposed to all usual notions of 
blessing, why should one count them as blessings at all? This latter reading is far too 
extreme to be of much use on its own, and fails to take into account much of the nuance 
of these sayings.  Nevertheless, the problem it poses is a real one, one that arises as 
soon as images of inversion are used at all, and in particular, one that appears to haunt 
any attempt to talk about redemptive suffering or self-denial. 
These tensions have a bearing both on the discussions of forgiveness already 
outlined and on the interpretation of the thought of Simone Weil.  We have already seen 
how the question of the intelligibility of forgiveness becomes ethically significant: does 
forgiveness ask us to operate according to given principles that guarantee its goodness, 
legitimacy and potency, or are we asked to step more nervously and dangerously 
beyond what we can know? Secondly, there is the sense that both a fully intelligible and 
justified forgiveness that exhibits prudent judgement, and an entirely momentary, mad 
forgiveness that exhibits creative grace seem to lose an important aspect of the 
difficulty of forgiveness.  Both completed principle and sheer promise seem to lose the 
responsibility involved in forgiving in different ways, and yet if we are to affirm that 
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forgiveness has the beginnings - and only the beginnings - of an intelligibility, we have 
the problem of responding to promise whilst searching for principle.  Put differently, 
this is the problem of how to combine the virtues of responsibility and trust, prudence 
and generosity.  Thirdly, there is the question of the extent to which an ethic of 
forgiveness might radically transform our evaluations, and if so, what mode of 
affirmation would be fitting.  If forgiveness is good in a way that we do not (yet) know 
how to comprehend, how might it be held up, or affirmed?  Each of these tensions are 
concerned, one way or another, with the problem of a gap, a space in which the 
frustration of incoherence is heightened by the suggestions of intelligibility, in which 
principle has as yet only been promised, and in which true treasure has not yet shown 
how it is valuable.   
 With these considerations in mind, the following discussion will begin with an 
exposition of Weil's approach to the problem of suffering, proceed to an exploration of 
her attempts to bring compassion into thought so that rationality is itself compassionate, 
and then finally interrogate her conceptions of redemptive suffering with her own 
warnings and concerns in mind. 
 
 
I 
Suffering, compassion and thought 
 
Simone Weil's preoccupation with suffering - philosophically, spiritually and 
practically - is the chief cause of both the admiration and the consternation she inspires.  
Her exploration of suffering and compassion demonstrates not only her central 
concerns, but also the sometimes tense relationship between the different levels of her 
thought.5 
                                                             
5The centre of Weil's metaphysics is not her notion of compassion, but the idea of separation of the 
necessary from the good, as Miklos Veto notes: '[a]t bottom it is a vision of reality containing in its 
totality only two true perfections, necessity and love, which will thereby become the two faces of God.  
The act of creation itself will reveal this duality.' (Miklos Veto, The religious metaphysics of Simone 
Weil, tr. Joan Dargon, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, pp.  11-2). Weil was certainly 
unashamed of metaphysics, and her affirmation of the importance of the contemplation of contradiction 
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Weil's phenomenology of suffering alone is a significant contribution to reflection 
on these issues.  Significantly, even the most complex forms of distress linked to the 
intellect or emotional life are still described as analogous to physical pain, in the way 
that it constrains and determines thought.  When suffering, one no longer has the 
freedom to choose a particular object to consider, one's attention is restricted, whether 
to one's own body and the present moment, a traumatic memory, or some fearfully 
anticipated event.6  However, as Weil notes, a couple of hours of toothache leave no 
permanent mark on the soul.  'Affliction', however, names something deeper than 
momentary distress: it is the combination of suffering, social degradation and subjection 
to blind necessity.  The Iliad, the figure of Job, the experience of slaves and Jesus' 
prayers in Gethsemane and on the cross are the central co-ordinates in Weil's 
understanding of this experience.  Weil describes affliction in a number of ways: as the 
complete uprooting of the person that prolonged exposure to the fear of death produces, 
as the state of being stripped of the clothing of character and turned into a mere thing,7 
or as a heightened yet powerless experience of time, and one's complete submission to 
it: '[e]ach second which passes brings some being in the world nearer to something he 
cannot bear'.8  Most importantly, affliction is an experience of an  absence of meaning, 
it cannot be fitted into any coherent structure of understanding.  In this way, the 
suffering involved in martyrdom may be qualitatively different from affliction because 
it may be recognised as containing some nobility or purpose, even if only by the martyr 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
is not meant to indicate the futility of rational activity, since it is only through careful analysis that 
contradiction appears as contradiction. See Andre Devaux, 'On the right use of contadiction according 
to Simone Weil' tr.  J.  P.  Little in 6LPRQH:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\RIFXOWXUHUHDGLQJVWRZDUGVDGLYLQH
humanity, ed. Richard H Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.  153 on this point. 
However, in many respects the abstract aspects of Weil's thought can be seen as experimental attempts 
to translate a more basic experience into philosophical language.  The central spiritual condition or 
movement in her conception of human life - 'compassion for creatures' - seems, as we will see, to 
function as a test for rational activity, and so I will presume this order of priority here.  Treating Weil's 
work in this way produces a different set of problems: rather than examine the consistency of her 
philosophical system, the task is to explore her attempts to be true to the experiences she found to be at 
the centre of graced human life, the contours of the struggle, and the way in which she continually 
reflects upon this process. 
6
 Weil, Waiting on God.  tr. Emma Crawford (London: Harper Collins, 1977), p. 62, and Notebooks, 
tr.  Arthur Wills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956),  p. 158. 
7Weil, Notebooks, p. 252. 
8
 Weil, Notebooks, p. 27. 
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himself, whereas no such consolation naturally appears in the experience of affliction.  
Hence Christ's suffering is not dignified: '[c]hrist was afflicted.  He did not die like a 
martyr.  He died like a common criminal, confused with thieves, only a little more 
ridiculous.  For affliction is ridiculous.'9  For Weil, the lack of conscious, cruel intention 
on the part of those perpetrating horrific acts simply increases the senselessness of it: 
one can be reduced to misery by someone who does not understand what they are 
doing, or why (hence the expression 'for they know not what they do' only increases as 
the isolation of the one suffering, as Amery also noted).  The significance of the 
suffering that crime produces is not experienced or even conceived by the criminal, 
only by the victim, and this one-sidedness is itself part of the ordeal.10  Related to this is 
the idea that affliction is ugly.  One of the central needs of the human soul is for beauty, 
to feel that one inhabits a beautiful world, but affliction appears to drain the world of all 
beauty, and the complete absence of beauty is a horror humans do anything to avoid.11 
Essentially, affliction destroys any sense of the reality of God: '[a]ffliction makes God 
appear absent for a time, more absent than a dead man.  .  .  A kind of horror submerges 
the whole soul.  During this absence there is nothing to love.'12 
As a result, we seldom, if ever, contemplate suffering honestly or willingly.  
Drawing on the book of Job, Weil stresses the  tendency to despise the afflicted, to 
'attach all the scorn, all the revulsion, all the hatred which our reason attaches to crime, 
to affliction.'13  The sight of affliction repels, because it makes us aware of our 'almost 
infinite fragility.'14  The body can be left in permanent pain by the simplest of physical 
changes, and the soul and the social personality are equally subject to unpredictable 
forces and dependent upon all sorts of external objects, themselves temporary and 
unpredictable.15  On the whole, we live with the illusion of having chosen our well-
                                                             
9
 Weil, Waiting on God, p. 68. 
10Weil, Waiting on God, p. 68.  See also First and last notebooks, p. 69: 'Evil is something external to 
itself; and in the place where it is, it is not felt.  It is felt where it is not.  The feeling of evil is not an 
evil.' 
11
 Weil, Waiting on God, p. 99. 
12
 Weil, Waiting on God, p. 65. 
13
 Weil, Waiting on God, p. 65. 
14
 Simone Weil, Science, necessity and the love of God, tr. and ed. Richard Rees (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p. 185. 
15
 Weil, Science, necessity and the love of God, p. 184. 
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being, and of deserving our comfort, but considering the afflicted raises the horrible 
suspicion that we too are entirely at the mercy of circumstance; no deep principle or 
existential right separates our well being from their poverty, sickness or misfortune.16  
More than this, thought is repulsed by affliction because it involves contemplating a 
void in meaning, the idea of an experience lived through with no purpose or goal other 
than that which is imposed upon one: like a slave being told to take an object from A to 
B, and then back again, and made to repeat this all day, every day, their only goal being 
to stay alive.  It is duration with no telos, and as such, regret manifests something 
similar.  She gives the fictional example of a selfish young man who agrees to prostitute 
his wife to a rich but repulsive old man in exchange for a fortune.  Afterwards the 
young man learns that there was never any chance of receiving this fortune, and is left 
contemplating the reality of his act without the sense that his motive seemed to give it: 
Wishing incessantly that his wife was still intact (would he not make a 
good hero for a tragedy?) his thought reverts to the recent past, when she 
was.  To return to the present, his thought must pass through that 
happening.  But that happening has now lost the motive which alone 
made it possible.  His thought keeps continually falling into the past and 
can only get back to the present by passing through the impossible. 
It is the same with an action whose accomplishment puts an end to the 
motive which alone made it possible.  For example, a murder due to rage 
which subsides as soon as the murder has been committed.   
Thought, having fled back to the innocent past, must go through the 
murder again without feeling rage.  But that is an impossible journey.17 
 
Finally, then, affliction is destructive because it tends to produce dishonesty in those 
who suffer and inflict it; the journey from past to present cannot be avoided in fact, but 
it can be looked away from in thought.  In affliction, one is subject to contradictory 
forces: the suffering consumes one's attention and brings it back repeatedly to the 
present,  but the same suffering produces the desire for a future in which there is no 
trace of it.  Two thoughts about the duration of suffering may appear to ease this tension 
                                                             
16
 Here Weil articulates something that Jean Amery expressed in more detail, after having been 
tortured: '[t]he first blow brings home to the prisoner that he is helpless, and thus it already contains 
everything that is to come.  ...  They are permitted to punch me in the face, the victim feels in numb 
surprise and concludes in just as numb certainty: they will do with me what they want.' Jean Amery, At 
the mind's limits, p.  27. 
17
 Weil, First and last notebooks, p. 148. 
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a little: that it will stop immediately, that it will continue forever.  'We can think of it as 
impossible or necessary, but we can never think that it simply is.  That is unendurable.'18  
The hope that suffering is going to stop in the very next instant is linked to the thought 
'I cannot bear it, therefore it is going to cease'.19  However, to gloomily suppose that this 
suffering is destined to last forever is to seek comfort in despair, which is at least fixed 
and final, but is also yet another kind of illusion.  If suffering, however horrific, can be 
relied upon, or predicted, the element of chance and senselessness is diminished, so that 
one does not have to contemplate the fact that one could just as easily be that person 
over there, the one who is not suffering.  The disproportion between the felt 
significance of suffering, and the external meaninglessness of its distribution and 
purpose produces a sense of disharmony, and imbalance.  Even the attempt to 
characterise those who inflict destructive suffering as evil - to identify those who are 
moral monsters - could, on this understanding, become a way of trying to restore the 
balance, insofar as one looks for a conscious intention to match the depth of the 
suffering.20 
To show compassion to someone in affliction is, for Weil, a supernatural act, 
because it involves contemplating this senselessness with those who suffer, without 
ceasing to love.  The contemplation of suffering is a secondary level of suffering, an 
expenditure of energy with no reward: one suffers not only through acknowledging 
another individual's affliction, but simply through acknowledging the possibility of such 
affliction.  The text in the background of Weil's account here is the parable of good 
Samaritan, of which she says: 
Those who pass by this thing scarcely notice it, and a few minutes 
afterwards do not even know that they saw it.  Only one stops and turns 
his attention towards it.  The actions that follow are just the automatic 
effect of this moment of attention.  The attention is creative.  But at the 
                                                             
18
 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p82. 
19
 Weil, Notebooks, p157. 
20
 This is what Cyril O'Regan, developing Weil's insights, refers to as the 'fallacy of inference', and 
this tends to be followed by the 'fallacy of representation', whereby those who cause immense suffering 
tend to be represented, in fiction especially, as particularly interesting or glamourous, as if the  power to 
cause immense suffering must be connected to an individual potency, rather than simply being a 
possibility inherent in the universe.  See O'Regan, 'Countermimesis and Simone Weil's Christian 
Platonism' in The Christian Platonism of Simone Weil ed.  E.  Jane Doering and Eric O.  Springsted 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), p. 190. 
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moment when it is engaged it is renunciation.  This is true, at least, if it is 
pure.  The man accepts being diminished by concentrating on an 
expenditure of energy, which will not extend his own power but will only 
give existence to a being other than himself, who will exist independently 
of him.21 
 
The idea that attention is creative is one which seems underdeveloped in Weil's 
notebooks, but the fact that it appears here in a more carefully considered essay is 
significant.  The attention paid to the afflicted is an echo of God's creative attention.  It 
does not simply respond to what is there, but creates the object of its contemplation: 
'[c]reative attention means really giving our attention to what does not exist.  Humanity 
does not exist in the anonymous flesh lying by the road-side.'22  The movement of 
compassion is not, therefore, accounted for by a quality displayed in the suffering of the 
afflicted.  The worst suffering destroys and reduces humanity, it does not reveal it.   And 
because contemplating the suffering of the afflicted involves facing one's own limited 
nature and powers (not only could it be me lying there in the road, I do not have the 
power to change the fact that such and such happened, and may happen again), it also 
involves consenting to a reduction in one's sense of life, beauty and power, with no 
guarantee of this being 'made up for'.  Acts of compassion are not simply reflections or 
imitations of the love of God, they are the love of God, whether recognised as such or 
not.  It is only God who can pay attention to an afflicted man,23 and it is through human 
attention that God listens to and gazes upon the creation.24   
 For Weil, supernatural compassion differs from most acts of  pity, which are 
frequently a kind of necessary guard against the impact of affliction when one can no 
longer avoid encountering it.  One usually offers help to someone so as to discharge the 
obligation to think about another's suffering, or (which is worse) to enjoy the feeling of 
power that comes through observing the effect one's efforts can have upon those less 
fortunate than oneself, whereas supernatural compassion involves identifying one's own 
frailty with the affliction of another.  This painful identification is not naturally made 
any easier by either experience or innocence: those who have not suffered dread it, and 
so are unwilling to think of the possibility; those who have suffered hate it and wish 
                                                             
21
 Weil, Waiting on God, p. 84. 
22
 Weil, Waiting on God, p. 85. 
23
 Weil, Waiting on God, p. 86, First and last notebooks, p. 92, and Notebooks, p. 333 
24
 Weil, Notebooks, p. 378-9 and p. 383. 
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only to forget it.  It is, equally, opposed to any kind of fascination or love of suffering.  
Despite the fact that, because of what one knows about her life and manner of death, 
one may read in many of her more extreme comments an unhealthy preoccupation with 
suffering, Weil is perfectly clear that the seeking out of suffering is mistaken, and 
wrong.25  To seek suffering because of what it may, somehow, give or produce is to fail 
to recognise the destructive nature of affliction, and to fail to value the life it destroys. 
For Weil, the reluctance to attend to misery and suffering is not just the result of a 
lack of warmth, or a preoccupation with one's own affairs, it arises from a kind of denial 
of the most troubling aspect of reality.  For Weil, the most incomprehensible aspect of 
existence is not the malign human will but the destructive experience of suffering, 
whether brought about by the intentional actions of another person, the impersonal 
forces of nature, or a mixture of both.26 The knowledge that such useless and 
undeserved suffering can and has occurred should be enough to reconfigure all thought; 
the scandal is that it is not.  This is expressed with particular force and clarity in the 
following remark: 
Let us suppose a man whose entire family has perished amidst tortures, 
and who himself was long exposed to torture in a concentration camp; or 
an American Indian of the sixteenth century who was the sole survivor of 
his people.  Such men as these, if they ever believed in God's mercy, 
either believe in it no longer, or else conceive it in an entirely different 
fashion from that in which they did before.  I myself have not gone 
through such things.  But I know that they exist; hence what difference is 
there? It comes, or must come, or should come to the same thing.27 
 
Just as the friends in the book of Job present forms of human wisdom that fail to 
acknowledge the reality of undeserved suffering, and are judged lacking as a result, so 
                                                             
25
 Weil, Science, necessity and the love of God, p. 184, and First and last notebooks, in which Weil 
writes almost as if she was writing her own creed: 'I believe in the value of suffering so long as one 
makes every [legitimate] attempt to escape it.' (p. 3.) 
26
 There is no sense, in Weil's writing, of horrified fascination at the possibility that a human could 
will evil for its own sake ± an idea which is plainly excluded by her account of the human will and the 
good - instead there is an acute sensitivity to the experience of those who suffer evil.  It is in this sense 
that evil is a mystery: the will of the evil doer does not demand attention, the experience of those who 
suffer as a result does.  Evil dwells in the heart of the evildoer without being felt there - this is to be 
expected given the predominance of illusion ± but it is felt in the heart of the victim.   
27
 Weil, Notebooks, p. 432.   
83 
 
Weil suggests here that there is something wrong with any conception of God that could 
not be shared by someone who had been through the most extreme affliction, or 
communicated to them without insult.  This would be to exclude them from one's moral 
or spiritual universe, to deny their existence.  For Weil, most conceptions of God and of 
the shape and texture of moral life fail to include the reality of undeserved suffering, 
because the voice of affliction is so difficult to listen to and its truth so difficult to 
express.  Wherever it is recognised, wherever there are acts of compassion 
unaccompanied by the assurance of an explanation or the confidence of having the 
power to end affliction, there is the love of God, whether it is consciously invoked or 
not (and for this reason Weil states rather boldly that she knows that the author of the 
Iliad knew the love of God while the author of the book of Joshua did not). 
 The ability to show compassion is intimately linked, then, not just with a recognition 
of the troubling reality of another's suffering, but with a recognition of the possibility of 
this suffering within the universe, as an ineliminable part of one's being.   So although 
Weil describes compassion in terms of an instinctive (although in some way 
supernaturally instinctive) response towards an individual, she suggests that this 
response is only possible as part of an acceptance of something that is more like a 
philosophical truth about the world in general, and in doing so links the ability to 
perceive affliction in another with one's openness to truth generally.  The sight of 
affliction is the sight of human finitude, frailty, insubstantiality; it is also the fact of 
necessity ± that God has given everything over to mechanical processes that can wreck 
and ruin everything that is most beautiful in humans (and for Weil, human evil is itself 
made up of almost mechanical processes, as discussed below).  To show real 
compassion is, at some level, to recognise all this, and to love nevertheless, and this 
movement, or posture, has resonances at every level of the human person, and every 
level of thought. 
 
 
Compassionate thought 
 
Weil's comments on the implicit love of God make it clear that she thought that 
compassion is quite possible without an explicit recognition of the significance she 
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believed to be present in every such act, but it is also clear that she believed that this 
quality could be displayed at the level of one's conceptual understanding, and that 
conceptual understanding itself can be compassionate, or lacking in compassion.  She is 
extremely sensitive to the ways in which the affirmation of a particular truth can operate 
so as to obscure the very same truth, and the way in which dogmas that begin as a 
response to affliction frequently end by clouding the reality of affliction.  But the 
question Weil's account raises is of how one can say anything at all about human 
suffering without throwing a comforting veil over it (and therefore of whether there are 
forms of comfort which are not simply veils), of how one can speak about an absence of 
significance, or of how to provide a representation of the world in which there is some 
void.28  Put differently, the problem is of how to think so as to produce compassion and 
of how to make thought itself compassionate.   
 A good example of Weil's treatment of this tension, and of the pressure it exerts on 
her work, is found in a cluster of remarks from her New York notebook: 
If one is hungry one eats, not for the love of God but because one is hungry.   
If an unknown man lying hungry in the road is hungry one must give him food, 
even if one has not enough for oneself, not for the love of God, but because he is 
hungry.29 
 
If one demands an explanation or understanding of the suffering of the afflicted before 
one is prepared to give them one's attention - a principle which guarantees that the 
attention will not be wasted - one will never get as far as compassion.  Hence the 
attention of compassion involves, and is dependent upon, an exposure to waste and 
insignificance.  Or in other words, compassion involves seeing only the current reality 
of suffering, not some future resolution or significance, something one's action would 
be for.  However, on  the next page, Weil appears to affirm the exact opposite: 
Every thinking being is worthy of love solely in so far as he has received 
existence by God's creative act, and possesses the right to renounce that 
existence for the love of God.  It is solely on this account that I have the 
right to love myself or another.  Only God is the good, therefore only he 
is a worthy object of care, solicitude, anxiety, longing, and efforts of 
thought. 
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 Weil, Notebooks, pp. 483-4 and 148.   
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 Weil, First and last notebooks, pp. 123-4. 
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In this case, the attempt to describe more fully the religious aspect of compassion, or 
the deeper metaphysical structure within which it has its place, seems to compromise 
the immediacy, and the concern for the particular as particular that characterises it.30  
We have already seen a similar tension within Jankelevitch's understanding of 
forgiveness; the sense that something essential is compromised in the movement 
towards intelligibility, or accountability.  Weil is not unaware of this tension, and so 
attempts to incorporate it into her thinking, as a comment on the previous page 
indicates: '[t]here are some truths which one must not know, or not too much.  E.g.  that 
the final outcome of obedience to God is undoubtedly beatitude.'31  One should love 
only God, but one should attend to the suffering of the other for its own sake, not for the 
sake of any divine contact or illumination that one might gain as a result.  This conflict 
is perhaps why she goes on to say that the value of some representations is dependent 
on their use.  The example given is the notion of hell, which should only be considered 
in relation to oneself,32 and for Weil the ambiguous value of certain ideas implies the 
need for a subtle structuring of thought: 
In the domain of the transcendent there is an architecture of representation and 
ideas.  Some are to be put in the foreground and others in the silent, secret part 
of the soul, unknown to consciousness.  Some should be in the imagination, 
others in the completely abstract intelligence, others in both places, etc. 
 This complex and refined architecture, which is operative even in those who 
are called simple, if they are close to sanctity, is what builds a soul ready for 
                                                             
30On this point see Rowan Williams, 'Simone Weil and the necessary non-existence of God' in 
Wrestling with angels, ed.  Mike Higton (London: SCM Press 2007).  Williams argues that a Kantian 
conviction that the limited subject is necessarily a source of error motivates this to-and-fro moment in 
her work between affirmation of the finite and particular, and the desire to purge conditional desires by 
a wrenching away from attachment: 'Hence, too, we cannot and must not love ourslves except 'because 
God loves us' ± and thus, presumably, as God loves, that is, unconditionally and impersonally, as part of 
the fabric of the necessary.  God loves that particular perspective of creation which can only be had 
from the spot where I am; but only when I am absent from it ± i.e.  not really as a subject's perspective.'  
(p. 220).  In other words, in some respects, Weil maintains a competitive notion of the relationship 
between God and creation, despite many indications of trajectories which move beyond this 
perspective, e.g. her insistence on 'the beauty of the world' as 'proof of incarnation'. 
31
 Weil, First and last notebooks, p. 122. 
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 Weil says that the notion of hell should be accepted when it is a case of accepting the will of God 
for oneself when one feels on the verge of damnation, but not when one feels close to salvation, because 
in that case one is accepting it for other people.   
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salvation.33 
 
Weil does not explicitly connect this point with her comments on compassion, self-love 
and the love of God, but there does seem to be a link.  On Weil's account, in 
compassion, there is in the foreground the simple need of another person, which exerts 
a pressure without further reference, just as one's hunger is itself the reason for 
satisfying it.  However, there is - at another level - an understanding of the nature of the 
good of created beings, which is of a more abstract nature.  An architecture is  required, 
which will harmonise this conceptual insight with one's sense of duty to others, so that 
one can form in the intelligence the idea that it is the goodness of God which grounds 
the love of self and neighbour-as-self, whilst keeping this insight sufficiently secret, so 
that it may exert its influence without being noticed, in such a way that compassion 
arises as if it were instinctive.  A similar kind of 'architecture' can be found in a number 
of her most important ideas.  Elsewhere, Weil makes a similar point in terms of 
different levels or planes of reality, and here the difficulty in articulating and affirming 
certain ideas is linked to the possibility of something being true at one level but not at 
another: 
To enumerate the truths which are of such a nature that by affirming them 
one destroys them (e.g.  the grace included in sin), because they are not 
true on the same plane on which the opinions one is affirming are found 
(on that plane, the reverse is true), but on a higher plane.  They are only 
able to be perceived as true by such minds as are capable of conceiving 
on several vertical, superposed planes simultaneously; to other minds 
they remain completely incommunicable.34 
 
As we shall see below the this applies particularly to the idea that suffering can be 
redemptive.  In itself, suffering is simply destructive, and to attribute redemptive 
qualities to it is to refuse to contemplate it, whether in oneself or another.  However at a 
higher level the honest contemplation of suffering produces spiritual fruit; grace fills the 
void that is left by unconsoled suffering.  The rupture between these levels arises 
because to articulate the truth of the higher plane may be to destroy the (opposite) truth 
of the lower plane; suffering is never accepted in its destructive reality, and never 
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 Weil, First and last notebooks, p. 122. 
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 Weil, Notebooks, p. 163.  See also Notebooks, p. 62-63, and First and Last Notebooks, p. 179. 
87 
 
becomes redemptive.  This implies a rupture between conceptual truth and experience, 
in that the attempt to make an experience more intelligible may be to block access to the 
experience, or falsely avoid it: one must not speak too much or too soon, because 
experience is changed as it is spoken of.35  However, in other ways, Weil supposes a 
more peaceful continuity between levels of reality, and between thought and action, 
concept and experience.  It is not possible here to provide an exhaustive analysis of how 
Weil construed these 'planes', or how well she constructs such an architecture herself, 
but two observations can be made that relate to the remaining discussion.   
Firstly, when discussing compassion or related ideas, Weil tends to stress the 
continuity between abstract thought and responsive behaviour.  This is one of the main 
concerns expressed in her 'Letter to a priest', in which she writes: '[o]ne may lay down 
as a postulate: All conceptions of God which are incompatible with a movement of pure 
charity are false.  All other conceptions of him, in varying degrees, are true.'36  In an 
important sense the recognition of suffering as intolerable, unexplained and unjustified 
becomes a criteria for judging beliefs; any belief which allows or encourages one to 
throw a veil over suffering is itself a lack of compassion, an 'expression of submission 
to the Great Beast.'37  As the capacity to genuinely pay attention is both intellectual and 
ethical (see in particular the essay 'Reflections on the right use of school studies' in 
Waiting on God), there is continuity between concept and behaviour.  Those who 
acknowledge undeserved suffering in theory will be more likely to recognise and 
respond to it in practice, and only those who recognise it in practice will be able to 
recognise it in theory.  Any conception of God which emerges from a failure to 
recognise suffering, or which (re)produces this failure, is incompatible with a 
movement of pure charity, and so false.  In this sense, thought and behaviour are 
condemned or affirmed with the same judgement.  Beliefs reproduce the blindness or 
cruelty in which they were conceived: those who believe that the order of the world 
clearly communicates the existence of a merciful God must become increasingly blind, 
deaf and pitiless in order to remain committed to this correspondence.38  Kindness 
                                                             
35On this point, see also First and last notebooks, pp.  231-3, where Weil explores the question of 
vainity in spiritual progress: 'There are some goods that are destroyed by being evaluated.  This really 
shows that only God can save by his grace.' 
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 Weil, Gateway to God, p. 135.   
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 Weil, Notebooks, p. 351. 
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 Weil, Notebooks, p. 438.  For a related discussion of this process, in which practice produces a 
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produces truth by nourishing one's capacity for attention, just as cruelty reaffirms one's 
incapacity to recognise suffering and the real existence of the other.39  As a 
simultaneously intellectual and ethical capacity, attention is the capacity and 
willingness to contemplate the world without lying to oneself or deliberately looking 
away from unwelcome facts, and this stance is part of what Weil means by 'waiting': 
'[a]bove all our thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to 
receive in its naked truth the object which is to penetrate it.'40 
Secondly, when discussing any kind of reward, spiritual fruit or progress, Weil tends 
to stress the discontinuity between thought or belief and attitude or behaviour, and the 
need for a more wary, delicate form of affirmation.  Conscious thought directs attention, 
and as previously noted, attention should not be consciously directed towards God or 
the prospect of spiritual benefit when responding to the needs of another, or rather, if it 
is, one is not really responding to the needs of another, but acting with another purpose 
in mind (the service of God, the sanctity of one's own soul).  The attention demanded by 
the affliction of others is such that there is no room for any other object, so that even 
though one may believe, as Weil did, that the love of neighbour is somehow one with 
the love of God, this knowledge must be hidden away at the highest level, beyond 
comprehension.41  One must love one's neighbour as one's neighbour, and nothing 
more, before this love can be found to be secretly the love of God.  It is not too difficult 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
principle, which then demands practice that defends and affirms the principle, see Philip Goodchild's 
'The logic of sacrifice in the book of Job' in Cultural Values vol.  4,  no.  2.  Responding to Rene 
Girard's reading of Job, Goodchild emphasises the economic stakes in the background of the dialogues, 
the way in which 'the principle of temporal retribution emerges from economic conduct' (p. 178) and 
the systematic blindness towards the exception necessary to affirm this principle and the economic 
aspirations that found it: 'The principle of reward and retribution becomes contagious through a similar 
pattern (i.e.  Girardian mimetic contagion): one moves from envy of Job's rewards, through imitation of 
his righteousness, to the imitative principle of reward for righteousness, symbolic reunification.  
Finally, in the face of Job's misfortunes, the credibility of Job's piety is sacrificed in favour of the 
abstract principle of temporal retribution which substitutes for it.' (p170) Job learns to speak rightly of 
God through occupying a 'chaotic interval' in which premature judgements concerning wickedness and 
innocence are suspended.  In many respects Goodchild's account of the 'chaotic interval' experienced by 
Job relates to the reading of Weil's notions of waiting and void being explored here. 
39
 Weil, Notebooks, p. 357. 
40
 Weil, Waiting on God, p. 58. 
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 Weil, First and last notebooks, p. 179. 
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to love God, but too easy; as a thought detached from human interaction, 'God' is almost 
infinitely malleable, and can be shaped to fit our desires exactly; the 'country here 
below', offers resistance which is essential in our learning of love.42  One only thinks 
about God, and loves God, through thinking of the world in a particular way.43  In this 
sense, spiritual treasure and reward are found at a qualitatively different level from their 
earthly counterparts, and any conceptual framework that allows such notions to be 
treated as straightforward goals that could be attained by particular means, or that can 
be used as an excuse to direct attention away from the present, should not be known 'too 
much' and only believed secretly (and here Weil makes frequent reference to the 
synoptic saying on giving in secret, the left hand not knowing what the right hand is 
doing).  A clumsy, over hasty identification of the love of neighbour as the love of God 
means that one construes God as an object desirable and obtainable like any other, and 
the neighbour as a mere means to an end; this reduces heaven to the level of earth, and 
earth to the level of a tool necessary for attaining heaven.  It is true, in a certain sense, 
that the love of the world is the love of God, but 'knowing' this as a truth in the wrong 
way prevents one from enacting it, and so there is a rupture between conscious 
affirmation and implicit acceptance.   
This discontinuity between 'levels' is partly a result of the sense of scarcity in her 
notion of attention: attention, as a way of giving or spending time, is limited, and there 
is an antagonistic competition between possible objects of attention.  The resistance to 
giving undivided attention to anything is at the heart of Weil's understanding of the 
condition of humanity, and so religious beliefs become problematic insofar as they 
seem to separate an act from its significance (if I give bread to the hungry because this 
pleases God), or virtue from reward (if the thought of heaven is compensation or 
counter-balance for the effort of obedience), discouraging the already very difficult 
business of giving undivided attention.  In a sense, Weil's intention seems to have been 
to compress ethical and religious thought so that all the concepts occupy a space small 
enough to contemplate all at the same time, so that attention can be undivided (hence 
the value of paradox ± two indispensable but contradictory truths in the same place).  
This is, perhaps, one of the reasons for her seeming reluctance to discuss the 
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 See 'Some thoughts on the love of God' and 'Some reflections on the love of God' in Science, 
necessity and the love of God. 
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resurrection; it seems to simply distract attention from that which is already nearly 
impossible to contemplate (it introduces an aspect of choice, which is always the 
beginning of error for Weil: do I contemplate the crucified Jewish teacher, or the risen 
and vindicated Saviour?). 
Interestingly, though, it is the fact that there is continuity between levels - between 
the love of God and the love of neighbour, and between conceptual formulations and 
attitude or behaviour ± that means that not only are conceptual formulations subject to 
judgement (in the same way that the Job's friends' words are subject to judgement), but 
also that the Christian conception of God has to be understood as being supernatural in 
content and origin.  The love that motivates compassion cannot be simply observed in 
the nature of physical or social patterns.  It does not arise from a straightforward 
'reading' of suffering, for in fact there can be no such thing, as suffering always 
produces some kind of reaction.  Real love, in thought or action, can only be the result 
of inspiration: 'it is for this reason that mysticism is the only source of the human 
virtues.  For whether we believe that there is no infinite mercy lying behind the curtain 
of the world, or whether we believe that this mercy lies in front of the curtain, in either 
case we are rendered cruel.'44  Belief in divine mercy and the capacity for compassion 
mutually condition each other: compassion only arises in those who glimpse an infinite 
mercy 'behind the curtain', but the chief demonstration of this divine mercy 'here below' 
is the radiance that comes from the compassionate, who have contemplated divine 
mercy in the midst of suffering.45  For Weil, the existence of genuine compassion is 
experimental proof of divine inspiration: the real conviction, in those who do not look 
away from suffering, that there is divine mercy 'behind the curtain' must be supernatural 
in origin, as there are no other explanations for such conviction.46 
In this sense, the experience of evil and suffering in a world of beauty and order 
                                                             
44Weil, Notebooks, p. 438. 
45Weil, Notebooks, p. 450. 
46This conviction elsewhere takes the shape of an ontological argument for the existence of 
perfection: 'Essential point of Christianity -(and of Platonism)-: It is only the thought of perfection that 
produces any good - and this good is imperfect.  If one aims at imperfect good, one does evil.  One 
cannot really aim at perfection unless it is really possible; so this is the proof that the possibility of 
perfection exists in this world.' (First and last notebooks, p.  342.)  However, as Weil recognised 
herself, when considered as a phenomenon that occurs within the world, inspiration compromises her 
notion of a world given over by God to be governed entirely by necessity (Notebooks, p.  361). 
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constitutes a void that can only be contemplated without (false) consolation if one 
receives 'supernatural bread'.47  The difficulty is of the form such 'supernatural bread' 
might take, how it might be described, and when it might be received.  If it takes the 
form of beliefs that can be passed on separate to any experience ± for example, belief in 
the final perfection of creation, the promise of reward for the good and punishment for 
the wicked - such beliefs may become occasions for the imagination to fly from the 
reality of unresolved, unredeemed suffering.  The suffering of the innocent no longer 
attracts attention if the contradiction it presents is resolved through anticipation, and 
removed in theory; one might then be able to pass by without stopping.  On the whole, 
Weil thinks of the vision of the love and mercy of God as something which is received 
through, and after, one has waited; that is, accepted the reality of some experience of 
void (unsatisfied desire, undeserved suffering, etc), and continued to love from within 
this void.  Equally, however, she conceived the void as that which cannot be 
contemplated as void without this vision.48  This makes the relationship between belief 
and experience very ambiguous in her work.  Doctrines concerning life after death, the 
fruit of obedience or virtue, or in fact any notions that express expectation or fulfilment, 
are often described as superfluous at best, if not actually harmful.49  But equally, she 
recognises that in a sense it is belief that makes certain experiences possible as much as 
it is experience that produces belief, as is shown in the following, from her discussion 
of the value of the apparently fruitless expenditure of energy in school studies: 
Without our knowing or feeling it, this apparently barren effort has 
brought more light into the soul.  The result will one day be discovered in 
prayer...  Certainties of this kind are experimental.  But if we do not 
believe in them before experiencing them, if at least we do not behave as 
though we believed in them, we shall never have the experience which 
leads to such certainties.50 
 
 Here she hints that on occasions inherited beliefs may act as boundaries that mark 
out a space that can only be filled through existential trial; lifeless themselves, but 
necessary to catch the moment when it comes.  Although here she is speaking about 
attention in study, the same applies to her understanding of suffering, and what it is that 
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is necessary for suffering to be undergone in such a way that it becomes redemptive.  
Ultimately, belief cannot be entirely redundant, derivative or secondary because it 
affects how one responds to suffering - whether one's own or another's - and more than 
this, affects the tonality of the experience itself.  However, Weil has such a heightened 
sense of the danger of belief being evasion of the void, imaginative consolation, etc, 
that she only occasional makes any positive statements like the one above, even though 
in a sense all her religious writing is an attempt to articulate the 'experimental 
certainties' gained through contemplating void in language that can be grasped outside, 
or prior to, such an experience.  Her work is a promise that there is plenitude within, or 
(and it is not clear which) out the other side of the void; and if all that she has said about 
the danger of evading suffering, or seeking some meaning or purpose within it is true, 
then to make this promise is always to risk it becoming another veil or evasion.  If there 
is a principle through which to contemplate the meaning and use of suffering, there is 
no void; if there is a promise of something more than destruction within suffering, one 
attends not to suffering, but to what is promised.   
 We can briefly note here that this relates very closely to the problems already 
explored concerning motivations for forgiveness, in two ways in particular.  Firstly 
there is a concern in Vladimir Jankelevitch's work, and, as we shall see, in Derrida's and 
Caputo's development of these ideas, to preserve a sense that to forgive is to be 
unmotivated, or to be motivated in a qualitatively different way.  This, in turn, relates to 
a concern to preserve the sense in which forgiveness is concerned not with moral 
norms, or pragmatic concerns with halting violent cycles or unhealthy psychological 
states, but with the other.  It expresses a different kind of vision.  In other words, the 
implication is that we cannot be concerned simply with the other whilst also being 
concerned with justifications for action, goals which include ourselves, or the deeper 
religious dimensions of the act.  There is a sense that if one is to say too much 
(positively, at least) about forgiveness - its conditions, benefits, and goals - one may 
actually prevent the moment of forgiveness from unfolding.  To attend to suffering, on 
Weil's account, is also to be unmotivated.  This does not primarily mean that someone 
who shows compassion would have no way of explaining their response, but more that 
no answer can be given to the question 'why be compassionate?' because the question 
itself is not compassionate.  Compassion is a way of living or response that is beyond 
the giving of justification and reasons, or else it is its own justification and reason.  In 
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some discussions of forgiveness, a similar approach is evident; forgiveness, like 
compassion, may be seen as a stopping point for justification or explanation.  Secondly, 
just as for Weil compassion involves a difficult acceptance of reality, so forgiveness 
seems to involve acceptance of some kind, and it is this aspect that provokes both the 
suspicion of its moral character, and the sense that it is a transformative moment that 
lies ahead of us, not within our ordinary personal or ethical capacities.  This sense of 
acceptance is, of course, profoundly linked with the  words of Jesus in Gethsemane, 
which also characterise Christian prayer: 'yet not my will, but yours'.  Weil's attempts to 
show the virtue of acceptance whilst affirming an uncompromising desire for the good 
led her towards an understanding of the posture of spiritual life as a fundamentally 
conflicted one, in which contradictions are borne within oneself, and it is this aspect 
that will be explored below. 
 
 
II 
Redemptive suffering and the cross 
 
Given the way in which Weil describes the destructive uselessness of human affliction, 
her account of redemptive suffering ± which finds a use for suffering and a meaning in 
evil ± is inevitably paradoxical.  However, despite the structures outlined above, she 
does attempt to explore in detail the 'how' of redemptive suffering - often to the point 
where it gives the impression of an unhealthy fascination or obsession.  The result is 
that there is a great deal of material that is in a sense an extended meditation on what 
might be called the logic of atonement.  Critically assessing Weil's thought on this 
subject, especially the material in her notebooks, is difficult, because many of these 
remarks have the appearance of being experiments in paradox, attempts at getting as 
close as possible in language to the contradiction experienced in life, or contemplated 
through religious imagery.  As far as Weil is concerned, that extreme suffering brings, 
through an almost impenetrable mystery, both destruction and divine grace is never in 
question.  This is the truth of the cross; the question is of how to say anything about 
this, of how to make this truth available without distorting it.  Weil's understanding of 
the cross incorporates both a sense of divine activity, and of human imitation: the cross 
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is the perfect instance of waiting in the void, and this act of waiting reproduces this 
experience in those who do so.   
Any number of examples could be chosen to highlight the paradoxical nature of 
Weil's reflections, but the following remark makes it particularly clear: 
We must never seek an external compensation for evil in some form of 
good which balances it, whether or not the evil and the good be linked 
together by a bond of necessity.  For in this way we deprive ourselves of 
the most precious use to be made of evil, which is to love God through 
and beyond evil as such. 
We must love God through and beyond evil as such; love him through 
and beyond the evil that we hate, while hating the evil; love him as the 
author of the evil that we are in the process of hating.51 
 
Evil exists; it is real and because it is real it should be loved  .52 But since evil is evil, it 
can only be hated.  Therefore to approach evil as evil, one must hate it: one loves evil 
by hating it.  Although in many places these kinds of expressions are presented simply 
as objects of contemplation, like Zen koan, Weil gives a great deal of attention to the 
task of providing explanations of the redemptive value of suffering, or describing what 
it happens when,  miraculously, suffering becomes redemptive.  It is not always clear 
how best to understand what Weil is trying to do - describe or explain - but it is clear 
that the former is never completely separate from the latter.  Moreover, a  trajectory can 
be traced from the description of what happens when suffering becomes useful, through 
an explanation of this process in terms of a kind of spiritual mechanics or cosmic 
necessity, ending in an elevation of redemptive suffering as the paradigmatic form of 
the love of God, thought in terms of the Cross.  Very roughly, three aspects of Weil's 
account of spiritual growth correspond to the stages of this transition: the experience of 
suffering as a means of awakening from imagination to reality; suffering as the 
necessary consequence of the refusal of passing on evil; suffering as a means of 
destroying the 'I' (which Weil sometimes refers to as 'decreation').  Only the first two of 
these will be dealt with here, since a full analysis of the third takes us into more 
metaphysical territory. 
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Acceptance 
 
Firstly, then, Weil believes that to love reality as it is involves suffering, and that the 
cross is the perfect model of this love.  As we have seen, the character of suffering is 
described particularly in terms of time: duration lived through with no purpose, being 
carried against one's will towards that which one cannot bear, the attention constrained 
to the present moment in which there is nothing to desire.  However, for Weil the desire 
to escape from time is also central to her understanding of sin: 'All sins are an attempt 
to escape from time.  Virtue is to submit to time, to press it to the heart until the heart 
breaks.'53  Essentially, Weil argues that most ways of giving meaning to life express a 
futile desire to overcome time, to love life only insofar as its course can be directed and 
contained, and so reject that which is most essential to being human: temporal finitude 
and passivity.  The future can always be imagined as containing a situation in which 
present difficulties or pains have been overcome, and in which one has been restored to 
one's rightful position as a self-determining being.  We learn, therefore, to construe the 
future as that which counter-balances the present, and fills up the void.  One loves 
things not because they are real but because the thought of them appears to render the 
present more tolerable, and in this way, imagination breeds a conditional love of the 
world.  These reflections on time are closely linked to others concerning death.  Death 
is the source of all deceit for humanity: it cannot be contemplated without dishonesty 
because the thought of it calls incessantly for a counterweight.54  The thought of death 
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 Weil, First and last notebooks, p.102.  See also Notebooks pp. 23, 38-39, 551 and First and last 
notebooks pp. 141, 177 and 183 for a selection of remarks concerning time.  See also Hans Urs von 
Balthasar's characterisation of the mission and person of Jesus in A theology of history (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1994), which echoes that of Weil in certain respects, for example: 'he does not do that 
precise thing which we try to do when we sin, which is to break out of time, within which are contained 
God's dispositions for us, in order to arrogate to ourselves a sort of eternity.  .  .  Time, in fact, is either 
real time, in which man encounters God and accepts his will, or it is unreal time, lost and corrupted: 
time as the finite in self-contradiction, an unredeemed promise, a space full of nothing, duration leading 
nowhere.' (pp. 36 and 41). 
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produces a panicked reaction, in which one seeks an opposite to cancel it out, but this 
reaction in fact prevents life being loved as what it is, because all valuations based on 
the threat of death simply turn life into death's opposite.55  In this way, it is only the 
acceptance of death that reveals life as an excessive abundance of reality, rather than a 
mere counterweight to death.  To contemplate another person without wishing them 
either immortal or dead is, for Weil, to begin to love truly, through death and time, and 
this love is as opposed to the selfish love which wishes to preserve someone forever as 
it is to the hatred which wishes them dead.56 
 However, for Weil, when time is accepted and loved as time, it opens out onto 
eternity, just as death accepted as death leads to life: 'If one behaves as though dead, the 
Lord comes and brings life from on high. ... Total obedience to time obliges God to 
bestow eternity.'57 There is a strange dynamic here: abundance is glimpsed, or given, 
only once scarcity is accepted.  But it is not clear whether Weil has in mind something 
like an unveiling or dramatic shift in perspective, in which time is found to be eternity, 
suffering to be joy and death to be life; or whether something more like a 
transformation, in which eternity overcomes the finitude of time, joy fills and overflows 
the void left by suffering, and death is destroyed by life.  Neither approach, alone, 
would seem to meet Weil's criteria for a real love of reality, and forms of understanding 
based on either could be accused of 'sweetening what is bitter' or providing false 
consolation: if one believes that one can, somehow, become reconciled with death 
through a shift in perspective, one sweetens the bitterness; if one believes that suffering 
is temporary and death insignificant, one never tastes the bitterness in the first place.  
These two possibilities correspond to the 'two thoughts' concerning the duration of time 
noted earlier: the first attempts to deny the reality of the present, the second denies its 
bitterness by attempting to make the present suffering (which, however terrible, is 
transitory) a permanent home. 
 A notable section on beauty from 'Forms of the implicit love of God' in Waiting on 
God displays a similar tension between dramatic change in perspective and real 
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transformation: 
It is because it can be loved by us, it is because it is beautiful, that the 
universe is a country.  It is our only country here below...  We have a 
heavenly country, but in a sense it is too difficult to love, because we do 
not know it; above all, though, in a sense it is too easy to love, because 
we can imagine it as we please.  We run the risk of loving a fiction under 
this name.  If the love of the fiction is strong enough it makes all virtue 
easy, but at the same time of little value.   
Let us love the country here below.  It is real; it offers resistance to 
love.  It is this country which God has given us to love.  He has willed 
that it should be difficult yet possible to love it. 
We feel ourselves to be strangers, uprooted, in exile here below.  We 
are like Ulysses who had been carried far away during his sleep by sailors 
and woke up in a strange land, longing for Ithaca with a longing that rent 
his soul.  Suddenly Athena opened his eyes and he saw that he was in 
Ithaca.  In the same way, every man who longs indefatigably for his 
country, who is distracted from his desire neither by Calypso nor by the 
Sirens, will one day suddenly find that he is there.   
 
The country 'here below' should be loved despite the fact that it is not home, not 
because it is home.  The longing for the country that is home leads to the surprise of 
finding that one is actually there.  Weil never fully resolves the ambiguity here: namely 
of whether one finds that one was in Ithaca all along, and all that was needed was a 
change perspective; or whether the journey to Ithaca is an actual journey, with a 
destination different to its starting point (or in the terms frequently employed by 
Derrida, of whether there is something Abrahamic about this Odyssey).  Weil frequently 
describes faith as the belief that the indefatigable desire for the good is never in vain 
(and as a result, anyone who is convinced of this is not an atheist, whatever they may 
claim).58  To believe that those who hunger for righteousness will not go hungry can 
only come from a glimpse 'behind the curtain', in the same way that real mercy can only 
come from a glimpse of an entirely absent divine mercy.  Desire implies hope, just as 
hope makes desire possible.  In fact, for Weil, it is as though the desire for the good is 
itself a promise.  It arrives somewhat miraculously demanding our consent, and those 
who consent to this desire in doing so trust in a 'domain' that is real but not given or 
accessible.  One particularly interesting entry in the notebooks outlines the way that 
different conceptions of afterlife each provide an essential way of contemplating death, 
whilst at the same masking reality in different ways.  Whilst the unthinking acceptance 
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of immortality that sometimes accompanies Christian belief masks the bitter truth of 
death and finitude, the materialistic conception of annihilation masks the 'essential, 
primordial truth that the one and only need of the soul is salvation, and that the whole 
meaning of life lies in making preparation for the moment of death'.59  The materialistic 
conception shuts off the sense that what is needed is transcendent to this life, and that 
however much perspective is altered, the deepest desire remains for what is real, but 
beyond.  It is clear, then, that there is no clear line to be drawn between those ideas 
which represent an evasion of reality and those that which emerge from some kind of 
difficult acceptance.  Or put differently, the point, for Weil, is not to arrive at a fixed set 
of conceptions of life, death and purpose, but rather try to find a way of using concepts 
as opportunities for a certain kind of contemplation.  One can contemplate the truth of 
atheism, and the truth of theism in different ways, because each may involve a genuine 
challenge to settled beliefs that in different ways cushion one from real contact with the 
world.  Andre Devaux suggests that for Weil, the contradictions that draw one upwards 
only exist for the consciousness that is searching for unity, so that it is not the formal 
qualities of any particular contradiction that represents its value, but rather the nature of 
our confrontation with it - the resistance it offers.  Hence the significance of the 
acceptance of death, or the reality and nature of suffering is that in the process one is 
fundamentally de-centred, made to 'look up and wait'.60  The atheist is not necessarily 
                                                             
59Since it is a particularly dense and suggestive passage, the full entry is reproduced here: 'The three 
conceptions, first that of annihilation in the sense understood by atheists, secondly that of reincarnation 
and purgatory, and thirdly that of paradise and hell ± all three of which are indispensable for pondering 
on the subject of death ± can very well be accepted as true and conceived of simultaneously if we bear 
in mind the fact that death lies at the point of intersection between time and eternity.  They only seem 
incompatible to us because we cannot prevent ourelves from visualizing eternity as a duration.   
 All three are necessary.  Reincarnation and purgatory mask the truth that this life is unique, 
irreparable, the only one in which we can either be lost or saved.  Paradise and hell mask the truth that 
salvation is solely the accompaniment of perfection, and damnation solely the accompaniment of 
betrayal, and that the soul which is imperfect, but nevertheless turned in the direction of good, is not 
susceptible of either the one or the other.  The materialistic notion of annihilation shuts out the essential, 
primordial truth that the one and only need of the soul is salvation, and that the whole meaning of life 
lies in making preparation for the moment of death.  The belief in immortality breaks up the pure 
bitterness and the reality itself of death, which remains for us the most precious gift bestowed by divine 
Providence.' (Notebooks, pp.  467-8.) 
60Andre Devaux 'On the use of contradiction in Simone Weil' in Simone Weil: the philosophy of 
culture: readings for a divine humanity, pp.  151-2. 
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better off than the Christian when it comes to the acceptance Weil describes, since 
belief in annihilation may be a form of 'sweetening what is bitter'. 
 Weil's account of the good of the world in relation to the goodness of God is 
complex, and closely linked to her understanding of what real acceptance entails.  On 
the one hand, contemplation of the natural order as a route to the understanding of God 
is absolutely central to her thought.  She reprimands the Christian tradition for its 
failure to nurture a sense of awe towards the order and beauty of the world ('How can 
Christianity call itself catholic if the universe itself is left out?')61 and states that because 
beauty is an attribute of God, the beauty evident in the natural world is 'the 
experimental proof that the Incarnation is possible.'62 Similarly, she has a high regard 
for the close contact with the rhythms of the natural world involved in farming, and 
feels that the Christian tradition has consistently failed to see the importance of physical 
labour as the spiritual core of human society, and as an essential symbol in the Christian 
gospel.63  On the other hand, she states very simply, as if it is perfectly obvious, that 
there is no good to be found in the world, and held very simply that the source of all 
error is the search for an earthly good.  The task humans are given is not to seek or 
believe in God, but to refuse to love everything which is not God, and to recognise that 
all the goods the world can offer are radically incapable of satisfying the desire for an 
infinite and perfect good.  The spiritual life is conceived in terms of a cultivation of a 
desire which is necessarily beyond satisfaction.  This understanding is felt by everyone 
at some point, but is dishonestly covered over and suppressed, because that knowledge 
feels like death: '[a]nd their feeling is true, for that knowledge kills, but it inflicts a 
death which leads to a resurrection.  But they do not know that beforehand; all they 
foresee is death; they must either choose truth and death or falsehood and life.'64 
 It seems correct to assume that Weil's comments are deliberately paradoxical in this 
                                                             
61Weil, Waiting on God, p. 94. 
62Weil, Notebooks, p. 440 and First and last notebooks, p. 341. 
63See in particular The need for roots, tr. Arthur Wills (London: Routledge, 1952), pp. 295-298, and 
Science, necessity and the love of God pp. 150-151.  Weil has a curious interpretation of Genesis 3: she 
suggests that the story must reflect the thought of some more ancient civilisation for whom physical 
labour was revered above all else, and this idea has somehow been incorporated into a myth about 
divine punishment.  The punishment of physical labour is, then, the means for humans to be re-
immersed in the 'current of the Good', and from this perspective is not a curse at all. 
64Weil, Science, necessity and the love of God, p. 158. 
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area, rather than simply inconsistent: the world must be both renounced and loved, and 
both in the appropriate manner.  More than this, both the renunciation and the love of 
the world correspond exactly to the love of God, are the love of God, while at the same 
time cannot be thought of as such.  Again, the notion of attention is important: it is the 
form of attention more than the object of attention which matters for Weil.  For Weil, to 
love God is a change in the way the world is loved and accepted, and this change is 
primarily negative, a cutting away of false attachment.  It involves two movements 
which seem to oppose each other: unyielding desire for the good that is to be found 
nowhere in the world, and an unconditional acceptance and love of the world as it is, as 
completely absent of the object of this desire.  Hence the notion of 'waiting' that Weil 
develops, although it seems like a stoic resignation, contains within it a greater tension, 
because it includes continual protest against evil and the refusal to be reconciled with it.  
In order to forgive, one must first condemn, and in a sense, for Weil the acceptance in 
love of reality as it is given involves at the same time protest, and even accusation of 
God.65  In other words, there is a necessary inner conflict within the genuine love of 
God.  To desire God as the good is necessarily difficult, and involves moments of 
rupture, because it involves accepting the void left by various idols without knowing 
how to fill it.  Similarly, to love the world is necessarily difficult because it involves 
loving through the evil and suffering which can only ever be hated.  Although Weil very 
clearly states that suffering should never be thought of as being productive of itself, or 
justified by being part of some divine scheme, the way in which she describes the love 
                                                             
65This idea does not appear often in the notebooks, and so it is difficult to discern whether these 
comments should be seen as an experiment or a part of a more developed line of thought.  Either way, 
they carry a certain force: 'In [the saintly soul] the dialogue of Christ's cry and the Father's silence 
echoes perpetually in perfect harmony.   
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 One can only excuse men for evil by accusing God of it.  If one accuses God one forgives, because 
God is the Good. 
 Amid the multitude of those who seem to owe us something, God is our only real debtor.  But our 
debt to him is greater.  He will release us from it if we forgive him.   
 Sin is an offence offered to God from resentment at the debts he owes and does not pay us.  By 
forgiving God we cut the root of sin in ourselves.  At the bottom of every sin there is anger against God.   
 If we forgive God for his crime against us, which is to have made us finite creatures, He will forgive 
our crime against him, which is that we are finite creatures.' First and last notebooks, p. 94-5. 
101 
 
of God, the desire for the good, and the love of the world is naturally allied with trauma, 
and so with an image like the cross.  The meaning of the cross is considered in relation 
to the traumatic interaction of the love of God, desire for the good and acceptance of 
reality, and the understanding of this interaction is developed through consideration of 
the place of the cross in Christian worship. 
 A further aspect is important in order to develop this point.  For Weil, an essential 
characteristic of Christian devotion is the idea that to worship God in the form of a 
crucified man is to purify the love of God (and therefore also the love of the world, 
since the two things are so closely related for Weil).  There is nothing intrinsically 
desirable about the cross: it is not dignified or noble, it is not reasonable or fruitful.  For 
Weil, the value of the cross for salvation is primarily as an object of contemplation; she 
frequently refers to the image from John 3 in which the crucified Jesus is described as 
the bronze serpent lifted up in the desert: one is saved by looking at something perfectly 
pure.  However, to contemplate the cross is to contemplate affliction, that which most 
repels the gaze, not a secret purity or beauty.  And so again, there is a distinction 
between levels of affirmation: at one level the cross is simply another instance of the 
interaction of human injustice, divine indifference and physical necessity ± appalling, 
but no more significant than any other horror; at another level it is the absolutely pure 
presence of God in the form of obedience through suffering, an affliction that has 
acquired 'an infinite value'.66  Weil is far from clear on this subject, but what she seems 
to suggest is that Jesus' anguished yet unbroken obedience to the Father on the cross 
represents, or instantiates, a love that contains within it the full contradiction of a pure 
love of God and an unconditional acceptance of creation.  And both of these at their 
most intense pitch.  To contemplate God through the cross is to begin to occupy the 
same position, to love God without imagination, false consolation, or resentment.  It is 
an entirely unresentful acceptance of the world, that somehow continues to desire what 
is absent. 
 
The halting of evil. 
 
As well as being an affirmation and acceptance of reality, the cross is also thought of in 
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terms of a stopping point for the contagion of evil.  A number of slightly different ideas 
gather under this basic theme.  In an important sense, Weil has an implicitly 
incarnational approach to atonement, that is, evil is extinguished simply through contact 
with perfect purity: nothing more is 'required' other than the presence of God.67  But 
evil cannot be passed on to God so that it might have contact with purity, and so simply 
'falls back' as a curse, and circulates from human to human.68  The cross is seen as a 
purification of the mixture of sin and suffering which characterises human evil ('sin 
makes us suffer and suffering makes us evil'),69 but on the cross, evil becomes pure 
suffering.  Weil sees the vicious cycle of violence and cruelty within human life as a 
mechanism based upon the search for equilibrium.  Suffering, at whichever level, and 
however it is imposed, is felt as a diminishment of energy, and as a lowering of the self; 
we seek to return to a lost (and fictional) equilibrium through making others suffer, 
seeking to raise ourselves through the lowering of another.70  The search for equilibrium 
is 'bad because it is imaginary'; it is a refusal  to accept void, and it results in evil being 
passed from person to person like a disease, which never stops because equilibrium is 
never reached.  Evil cannot be represented in a form which satisfies the horror we feel 
towards it; every attempt produces another void, and every such void is refused through 
the same process.  Weil understood suffering as an opportunity to accept the void as 
void, and so to halt the spread of evil ± it is as though, once refused, the void becomes 
mobile and travels in the desire to punish, harm and diminish others.  To accept it in 
oneself is to stop this malevolent and circular journey.  In a sense, any moment in which 
one renounces the opportunity to express outwardly one's frustration or anger, or in 
which one refuses the temptation of seeking to make someone else suffer as we have, is, 
for Weil, analogous to suffering.  To accept suffering, or the wrong done to one, without 
seeking to represent it externally is difficult for the same reason compassion is difficult; 
not only is it the acceptance a particular void, it is acceptance of the existence of void.  
                                                             
67This relates closely to her insistence that it is only lack of time that makes complete holiness 
impossible to achieve during one's life. The evil within us is finite, but the purity which destroys it is 
infinite.  See Notebooks, p. 378. 
68Weil, First and last notebooks, p. 153-4. 
69Weil, Science, necessity and the love of God, p. 149. 
70This is a theme particularly drawn out in the selections from the notebooks in Gravity and Grace, 
although it should be noted that proportionally this theme is not as dominant in the notebooks.  See 
especially pp. 5±10. 
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It is to let evil appear as such, so that its reproduction might cease: 
The man who receives and transmits malediction does not let it penetrate 
to his core.  He does not feel it.  But it penetrates to the core of the man 
upon whom it settles, the man who arrests it.  He becomes a curse.  To 
become a curse, it is necessary to be pure. 
The plenitude of joy is necessary in order to make a being so pure that 
he can become a curse.  71  
 
Evil only penetrates to the core when it is accompanied by a continuing love of God, 
and desire for the good (it means to refuse the final form of consolation that remains 
when all other forms have been taken away - to 'curse God and die').   
 At this point, we can pause to consider Miroslav Volf's work on justice and 
'embrace' which, despite the dissimilarities of tone, makes a similar point in a 
discussion of the relationship between reconciliation and justice.  The similarity is in 
the importance given to the acceptance of imbalance.  Volf argues that forgiveness 
would be impossible if considered as that which is possible only after justice has been 
done, not only because this would render the act of forgiving unnecessary, but because 
when examined, it turns out that justice in itself is impossible, and so the time for 
forgiveness would never come.72 7KDWLVDµVWULFWMXVWLFH¶ZKLFKDLPVDWDSHUIHFWO\
balanced outcome, in which each is given only what they deserve, is a practical 
LPSRVVLELOLW\9ROI¶VSRLQWLVWKDWQRWRQO\PXVWIRUJLYHQHVVEHVRXJKWDORQJZLWK
justice, rather than outside or after it, but that there can only be justice where something 
PRUHWKDQMXVWLFHLVHQYLVDJHGµWUXHMXVWLFHZLOODOZD\VEHRQWKHZD\WRHPEUDFH¶73  
2QWKHEDVLVRI9ROI¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIMXVWLFHLQExclusion and Embrace, we can discern 
two aspects to this necessity, both of which concern the relationship between justice and 
abstraction.  Firstly, the desire for strict justice carries the tendency to be continually 
unsatisfied: the point is not just that if everyone took an eye for an eye the whole world 
would be blind, but that if everyone took an eye for an eye the whole world would be 
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720LURVODY9ROIµ)RUJLYHQHVVUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDQGMXVWLFHDFKULVWLDQFRQWULEXWLRQWRPRUHSHDFHIXO
VRFLDOHQYLURQPHQWV¶LQForgiveness and Reconciliation: religion, public policy and conflict 
transformation, ed. Raymond G Helmick S.J. and Rodney L Peterson (Philadelphia and London, 
Templeton Foundation Press 2001),  pp. 38-47. 
73Volf, Exclusion and Embrace $ELQJGRQ3UHVV1DVKYLOOHS6HHDOVRµ)RUJLYHQHVV
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blind but still unsatisfied.  If the first eye is taken in an act of unprovoked aggression, 
and therefore without consent, the eye taken in return has the appearance of a more 
reasonable exchange; it lacks the element of theft and violation of the initial crime, and 
so can never really be its equal.  And if, for this reason, the justly-demanded eye 
inevitably fails to restore balance, there seems to be no way of saying how many eyes 
would be enough, and the search for justice turns into the excessive yet impotent 
repetition of evil.  If justice is conceived in terms of the accurate measurement of 
wrong-doing, so that it may prescribe some kind of counter-balancing measure (whether 
this is framed as punishment or a form of restitution) it soon becomes clear that it has 
no means by which to accomplish the measurement. 
Secondly, if justice is merely concerned with the ending of injustice, there exists no 
easy way to distinguish between rival claims to know who the victims of injustice are, 
and therefore, when justice has been done.  Any attempts to attribute the status of 
perpetrator or victim can themselves become  strategies for maintaining or increasing 
power, or quelling dissent.  Given the complexity of most situations of protracted 
conflict, in which people on the whole think of themselves primarily as victim rather 
than perpetrator, injustice cannot be ended without at least one party feeling that more 
injustice has been done in the process, and there is simply no possibility of a return to 
an equilibrium where no-one holds anything against anyone else and all debts are 
calmly acknowledged to have been paid.  If justice is to be considered a finished 
business, those perspectives that consider that justice has not yet been done must be 
disregarded as false, and possibly silenced, in favour of superior, allegedly impartial 
perspective.  However, on closer examination it seems as though this perspective would 
not only have to be unswayed by imbalances of power, and so be able to survey each 
situation in its totality, but also be infinitely sensitive and attentive to every difference 
between people, and so in a sense infinitely partial rather than impartial.  And once it is 
admitted that such a perspective is difficult to imagine in theory, let alone achieve in 
practice, it must also be admitted that justice has never, strictly speaking, been done, 
and if it is to be considered coherent at all must be seen as an ongoing, never completed 
task, only possible when pursued within a wider context of grace and the desire for 
reconciliation.74  It is only, for Volf, the desire for renewed and deepened relationship 
beyond the simple execution of justice, which includes the willingness to at least 
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that there is any justice at all. It is only such a desire that will be willing to overlook the 
inevitable inadequacy of any settlement, restitution or punishment, and renew 
relationships despite the fact that some wrongs are yet to be righted, and that ultimately 
no full restitution - in the sense of a complete undoing of what has been done - is 
possible. 
In Weilian terms, what Volf articulates here is the way in which the search for a 
equilibrium is 'bad because imaginary'.75  However, on Weil's account, the acceptance 
of imbalance is always a painful moment of acceptance, because it involves at the same 
time an acknowledgement of the absence of good 'here below'.  In other words, she 
provides an analysis of why it is that the recognition of the impossibility of 'strict 
justice', or 'justice-as-balance' is so difficult to come by: it is actually part of how we 
think, such that our thinking is, at times, a search for equilibrium.76  Some thoughts are 
formed so as to counter-balance certain experiences.  To incorporate Volf's insights 
here, we might say that evil must be experienced in order to be stopped; otherwise one 
passes it on either through intentional vengeance, or through the insatiable nature of the 
sense of justice which rises up against it. But it is only experienced as evil when the 
energy of the protest, the desire for justice, is maintained.  The desire for justice, then, is 
not to be regretfully left to one side, but held in a different way within the soul, in a way 
which includes recognition of one's own powerlessness to achieve or effect it. 
                                                             
75Volf's more recent book The end of memory: remembering rightly in a violent world (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006)  proposes something similar in relation to memory.  If memory 
is to be redeeming, one will need to accept that some memories simply cannot be assimilated. Volf 
argues that rather than take this as a call to incessantly recall the horrors of the past out of a sense of 
justice, justice in fact requires that at some point, the choice be made to  forget. Volf is consciously 
opposing the almost ubituitous Western injunction 'never forget', and does so persuasively and 
profoundly.  See pp. 3-35, 131-151. I have focused on Exclusion and embrace here, because the 
emphasis on imbalance is more consonant with Weil's work. 
76As a consequence, it is Weil' own insight that provides the best critique of her more speculative 
metaphysical statements that suggest that the destiny of the created subject is to decreate itself, so as to 
repent of our original sin, which is to let our selves be created. (First and last notebook, p. 213). J. P. 
Little's essay  in Simone Weil: the philosophy of culture, ed. Richard H. Bell, is incisive on this point: at 
certain points, her metaphysics of decreation is motivated by the desire to counter-balance the moment 
RIFUHDWLRQVRDVWRUHWXUQWRHTXLOLULXP6HH/LWWOHµ6LPRQH:HLO¶VFRQFHSWRIGHFUHDWLRQ¶SS- 9. 
Rowan Williams' point is also crucial here: for Weil there does not seem to be the possibility of seeing 
the act of creation as a miraculous expansion. See Williams, Wrestling with angels, p. 224. 
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 Failure, to recognise this aspect of futility or impotence can easily lead to an 
insatiable repetition of evil, each imbalance justifying further injustice, each injustice 
producing further imbalance.  Weil makes the desire for equilibrium a more 
fundamental part of the human condition, and the acceptance that is necessary to exit 
from the futility is conceived in more violent terms: one has to be wrenched away from 
one's commitment to seek equilibrium, by the experience of suffering. The kind of 
resentment that Griswold, Murphy and others frame as a significant part of the sense of 
human value, dignity and right, would for Weil be an indication that we do not accept 
the vulnerability that is part of being human, or a way of counter-balancing the thought 
of death (because it is the threat of death, of being nothing rather than something, that 
threatens us even in insult).  Resentment directs attention in the wrong direction: what 
matters is not the wrongdoing of the one who inflicts suffering, but the suffering 
inflicted; the innocent part of the soul that cries out from within even the most hardened 
criminal 'why is this happening to me?'.  Resentment could also be understood as a 
desire 'cloaked in imaginary satisfaction'.  When we are surprised that we are not 
satisfied when we attain what we desired, it is because there was an element of 
imagination in the desire.   
 This point is related to her comments on the 'liberation of energy'.  Although this 
cannot be dealt with adequately here, resentment provides a good example of what she 
means by this.  Resentment may be directed at the author of a particular deed, and be 
felt as a desire to repay in some form, the desire to make them understand what they 
have done, or the desire to triumph over them, whether symbolically or physically.  But 
on Weil's account, the protest that destructive suffering issues in (suffering that 
produces a sense of isolation, despair, or in Amery's terms, that destroys one's trust in 
the world) contains an energy that is degraded through being attached to finite objects.77  
The energy of resentment is not simply to be suppressed, as if it were judged to be 
criminal in itself, but rather torn from its attachment to the finite, and addressed to God, 
so that 'why is this happening to me?' becomes 'why have you forsaken me?'.  The 
deepest resentment is protest, not simply against this or that person, but against the 
world, and against the creator.  In this sense, Weil is thoroughly in agreement with Ivan 
                                                             
77See Miklos Veto, The religious metaphysics of Simone Weil, pp.  56-69 for an exposition and 
discussion of Weil's conception of the transference of energy.  See also J.  P.  Little's analysis in Simone 
Weil: the philosophy of culture: readings towards a divine humanity, pp.  35-6. 
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Karamzov, except rather than return the ticket in silent protest, she envisages more of a 
confrontation: 
One can only excuse men for evil by accusing God of it.  If one accuses 
God one forgives, because God is the Good. 
 Amid the multitude of those who seem to owe us something, God is 
our only real debtor.  But our debt to him is greater.  He will release us 
from it if we forgive him.   
 Sin is an offence offered to God from resentment at the debts he owes 
and does not pay us.  By forgiving God we cut the root of sin in 
ourselves.  At the bottom of every sin there is anger against God. 
 If we forgive God for his crime against us, which is to have made us 
finite creatures, He will forgive our crime against him, which is that we 
are finite creatures. 
 By accepting that we are creatures we win freedom from the past.78 
 
In this sense, for Weil, to forgive involves resentment passing through the void.  It is not 
that one tells oneself that one is wrong to be so angry, or finds reasons to justify or 
excuse those who harm us (or ourselves where we have harmed others), or even that 
one says 'enough is enough', but that resentment is detached from finite objects and 
directed at God, which is to say, undirected.  Despite the idiosyncrasy of Weil's work, 
there does seem to be something important in this idea.  Jean Amery's description of the 
experience of torture and life in the concentration camp emphasises the discrepancy 
between the fairly average cruelty of individual Nazi soldiers, with the desolation of his 
experience.  Torture produces not just a sense of being attacked  and degraded by a 
particular person, but a sense of cosmic abandonment: 
Whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at home in the 
world.  The shame of destruction cannot be erased.  Trust in the world, 
which already collapsed in part at the first blow, but in the end, under 
torture, fully, will not be regained.  That one's fellow man was revealed as 
the anti-man remains in the tortured person as accumulated horror.  It 
blocks the view into a world in which the principle of hope rules.79 
 
 The resonances between Weil and Amery are particularly striking here (especially 
when one considers that the experiences Amery describes may well have been 
happening as Weil was writing).  Both attest to the shock of realisation that 'all those 
                                                             
78Weil, First and last notebooks, p.  95. 
79Jean Amery, 'Torture' in At the mind's limits: contemplations by a survivor on Auschwitz and its 
realities, p.  40. 
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things that one may, according to inclination, call his soul'80 are exactly as vulnerable as 
the flesh, and describe the way in which this realisation - either through real experience, 
or through a heightened sensitivity to the possibility of such suffering - has a profound 
effect on one's view of the world and the human person.81  In Weil's terms, experiences 
like Amery's produce a protest that is out of proportion to any human target; there is no-
one to receive it, no-one capable of weighing its seriousness.  And as the essay on 
resentment suggests, the desire that fuels resentment of the kind that Amery knows is a 
desire that exceeds the limits of what is possible.  To 'forgive' in the way that Weil 
describes above is not to cease resentment, but to wrench its energy away from 
particular aims so that it can be seen without the imaginary sense of fulfilment that the 
anticipation these aims produces.82  For Weil, the command to forgive is a command to 
let one's desire (for satisfaction, for equilibrium, for vindication, etc.) be without 
determinate object, and in the case of resentment, this means to accuse God whilst 
desiring the good that only God is.   
 For Weil, the cross is an image and an instance of what this means.  For Weil, the 
prayer of forgiveness that comes from the cross, combined with the cry of abandonment 
is an indication that here there is the co-existence of an acceptance, protest and love.  
Christ has no resentment not because of a failure to recognise the reality of injustice, or 
a refusal of anger, or a contemptuous attitude towards those that crucify, but because the 
energy of the protest is torn away from finite objects, and directed, in love and pain, 
towards the Father. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is difficult to sum up what is learnt through an encounter with Simone Weil. Her work 
has proved essential for this thesis precisely because of the direct attempt to wrestle 
                                                             
80Amery, 'Torture' p.  40. 
81Eric Springsted and Diognees Allen suggest that it was this realisation that launched Weil into her 
later views in which she often talks about the 'supernatural' part of the soul as a distinct, inacessible 
aspect of the person.   See Spirit, nature and community: issues in the thought of Simone Weil (Albany:  
State University of New York Press, 1994) p.  83.  See also pp.  97-110 for a comparison between 
Epictetus and Weil's conceptions of the effect of suffering on the person.   
82Weil, Notebooks, p.  175. 
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with problems that seem essential to this subject, and for the immense sensitivity she 
demonstrates at times towards these issues. At the risk of overlooking some serious 
problems with Weil's thought, we can draw out a number of points which will be 
instructive in what follows. 
 Firstly, Weil sensed that compassion, as an honest and loving response to the human 
experience of suffering, involves an elusive but very real character of thinking. This is 
construed in terms of the motivation of thought: not to look for false compensation or 
hurry past the intolerable, but equally, not to justify or normalise what is continually 
exceptional.  Just as the experience of suffering produces thought, and one's response to 
it shapes thought, so one can say something similar about forgiveness: the intellectual 
processes through which we name and reflect upon wrongdoing are already responses 
to it.  This is consonant with the argument made in the previous chapter, that 
forgiveness involves both a suspension, or abandonment of judgement, and a re-
learning of judgement.  Secondly, Weil emphasises the centrality of the experience of 
contradiction, such that one cannot be compassionate without feeling it 'with one's 
whole soul'.  However, for Weil, the contradictions of existence are encountered, not in 
an instant, but through an openness of posture which is intrinsically temporal: waiting is 
a way of being in time, and attention, which involves an embrace of contradiction, is 
given only through time.  The notion of waiting will prove to be a way of interrogating 
Derrida's insistence on the importance of aporetic instants. Finally, the tortured contours 
of many of Weil's notes indicate that there is an inherent ambiguity to many of the most 
important things that there are to say about suffering and grace. This aspect of her 
thought sheds more light on why it is that describing the nature and meaning of 
forgiveness is necessarily precarious, risky and provisional. In the chapters that follow, I 
will continue to use these aspects of Weil's work as a resource in the discussions. 
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Chapter three 
 
Forgiveness and the cross: atonement, perspective and necessity 
 
This chapter explores the change of perspective that forgiveness might involve through  
constructive use of a number of sources.  As well as continuing discussion on Charles 
Griswold and Vladimir Jankelevitch, I also engage with the debate about atonement 
engendered by the work of Rene Girard, and  reflect upon biblical scholar Michael J.  
Gorman's recent work on Pauline theology.  The argument is suggestive rather than 
conclusive: it is an attempt to give a sense of what forgiveness might be when exposed 
to seemingly contradictory concerns, namely, that it be comprehending and vigilant as 
well as excessive and mysterious: 'as wise as snakes and as innocent as doves'.  I hope 
already to have shown that it is necessary to let one's understanding of forgiveness be 
open to these sometimes opposing concerns, through the discussions in the first chapter.  
I also hope to have shown, through interaction with Charles Taylor, further extended in 
engagement with Simone Weil, the way in which understanding itself is already 
pressured by these concerns.  Just as for Weil, thought itself is a form of response to 
suffering, so it seems that the unavoidable questions posed in the figure of forgiveness 
are always already shaping understanding, so that our thinking is itself already a form 
of response to wrongdoing (the question 'what now?' which any violation poses, is one 
which we are always answering, in one way or another).  In this chapter I suggest a way 
of seeing the significance of the ambiguity which seems to remain even in the most 
thorough account of forgiveness, such that when embraced - or taken up, and carried, 
like a cross - it may become redemptive. 
 Rene Girard's work is chosen here for two reasons.  Firstly, Girard's work, as well as 
that of those who have made theological use of it, is concerned with a purification of 
thinking: as we will see, the gospel is thought in terms of the collapse of a whole 
complex of significance which grows up around compulsive violence.  As we have seen 
in the case of Jankelevitch, there is a tendency when trying to articulate the gratuity of 
forgiveness to oppose the moment of forgiveness to any condition, principle, motivation 
or goal.  In other words, the desire seems to be for an uncontaminated understanding of 
forgiveness.  I have already indicated the way in which I think that this tendency 
actually results in diminished understanding, in which the tension of the forgiving 
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moment is actually reduced by the lack of contact with the pragmatic necessities of 
judgement.  Similarly, Girardian theology can be seen as the attempt to purify theology 
from the sacrificial mentality that requires and produces victims, and more than this, 
from the sense that some evil is always necessary to drive out evil.  In this sense, the 
difficulties that this attempt encounters can be seen as another example of what Charles 
Taylor calls 'cross-pressures'.  I hope to show how the tensions evident in this task 
parallel those that I have been exploring thus far.  Secondly, and more positively, 
Girard's thought may be read as a description of how one set of necessities are revealed 
to be unnecessary, and therefore as a description of a liberating change in perspective: 
the death and resurrection of Jesus reveals the way in which scapegoating is futile and 
unnecessary.  This gives a particularly helpful way of exploring the way in which 
forgiveness may be an unforeseen possibility, either invisible or incomprehensible from 
certain perspectives, so that the discourse on forgiveness involves articulating this sense 
of discovery. 
 The chapter begins with a discussion of necessity and forgiveness that lays out in 
more depth the issues that are at stake, before briefly summarising the main points of 
Girard's theory, as well as some of the problems with it.  The discussion then moves to 
examine some of the constructive theological uses of Girard's work, with a particular 
emphasis on the way that any discussion of atonement involves giving meaning to 
death.  Finally, I propose a slightly different approach to the question of learning or 
discovery, with reference to the textual dynamics Michael Gorman finds in the Philippi 
hymn, and use this to suggest that the 'impurity' that appears to haunt discussions of 
both forgiveness and atonement may actually play a more constructive role in the 
transformation of perspective.  I end with a return to Charles Griswold's work in an 
attempt to flesh out what this means more concretely.   
 
 
Girard, forgiveness and necessity 
 
What is necessary in order for us to forgive, or be forgiven? One of the issues we have 
been concerned with so far is the way in which forgiveness may be in opposition to a 
calculating, measured or retributive mentality, so that to forgive may mean to give up 
on giving reasons, and on the necessity of condition preceding response.  We have seen 
the way in which where forgiveness is presented as a well-regulated giving of what is, 
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in any case only proper, it appears somewhat diminished and pallid.  Vladimir 
Jankelevitch gives one explanation of why reasons are found for forgiveness.  He writes 
of the way in which, when interrogated, the loving person loses confidence in their 
ungrounded generosity, retreating back into the realm of 'becauses' and 'whys' so as to 
justify themselves: 
Thus the generous man sometimes clings to a semblance of mitigating 
excuse or excusing circumstance, immeasurably exaggerates the 
justificatory occasion, or even invents it whole, so as to be in accordance 
with rational logic.  Love, solicited to say why it loves (as if it were 
necessary that there be a why!), looks into itself and naturally finds for 
itself, right away, some becauses.  The creator, interrogated by journalists 
about the mystery of creation, reconstructs a retrospective causality - for 
he finds it more fitting to write his poems for this or that reason.  And 
likewise, impulsive forgiveness gives itself an explicative etiology and 
some reasonable motives for indulgence after the fact; retrospectively, it 
finds reasons for excusing what it was wholly disposed to forgive without 
reason.1 
 
There is a sense here that from the perspective of the truly forgiving person, the 
question 'what is necessary in order for us to forgive?' simply does not arise, and so 
cannot be answered without betrayal.  The explanation of what from one perspective is 
without need of explanation, according to the norms and principles of another, is framed 
as a failure of nerve, or a result of shame.  The 'becauses' and 'whys' that make up this 
retrospective causality lack the generosity, creativity or impulsive nature of the act they 
are given to explain, but most people are unprepared to remain silent for long, or 
renounce the opportunity to exercise their reasoning.  One possibility here is to see the 
difference between the two perspectives - the way that what appears obvious from one 
must be justified from another -  as analogous to the way that the wisdom of God is 
found to be foolish from the perspective of the wisdom of the world.  For John Caputo, 
this is precisely what the impossibility of forgiveness indicates.  In 'the kingdom of the 
impossible', the principle of reason is upended by an event in excess of logic: 'this 
coming of the impossible, of the gift, of the kingdom, shatters the horizon of 
economics, of balanced payments and carefully conducted cost analyses'.2  As the 
                                                             
1Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, p.  113. 
2John D. Caputo, The weakness of God: a theology of the event, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2006), p.  109.  See pp.  101-112, and 208-235 for his discussion of forgiveness as the 
impossible.  This thesis does not focus on Caputo directly, but since his work so clearly follows 
Derrida, especially on the subject of the impossibility of the gift, much of what is discussed in chapter 
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impossible, forgiveness necessarily appears groundless and unreasonable, but this 
foolishness is wiser than the wisdom of the world.   
 But the 'retrospective causality' that Jankelevitch describes above also calls to mind 
the resurrection appearances of Jesus, in which the risen Jesus, with a note of 
impatience, explains that there were reasons for the events in Jerusalem: 'Oh, how 
foolish you are, and how slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have declared! 
Was it not necessary that the Messiah should suffer these things and then enter his 
glory?'3  Luke narrates a story of discovery, the experience of finding sense where there 
was no sense, reasons where there were none.  However, in the New Testament, the 
'retrospective causality' that looks for, and finds, a 'because' or a 'for this reason' in the 
death of Jesus is not framed as a compromising co-operation with unforgiving 
standards, but almost as the opposite.  In this case, the generous, creative one gives his 
reasons as illumination rather than compromise, and the reasons are given so as to 
challenge and change minds, not pander to them.  Nevertheless, the Christian doctrine 
of atonement, which attempts to describe in more detail what 'for this reason' might 
mean remains notoriously unresolved, and the kind of thinking that lies behind 'was it 
not necessary?' is a matter of ongoing contention.  René Girard's work has provoked an 
attempt to re-think the nature of this necessity, one that centres on the interaction 
between human desire, ritual behaviour, mythology and violence. 
 Through his early work as a literary critic, Girard began to formulate a theory of 
mimetic, or triangular, desire.  Rather than assuming that human desire is primarily a 
matter of someone desiring and something desired, Girard suggests that desire is always 
mediated through a third party, or model: I desire that which is already desired by 
another, because it is desired by another, or in James Alison's words, 'I desire according 
to the desire of another'.  In practice, this mimetic desire seems to be inextricably linked 
with conflict: the model for my desire tends to become my rival, and an antagonistic 
spiral ensues, in which despite the intensification of desire on both sides, the attention 
gradually shifts from the object of desire to the opponent who blocks the way to the 
object.4  This feature of human behaviour leads inevitably to violence, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
four in relation to Derrida applies to Caputo. 
3Luke 24: 25-6. 
4Mimetic desire is not the subject of this discussion, but there are important questions about Girard's 
account of mimesis, in particular over whether he implies, willingly or not, that desire is inherently 
violent.  Rebecca Adam's essay 'Loving mimesis and Girard's scapegoat of the text' in Violence 
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possibility of murder, which in turn creates further spiralling of aggression within 
communities, the risk of a complete deterioration of relations within them, and a latent 
fear of this possibility haunts collective consciousness.  Girard hypothetically re-creates 
a foundational moment in which a new form of consciousness is born.  During a period 
of uncontrolled aggression, fuelled by mimetic desire, and without any means of being 
quelled, the attention of a seething mob is diverted onto an unfortunate individual, 
usually someone noticeably unusual, weak or marginal, who is spontaneously 
murdered.  It is not simply the fact of murder that is significant, but the unanimity: 
'suddenly the opposition of everyone against everyone else is replaced by the opposition 
of all against one.  Where previously there had been a chaotic ensemble of particular 
conflicts, there is now the simplicity of a single conflict: the entire community on one 
side, and on the other, the victim.'5  A grateful peace descends on the community, but it 
is a peace linked to the presence of a dead body.  This body commands attention in a 
new way, it brings about 'the first non-instinctual attention', and as such this moment is 
truly foundational ± it precedes all cultural institutions and systems of signs.  Here is the 
origin of worship, because the dead victim is the object of both horror and reverence.  
For Girard, this ambivalence lies behind the unstable figures within mythology that 
shift between benevolence and malevolence, gods and monsters.6 
In this way, a mechanism emerges for the maintenance of relative peace within 
communities, and as Girard sees it, this mechanism lies in the background of most 
myths, and nearly all religious practices.  The practice of sacrifice is a way of repeating 
the essence of what actually happened in this foundational moment in a safer, more 
controlled and sustainable way, and myths are re-tellings of the foundational moment of 
violence from the perspective of the newly-united community.  In both cases there is an 
unconscious collective compulsion to repeat in narrative or ritual form the logic of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Renounced, ed. William M. Swartley (Telford: Pandora Press 2000) is a particularly helpful discussion 
of this question, and focuses on the desire for others, and the way in which it is not just what is desired 
by the other that is imitated, but how the other desires, and so imitative desire can be positive if it 
imitates a non-possessive desire for another's continued subjective flourishing. 
5
 Girard, Oughoulian and Lefort, Things hidden since the foundation of the world, (The Athlone 
Press: London), 1978, p. 24. 
6
 Girard, Violence and the sacred, tr. Patrick Gregory, (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore 
and London), 1977, pp. 251-253. 
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scapegoating.  Both sacrificial practice and founding myths are necessarily deceptive, 
though, because the violence directed at the victim is presented as being in some way 
necessary or deserved, not as the random re-directing of internal rivalry and 
antagonism, and ultimately, not as murder.  The actual source of conflict is thereby 
occluded, and Girard repeatedly stresses the way in which many modern attempts to 
examine ancient myths or rituals fall straight back into the same perspectives that the 
myths are developed in order to perpetuate.7 Much of Girard's work has been concerned 
with emphasising the way in which the bible has been the primary vehicle for revealing 
the innocence of the victim of scapegoating, and so enabling a conception of God 
fundamentally different to that which is found in all religious systems, as well as a more 
honest reading of both ritual practice and myth.  The truth of human violence is 
revealed at the same moment as the victim is revealed to be innocent, because once the 
necessity of the murder is no longer believed, attention is directed onto the real cause of 
the eruption of violence. 
 Interestingly, despite the obvious way in which this perspective links sacrifice with 
the most destructive patterns of behaviour, it highlights something that most 
interpretations of sacrifice miss, according to Girard; namely, that scapegoating (and its 
ritualised repetition,  which sacrifice involves) actually works.  That is, it produces a 
powerful effect because it temporarily stills the storm of mimetic conflict within a 
community through a redirection of aggression and attention.  Primitive religious 
                                                             
7A particularly striking example of this point is given by S. Mark Heim from a book on myth by 
Joseph Campbell and Bill D Moyers.  Campbell and Moyers discuss a religious festival which involves 
a sexual orgy in which taboos are broken, and some of the young boys undergo sexual initiation.  The 
boys enter one by one into a specially constructed log hut to have their first sexual experience with a 
young woman dressed up as a deity: 'Campbell: .  .  .  And when the last boy is with her in full 
embrace, the supports are withdrawn, the logs drop, and the couple is killed.  There is the union of male 
and female again, as they were in the beginning, before the separation took place.  There is the union of 
begetting and death.  They are both the same thing.  Then the little couple is pulled out and roasted and 
eaten that very evening.  The ritual is the repetition of the original act of the killing of a god followed 
by the coming of the food from the dead saviour In the sacrifice of the Mass, you are taught that this is 
the body and blood of the Saviour.  You take it to you, and you turn inward, and there he works within 
you.  Moyers: What is the truth to which the rituals point?' Heim goes on to note that the shocking 
thing here is not the ritual itself, but the fact that the meaning of the ritual is seen as entirely separate 
from the very real violence that it is actually composed of.   See S.  Mark Heim, Saved from sacrifice, 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), pp. 57-59. 
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practices do not just reflect an unscientific world-view, which supposes that the smell of 
burning fat is 'well-pleasing to the LORD', but rather, they draw upon fundamental 
human impulses, and testify - albeit deceptively - to a basic truth about human sociality: 
violence can be used to expel violence, as long as no-one recognises that this is what is 
happening.  Once the victims of scapegoating are recognised as innocent, and the 
killing unjust, the mechanism begins to falter.  For Girard, the crucifixion of Jesus is the 
story of an act of scapegoating told, for the first time, entirely from the perspective of 
the victim, with all the communal illusions highlighted rather than consented to.  The 
reasons given for Jesus' execution are shown to be fabrications, and the innocence of 
Jesus is stressed through dissenting voices, but more importantly, the arrest, trial and 
execution of Jesus is presented as an escalating contagion, out of the control of any one 
person or group.   
 Crucially, Girard stresses that 'the sacred plays no part in the death of Jesus'.8 That 
is, although the New Testament witnesses assert (and in fact, much more strongly that 
Girard allows) that within the dishonesty and compulsion of the rushed execution there 
was the work of a different intentionality, already alluded to by the prophets, and which 
was also that of Jesus himself, the cross is nevertheless the work of evil.9  In this sense, 
the gospel texts reveal how things have been and at the same time show that they need 
no longer be this way, or as James Alison puts it: '[a]s it becomes possible to perceive 
humans as constitutionally violent, so it becomes possible to understand God as entirely 
without violence'.10  It is not God who demands sacrifice, but violent, frustrated 
humanity; for God, only one thing is needed, and it is not sacrifice.  This is a crucial 
point, because for Girard the central thrust of Christianity is found in this revelation, 
and it is this revelation that opens up the possibility of peaceful community no longer 
based on expulsion.  As Girard describes it, the truth of the innocent victim is resisted 
not by individual perversity, but by a powerful communal blindness, and made visible 
only through a remarkable (and costly) disentanglement from mimetic fascination.  
However, it is a perspective that is difficult to be true to, since the draw towards 
sacrificial thinking is so strong.  Where the New Testament begins to lose sight of the 
                                                             
8Girard, Things hidden, p. 231. 
9Hence the formula in Acts: 'this man Jesus...  whom you crucified...  God has raised'.  See Acts 2:23-
24, 2:14-15, 5:30-31 
10James Alison, The joy of being wrong: original sin through Easter eyes, (The crossroad publishing 
company: New York), 1998, p. 83. 
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role of sinful human agents in bringing about the crucifixion, it also loses the sense of 
the innocence of the victim, and the perspective that this makes possible.  When the 
cross is framed as a necessity (as, for Girard, it is in the book of Hebrews),11 we 
succumb to a mentality that needs, and demands, death in order for life to continue. 
 We can see, then, that there is a parallel here with the two interpretations of 
forgiveness we are considering: reasoned conditionality and excessive unconditionality.  
For Jankelevitch, the creative, generous man slips out of a genuinely forgiving 
perspective as he gives his reasons for that which, at the time, there were no reasons 
(forgiveness being its own reason).  Similarly, for Girard, the movement towards a 
greater elaboration of the sacrificial meaning of the death of Christ is a movement 
backwards into the compromised perspective of scapegoating.  The following 
discussion aims to examine in more detail the way in which Girard's work can be used 
to form a new perspective on the death of Jesus, and to show the way in which this 
perspective necessarily involves more compromise with the perspective it aims to leave 
behind than is admitted.    
  
 
The impurity of the gospel 
  
Girard's thought has had an important impact upon Christian theology, in a number of 
ways.  The way in which the life of Jesus is, at important junctures, concerned with the 
influence of crowds and the influence of collective mentalities upon the individual, 
seems increasingly significant in the light of Girard's work, given his description of a 
collective mentality formed at moments of heightened tension.12  Similarly, the 
emphasis on the link between the drama of the gospel narrative and its inner meaning is 
crucial,  so that the need to explore the historical event of the crucifixion has become 
                                                             
11Girard, Things hidden, p.  230.   
12An excellent example of the theory of mimetic desire 'in action' is James Alison's essay on the 
Sermon on the mount sayings on prayer, recently included in the collection Broken hearts and new 
creations.  Alison highlights the way in which the emphasis on secrecy does not equate to an 
affirmation of the private sphere and a judgement of public life, but rather indicates that desire is only 
renewed when it is nurtured away from the pressures of mimetic desire.  Hence the focus of the 
teaching, on this reading, is not on the danger of pride, as if our appearance before others were itself an 
evil, but on the way that a positive, non-rivalistic desire must initially be learned through isolation. 
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more important in attempts to explore the logic of atonement.13 Closely linked with this 
is the sense that the resurrection attains a new significance, because it is only the 
undoing, in a certain sense, of the unjust murder that allows it to be revealed as unjust 
murder.14  Another distinctive feature of the Girardian picture is that in its use of 
biblical texts, passages not normally taken to be crucial begin to appear to take on a 
new, perhaps central, significance.  Jesus' statement about his affinity with a long line of 
murdered prophets, his description of Satan as both a murderer from the beginning and 
the father of lies, the enigmatic response to the question about authority ('How can 
Satan cast out Satan?) and Caiaphas' declaration that 'it is better for one man to die than 
the whole nation to perish' all come to be vital in drawing out the significance of the 
passion narratives.  Any picture of what the death of Jesus was motivated by, what it 
meant and what it means is built up through the way in which key texts are linked 
together, and if nothing else, Girard has demonstrated how different the picture can be if 
we link different texts together in different ways.   
Most important, though, is the way in which it highlights the problematic nature of 
talk of Jesus' death as part of a divine plan, and therefore as something which, from this 
point of view, 'had' to happen.  It may be that this has always been one of the central 
problems in discussing the significance of the cross, but the picture presented by Girard 
highlights it in a new way.  It highlights the way in which any talk of meaning in the 
cross relies upon two layers of intentionality - the purposes of God, the purposes of 
those that crucify - and yet at the same time draws attention to the conflict between 
these.  In fact, it might be said that this tension is particularly problematic in the 
Girardian picture, precisely because the revelation that deaths like that of Jesus are 
futile and unnecessary is the main content of the gospel, and it is this perspective that 
the  non-mythological preservation of the story in subsequent human history makes 
possible.  If there is a discrepancy between the message and the way which it comes to 
                                                             
13Despite some major reservations concerning Girard, John Milbank is still happy to use his insights 
positively, and his essay on the crucifixion in Being reconciled: ontology and pardon (London, 
Routledge, 2004), assumes that Girard is right to stress the way in which Jesus' death is in part the 
result of a mob.  See pp.79-93, especially pp.  92-3. See also The word made strange: theology, 
language, culture (Oxford: Blackwell 1997), pp.  159-161. 
14Rowan Williams' much loved book Resurrection: interpreting the Easter gospel (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 2002), anticipates some of this significance, as Williams notes in the new 
introduction, where he suggests the book should now be read with Girard's work in mind. See p. viii. 
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light, it is especially serious in this case, where the link between violence, deception 
and story-telling has been stressed so distinctively.  The gospel makes possible a new 
realisation: we do not need to create arbitrary victims in order to find an outlet for 
murderous rage, we do not need to keep warding off impending crisis with just one 
more sacrifice, we do not need to collude with the temporary wishes of a violent crowd 
so that order can be kept, and we do not need to distance ourselves from the victims of 
these acts in order to hold onto our own fragile place in the world.  But in order for any 
of this to be seen, a violent death had to be suffered in a certain way.  And so violence is 
necessary, and redemptive: God ends up in the background of the lynching, holding the 
cloaks of the mob.15   
The point is not to claim that Girardian insights can or should be reduced to such a 
stark contradiction, but simply to suggest that even if the Christian gospel is construed 
primarily in terms of the unmasking of violence and the potential for forming peaceful 
human community, rather than as an overcoming of humanity's alienation from God, 
some kind of link between violence and reconciliation remains, and the difficulty is of 
how to articulate this.  Thinkers attempting to use Girard's insights as a way to flesh out 
an alternative approach to atonement have the task of expressing this link without 
leaving God compromised in human violence.  One might conclude, as Mark Heim 
does, that on this point the difference between being very right and very wrong can be 
'vanishingly small', which means that atonement theology is by definition the task of 
walking along this knife edge, and Girardian insights simply bring this tension into 
particularly sharp focus by highlighting the scapegoating pattern.16  Equally, though, 
one might see this knife edge as a sign that Girardian approaches are still an attempt to 
present sacrificial death as necessary, and instead of reinterpreting the death of Christ, 
propose that the natural movement of understanding provoked by the New Testament is 
away from the cross as a significant moment in its own right.  I will explore this latter 
possibility first, since it sheds light on the former. 
This position is taken up by Stephen Finlan.  Finlan claims that Girard attempts to 
hold on to the sacrificial mentality whilst explaining it, and that only a more thorough 
soteriology of incarnation can free theology from the idea of atonement by sacrifice, 
                                                             
15See S. Mark Heim, Saved from sacrifice: A theology of the cross (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2006), pp.  
192-207 on this point, and more critically, Stephen Finlan, Problems with atonement: the origins of, 
and controversy about, the atonement doctrine (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2005), p. 93. 
16
 Heim, Saved from Sacrifice, p. 7. 
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which is by definition a 'strange marriage of primitive concepts of a violent god and the 
revealed teaching of a loving God.'17  Essentially, then, Girard's framework faces the 
same problem that all atonement theologies face; namely, that it is an atonement 
theology: even in Girard, there is still the trace of 'sacrificial blood magic'.18 Finlan 
begins with a description of the process of the spiritualisation of sacrifice that was 
already well under-way by the time the New Testament was being written, and 
describes this process in terms of six stages: substitution (animals for humans), 
moralising (insertion of new meanings into existing practice), internalisation (attitude 
and motive become more important that accurate practice, and can sometimes count as 
sacrifice in a further substitution), metaphorical use of cultic terms (e.g.  the idea that 
one's body becomes a temple), actual rejection of sacrifice (whether because it is 
insincere or hypocritical, as in some prophetic sayings and Psalms, or more radically, 
because it is not needed, as is frequent in ancient Greek philosophy), and finally, the 
culmination of these moves in the notion of spiritual transformation: the whole of life 
seen as an offering up in which what is human becomes divine, as for example in the 
Christian notion of theosis.19  For Finlan, the problem with making atonement through 
the cross a central doctrine is that in the background lurks the idea that God is somehow 
dependant on ritual process, or that the underlying structures of sacrificial ritual flow 
from God, or are written into being itself.  Thus, the movement of spiritualisation is 
impeded, as assumptions about the efficacy of ritual that should be naturally left behind 
(that sins can be unloaded onto a scapegoat, that blood purifies, that God needs to be 
appeased, that divine economy mimics human economy, etc.) are cemented into the 
meaning of the gospel.20  Instead, Finlan argues, it is the doctrine of the Incarnation that 
is crucial; atonement theology can be helpful in as much as it 'transmits' the notion of 
God entering into human life and suffering, but this could be transmitted just as well 
without it.21  The central meaning of the cross should instead be something like 
Irenaeus' notion of recapitulation, although with Irenaeus' unfortunate references to 
transactional terms like ransom, propitiation and redemption omitted: 'the divine Son 
salvaged each phase of human life by his living through it.  The living of this life had 
                                                             
17Finlan, Problems with atonement, pp. 98 and 101 for the same critique applied to Walter Wink. 
18Finlan, Problems with atonement, p.  94. 
19Finlan, Problems with atonement, pp. 20-29. 
20Finlan, Problems with atonement, pp. 43-44 and 80. 
21Finlan, Problems with atonement, pp. 120. 
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the effect of re-making human life itself, of restoring the potential for union with 
God.'22  The notion of recapitulation is naturally allied to the drama of the gospels, in 
that if it is simply the living of this particular life which is salvific, rather than some 
extrinsic achievement, then to imaginatively enter into Jesus' life to perceive is 
character and potency, is already to begin to understand its saving significance.23 
  One might say, then, that for both Girard and Finlan, there is a movement towards 
purification, so that the gospel becomes, to echo Wittgenstein, more and more 'limpid'.24  
However, for Finlan, the movement only has integrity when it is allied to a more 
robustly theological perspective (of creation, incarnation, the solidarity of God with 
suffering humanity, and ultimately, theosis), rather than a rationalising explanation 
which allows death, under certain circumstances, to mean something, or accomplish 
something.  Something important should be noted here, however.  The significance that 
the incarnation gives to temporal events means that one contemplates those events 
differently (so that, for example, for Jesus to feast with tax-collectors and sinners means 
something more than an average feast involving tax-collectors and sinners).  This is 
particularly true when it comes to the crucifixion.  The sense of divine humanity gives 
the event of death - even the cruellest, most unjust death - the significance of showing 
God's 'willingness to go the full measure of participation in human suffering',25 rather 
than simply being another instance of political violence.  But in this change of 
perspective, too, one can see a sacrifice.  The beginnings of a sense of redemptive 
purpose alters, surely, the way in which the horror of crucifixion is contemplated; in 
Weil's terms, there is the potential here for an evasion of the full sense of affliction - it 
sweetens what is bitter.  Does Finlan's perspective not equally cultivate a tendency to 
look away from suffering, insofar as the image of Christ on the cross somehow dilutes 
or distracts from the senseless horror of the human body nailed onto wood to hang till it 
dies?  It is important to note here that there is tendency for these discussions to proceed 
                                                             
22Finlan, Problems with atonement, p. 121. 
23Finlan, Problems with atonement, p.  121. 
24See his comment in Lecture on ethics, culture and value in The Wittgenstein Reader, p.  298.  
Although he is referring to 'what his nose tells him' about the difference between the gospels and Paul's 
epistles in terms of humility, not sacrificial language, the way he qualifies his own criticism is relevant 
here.  Perhaps, he says, it is my own impurity which causes the turbulence, for why should my impurity 
not be able to pollute what is limpid? 
25Finlan, Problems with atonement, p.  110. 
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by way of a trade in accusation: Girard accuses the 'sacrificial' interpretation of 
Christianity of violence, and proposes instead that the gospels unveil the futility of 
sacrifice; Finlan accuses Girard of further complicity in sacrifice, through affirming the 
need for there to be 'one last sacrifice' that exposes the violence.  But there is no reason 
why this process cannot be continued: Simone Weil might accuse Finlan of refusing, 
still, to contemplate the destructive depths of affliction, because the cross is always seen 
through the lens of incarnation, in advance. 
 However, the accusation need not stop there.  Susan Taubes' criticism of Weil is that 
despite her concern with suffering, she, too ends up rationalising and justifying the 
sufferings of the afflicted in the same way that Weil construes much of Christian 
orthodoxy as doing.26  A traditional belief in heavenly consolation may, as Weil argues, 
encourage a lack of attention to affliction (the present reality of suffering and injustice 
can be accepted because one day they will be forgotten - it is a counter-balance) but 
Weil's account of a traumatic awakening produced through affliction may equally 
render real physical, emotional or social suffering less significant because of the fruit it 
is believed to produce if undergone in the right way.  But for Taubes, both attempts at 
reconciliation could encourage passivity and be used to justify or tolerate violence or 
injustice, or else to make sense of the feeling of impotence in the face of evil and 
suffering by ascribing a similar impotence to God.27  For Taubes, Weil's meditations on 
the cross, despite their severity, still give suffering and death a theological glow, and 
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 Susan Taubes, 'Simone Weil: The Absent God', in Toward a new Christianity: readings in the death 
of God theology, ed.  Thomas Altizer (Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.: New York 1967). 
27
 Toward a new Christianity, pp. 116, 118.  For Taubes, despite Weil's descriptions of the absence of 
God, and the kenosis involved in creating a world governed by necessity, in the background there is still 
the all-powerful God of traditional theism, who voluntary abdicates his power.  In practice, then, Weil's 
picture is not so different from that which she opposes, and giving suffering a supernatural use is not so 
different from anticipating a supernatural remedy; the former may simply be a more sophisticated route 
to reach the same destination.  Both strive for a perspective from which to be reconciled with reality, 
and are prepared to sacrifice one aspect of life to do so.  Where beliefs about future reward for the poor 
and the suffering can become a legitimation of inequality and oppression, the presentation of an absent 
God and a spiritually purifying suffering may give dignity to impotence and passivity.  Despite Weil's 
strongest intentions, the theological framework that she builds around her description of the reality of 
suffering and its place in spiritual life is still a divinisation of the human order; and theodicy has not 
been avoided, only displaced.  For Taubes, then, Weil's account is lacking because it could easily fail to 
produce the right kind of attention towards suffering and injustice, just as a more traditional theodicy 
might.     
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this requires a sacrifice of our attention towards the real suffering of others.  The 
problem with this process is that it is not obvious how any way of giving meaning to 
suffering or death could completely justify the change of perspective that is thereby 
encouraged.  More specifically, it is not obvious how any statement about the 
theological significance of a crucifixion can avoid the risk that it thereby justifies 
violence retrospectively.  The demand for a complete escape from the idea of necessary 
violence produces its own accusation, and, in Taylor's terms, the desire to definitively 
avoid being impaled by one horn of a dilemma may simply push one more firmly onto 
another.  If this demand is made then it is difficult to see how any positive statement 
about the death of Christ can meet it, or defend itself against the accusation completely.  
This is pointed out not to induce a despairing resignation towards the whole endeavour, 
but to highlight that discussion about atonement is necessarily precarious, and seems to 
involve a mixture of sometimes competing perspectives.   
 What does this imply with regard to the discourse on forgiveness? There is a 
different parallel in the case of each of the approaches to forgiveness outlined.  For 
Griswold, as we have seen, the task is for an affirmation of forgiveness to avoid the 
charge that it is a complicity in evil, or that it cultivates in those who practice it a 
dangerous indifference, resignation or naivety.28  What the ambiguities above suggest is 
that something similar holds for the attempt to articulate the theological significance of 
the cross: how can any affirmation of its goodness or meaning avoid being complicit in 
the violence that it is a result of?  In each case, behind the appearance of grace, real 
dangers are perceived: what if the affirmation of saving significance in the cross 
(whether sacrificial, or revelatory) encourages acquiescence in the demands of violent 
mimetic contagion? what if the affirmation of leniency, compassion or pardon 
encourages moral laxity? But as Jankelevitch draws out, in the case of forgiveness, 
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great lengths to show how forgiveness is coherent by showing that one can justifiably alter one's attitude 
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alter one's attitude towards someone than to alter one's judgements concerning them, especially since 
there is a good case that cognitive judgements emerge to a large degree from less articulate feelings.  See 
Lucy Allais, 'Wiping the slate clean: the heart of forgiveness' in Philosophy and public affairs 36,  no. 1 
especially pp.  35, 60-1. 
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along with the satisfaction of justification comes a sense that one loses something 
essential to the force of the ideas in hand - what Cyril O'Regan calls 'the explosiveness 
of forgiveness'.29  So the parallel here is rather different.  Just as the sacrificial 
perspective demands that someone pay for sin, so a compromised forgiveness seeks the 
assurance of conditions.  Part of the unease that motivates the reformulation of 
atonement theology along Girardian lines is precisely the sense that there is a 
discordance with the stance that the teaching of Jesus encourages one to adopt.  On the 
one hand the doctrine appears bound up with 'an attitude that insists on a precise 
balance between debit and credit';30 on the other, one is taught to give without 
expectation of return and to forgive without insisting on reparation. 
 The suggestion here is that there is a reason for the parallels between the dynamics 
of the discussion concerning Girard and these two very different approaches.  In each 
case there is a desire to adopt what we might call a 'completed perspective', whether it is 
in the way one contemplates the cross, or the way one contemplates the character of 
forgiveness.  As I have tried to show, the difficulty with this movement is that the 
concerns which motivate this search, and which would be necessary to know if one had 
attained it, are themselves in question.  This will be explored more thoroughly below, 
but first I will briefly explore two attempts at constructive theology that use Girard, 
with an emphasis on the way that death is given positive meaning. 
 
 
Resurrection and the use of death 
 
Taubes' criticism of Weil is unsatisfying for the same reasons that Finlan's criticism of 
Girard is; both are right to point out the problem, but wrong to assume that this problem 
itself necessitates abandoning the insight which gives rise to it.  Taubes suggests that 
there is a preoccupation evident in Weil's work with the thought of suffering in the 
absence of a direct experience of its reality.  She notes Weil's failure to live up to her  
ideals of sharing the poverty and servitude of the working classes - she only managed 
one year at the Renault factory ± and her distance from the experience of those suffering 
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 Cyril O'Regan, 'Forgiveness and the forms of the impossible', Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 82, p.  68. 
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 Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, tr. J. R. Foster, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1968), 
p.  281. 
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in France due to the war, and suggests that there is a naivety in her concern: 
It is a romantic illusion that one can go to the people and share their lot as 
long as one retains the possibility of returning to one's former life of 
security whenever one chooses.  .  .  .  If one would share the condition of 
the poor, one must go among them as one enters a cloister, leaving one's 
securities and resources behind.  Otherwise one remains a spectator.  For 
the gravity of their lot consists just in its hopeless finality.31 
 
 The  resonances with the Christian gospel are obvious here: just as Weil's privileged 
background means that she can never experience the affliction of a factory worker with 
no option but to work, so perhaps the Son never fully shares the sufferings of humanity 
because of his unique identity.  In other words, Taubes is claiming that sharing another's 
hopeless suffering is impossible so long as one does not share their hopelessness.  What 
Taubes completely fails to note (however correct she may be in her analysis of Weil's 
romanticism) is that if it is a romantic illusion to believe that one can share another's 
suffering without the sense of inevitability and finality that they experience, it is also an 
illusion, and perhaps an equally romantic one, to suppose that one can share another's 
suffering as it is, leaving it unchanged.  This is why Weil's notion of creative attention is 
so significant, perhaps in ways that she did not stress sufficiently herself.  By attending 
honestly, one affects that to which one attends.  This is a central paradox for Weil: when 
time is accepted as time, it becomes a doorway to the eternal, when the world is loved 
as the world, it becomes a way of loving God.  One has to wait in a void without grace, 
but only grace allows one to wait without grace.  And something very deep seems to 
resonates within the idea of creative attention, because to know that someone has 
noticed one's sufferings and allowed themselves to be exposed to the frustration and 
futility one may feel, one's experience is changed - indefinably but powerfully.  Job 
does not primarily desire restitution, but attention. 
 In other words, if speaking meaningfully about suffering is morally risky because of 
the tendency to seek an easy reconciliation with the world for the sake of one's own 
peace of mind, it is also precarious, because the subject matter changes as it is made 
significant.  Here, this precariousness, the change that is hard to define, is of course 
related to the resurrection.  And this is also what Finlan fails to observe in his criticism 
of Girard and the theological uses of Girard, and what is lacking in his own 
incarnational soteriology; the resurrection construed as the making-possible of a new 
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perspective on the cross, and so of death.32  This aspect is more obviously drawn out by 
Raymund Schwager and James Alison, whose work I will now turn to.   
 At the heart of Schwager's discussion of Jesus' 'use of death' is the following 
reflection on the 'act' of dying: 
Whoever in dying places himself in the hands of another person 
renounces entirely any further self-determination and hands himself over 
to the treatment of this other, to whom he thereby entrusts himself 
without reserve in love.  Every act of surrender made during a person's 
life has its limits, arising at the least from the demands of one's own life 
and one's own identity.  At the moment of dying, these limits can be 
broken down.  But since in death all a person's strengths fail, death in 
itself is extremely ambiguous.  .  .  Whoever no longer determines himself 
by his own spirit, but entrusts this to the heavenly Father in order to allow 
himself to be totally determined by him, achieves a sort of openness and 
availability which goes beyond our earthly experience and can only be 
hinted at by parables.  .  .   [Jesus] turned the radical delivering of himself 
to his enemies, as he experienced this in being executed, into a radical 
surrender to his Father.33 
 
 This is an extremely provocative passage, and a fair distance from the often formal 
nature of Girard's reflections.  Schwager's point is that Jesus is indeed a scapegoat, 
victimised for all the usual reasons people are victimised, but that Jesus was able to use 
this experience differently, to inhabit his enemies' intentions and subvert them, so that 
his own will (or rather, the will of the Father that he is obedient to) determined the 
meaning of the act.34  Here something much more than an simple uncovering of 
underlying human structures is being claimed; the aspect of Jesus' death that makes 
such a subversion of his enemies' intentions possible is the way in which passive 
suffering of  'sacrificial' violence could be turned into a peaceful offering to the Father, 
through the Spirit.  If this is what Jesus made his death mean - the peaceful offering of 
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 One of the most powerful visual representations of the meaning of the resurrection compatible with a 
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self to the Father and the making available of himself to humanity ± this meaning is 
only made visible when it is already a death undone through the resurrection;35 and in 
that sense it only becomes possible to see Jesus' own interpretation of his death when 
the obvious level of intention ± to silence, kill and remove ± has been shown to have 
actually been futile.  In other words, the victory of God in Jesus is in determining the 
meaning of his own death, but this is possible because he is no longer dead.   This may 
not be 'sacrificial blood magic', but it is 'magical' in that its possibility is not given in 
advance, or outside of itself. 
Schwager arrives at this point after a careful consideration of the gospel material, 
and in particular the significance of Jesus' prayer for his killers and the words of the last 
supper ± the apparent contradiction between the will to give oneself through death and 
the judgement that the act through which this is to happen is an evil (implied 
throughout, but particularly emphasised in the prayer for forgiveness).36  The question 
is of how Jesus can have 'intended' his death as an act of self-giving without also being 
an accomplice in an unjust murder.  Here Schwager argues that Jesus' cry for 
forgiveness is to be taken as a continuation of Jesus' identification with the victims of 
sin and its oppressive power, because to take part in evil is to become a victim of it 
oneself, to be out of control and not fully conscious of the meaning of one's actions.  
Therefore, Jesus' death on the cross can begin to be seen as an act of transformative 
solidarity with both victims and victimisers: '[a]t this deeper level, Jesus no longer 
stood over against his opponents, but he underwent together with them the blows of a 
destructive power, but in such a way that he alone experienced this suffering for what it 
was.'37 This links up with the idea that teaching non-violent response to aggression 
presents a 'third way', a response which refuses the choice that violent action seems to 
impose between being simply dominated and overcome by it as a victim, or becoming a 
mirror image of the perpetrator through counter-strike or revenge, both of which affirm 
the power of violence.  If non-violence gains its power through a refusal of the 
assumptions of violence, one might see Jesus' attitude towards his own death in a 
similar light, namely as a refusal to place himself over and against his killers, and as an 
affirmation that it is they who are in need of liberation and rescue, combined with a 
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belief that suffering, and even death, could somehow be active and effective, despite 
being imposed from without.   
It is through the resurrection that the intentions of Jesus, which undo those of his 
persecutors and killers, are revealed: the will to enter and overcome the darkness of 
humanity, and in doing so to continue to trust and give himself to the Father.  In other 
words, the problem of how to walk the fine line of affirming some kind of divine 
involvement in the death of Jesus without succumbing to the 'sacrificial' perspective of 
the mob leads directly to the question of the meaning of the resurrection, because it is 
only through this that the divine perspective (in Girardian terms; the innocence of this, 
and all other victims of collective purifying violence) is made visible.  For Schwager, 
then, it is only through resurrection that this death is revealed to have been, and to be, 
self-giving.  Here, though, as Schwager admits, there is still a break between the logic 
of a new practice - the love of enemies, forgiveness without recompense, the refusal of 
violence, etc. - and the event through which such a logic is proclaimed.  Put differently, 
the movement is out of a substitutionary understanding of Christ towards an exemplarist 
one, but it is not a movement that is ever completed.  The death of Christ only appears 
as something more than surrender to evil, and therefore as something that could give 
rise to example, through the resurrection, but one cannot imitate the resurrection, only 
the obedience of the cross.  What this means is that although for Schwager the 
resurrection is a testimony to the inherent vivacity of certain ways of living (difficult 
withdrawal from mimetic conflict, the refusal to return evil for evil, forgiving rather 
than taking vengeance, etc.), this vivacity is not visible without an event which exceeds 
it.  In order to learn the power of innocent love over violence, it is not enough simply to 
contemplate innocent suffering; we must witness the vindication of such innocence, and 
the power of such love. 
James Alison provides a more detailed account of the link between resurrection, 
revelation and self-giving.  For Alison, as for Girard, the resurrection is primarily a 
'foundational scene of origin in reverse',38 insofar as Jesus founds a new community 
based on the memory of his own unjust killing, rather than a continual cover up.  
Reading Girard, one sometimes gets the impression that the resurrection is a conceptual 
necessity ± required so that the story of the crucifixion can be told honestly (and in this 
sense, the resurrection is necessary because Jesus is the only faithful witness to the 
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crucifixion), but something more than this is being asserted here.  Alison's theology is 
more obviously Eucharistic, and relies on interpreting the sense in which Christ is 
present within the church.  The presence of the Christ 'the risen victim' within the new 
community is not an accusation, but the presence of forgiveness, because 'Jesus' 
resurrection is not revealed as eschatological revenge, but as eschatological pardon.'39 
Complicity in violence is not exposed as brute fact, or along with the threat of 
retaliatory violence, but as part of an invitation to belong differently, as forgiven.  This 
is not  a new knowledge of what victimisation is, and how best to avoid it; it is, in 
Alison's words, a new form of intelligence ± 'the intelligence of the victim' - that is 'in 
fact identical with salvation, or redemption.'40  This new intelligence cannot be detached 
from the disciples' actual experience of finding themselves approached, without 
vengeance, by the resurrected Jesus, and this, in turn, is how the presence of Christ in 
the Eucharist is understood.  Jesus is given back as 'simultaneously dead and alive',41 in 
that his presence is both an ongoing reminder of complicity (hence the marks of death 
are present), and invitation to begin an entirely new form of human unity, 'a unity 
received from the self-giving victim.. .   a unity based on penitence at complicity in 
violence rather than the much stronger-seeming sort of unity that comes from shared 
hatred.'42  Simply, then, the resurrection is primarily a movement of love, which 
includes the love of enemies, not simply an exposure of truth, which is the sense that 
often emerges in Girard - although it is also this. 
As with Schwager, Alison's development of how Jesus actively intends his dying to 
mean something depends on  a sense that Jesus had a unique freedom to creatively act 
within the processes of mimetic compulsion, even whilst being unable to avoid the 
consequences of such compulsion.  This is Alison's means of approaching the sense of 
purpose that pervades the synoptic gospels, which is, as we have seen, problematic 
within the Girardian framework. 
In the synoptic gospels he even refers to his death as necessary.  What 
came to be understood was that Jesus was no merely passive participant.  
There is a deliberate element in the way in which Jesus goes to his death, 
and this deliberate element has nothing to do with any masochism or 
death wish.  Quite the contrary.  It is the attitude of someone who is so 
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 Alison, The joy of being wrong, pp. 98. 
40Alison, The joy of being wrong, pp. 84. 
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 Alison, The joy of being wrong, pp. 76. 
42Alison, The joy of being wrong, pp. 90. 
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entirely free of being involved in death that he manages to mount, to 
stage, a show, a mime, in such a way that other people will be able to 
learn to live as though death were not.  That is the difference between 
dying and redeeming death.  Someone who is totally and utterly free with 
respect to his death is capable of making of his death a sort of "show" 
which takes the sting out of death's tail, detoxifying the reality of death, 
revealing it to be without power and doing this forever.43 
 
The concern evident in this passage is to show that there is a way of seeing the 
necessity of death (the perspective of Jesus) that undoes the sacrificial sense of 
necessity.  But whereas in Girard, the uncovering of truth tends to refer simply to 
human violence, for Alison, it is a new perspective towards death as such that is made 
possible by the cross.  Jesus goes to his death to 'create a belief'; that the Father is 
deathless.44  The intelligence of the victim, for Alison, is to perceive not simply the 
futility of mimesis, rivalry, expulsion, etc., but also a more ontological sense of freedom 
and peace.  One senses here that sin is conceived not simply in terms of mimesis, 
rivalry, expulsion, etc., but in terms of a fearful and resentful attitude towards finitude 
as such: the sense that one's place in the world is always threatened, that one has to be 
'over against' another in order to be at all.45  Alison emphasises particularly the way in 
which the process of forming a sense of identity tends to be determined by the threat of 
exclusion, and so becomes a constant struggle to avoid occupying the place of the 
victim,  a constant positioning of oneself in reference to this position.  Identity, then,  is 
formed and maintained at the expense of victims, and this itself is a kind of continual 
involvement with death (and this is the case even where one seeks the identity of 
'victim', and the righteousness it might seem to hold).46  This threatened perspective is, 
for Alison, closely linked to, and understood through, social processes of exclusionary 
violence, but is not simply identical with it.  We are fearful of death because of our 
methods of building identity, peace and belonging are all bound up with the threat of 
death, and are complicit with this threat; but at the same time, there is a sense that it 
works the other way round as well.  That is, we die because we sin (i.e.  sin, as 
                                                             
43James Alison, Living in the end times: the last things re-imagined, (London: SPCK 1997), p.  58. 
44Alison, Living in the end times, p.  61. 
45Here I am summarising Alison's project in general, rather than any particular passage, based on 
listening to many talks, and the short essays in his more popular work.   
46James Alison, On being liked, (London: Darton Longman and Todd 2003), p. 39, and chapters 1-3 
generally. 
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scapegoating ultimately leads to death), but at the same time, we sin because we die, 
and so are threatened.47 
 There is much more detail in Alison's work than I have shown, and there are many 
developments of Girardian perspectives which could be further explored.48  The central 
point here is that when understood in this way, the resurrection appears less as a 
stripping away of one form of significance (the significance produced by the 
mysteriously pacifying murder) than as the giving to death of a new kind of 
significance, one that includes the transfigured presence of the old.  Because the 
meaning of this death is only given, presented, or recovered through its undoing, there 
is no simple presentation whatever it is that is demonstrated, achieved or exemplified by 
the cross.  The resurrection presents and transforms, or transforms as it presents, and 
here Weil's notion of creative attention might prove useful as way of considering the 
attention that is given to the victim of crucifixion: perhaps it is an attention that dwells 
without fear or revulsion upon affliction and death, and in doing so, re-creates.  And this 
leaves a tremendous ambiguity as to how we can see meaning in death, or indeed, see 
meaning in a particular approach to death as a way of living.  If the death of Jesus can 
be said to bring life, we are left with the question of what, in this case, we mean by 
'death', just as, if it is the crucified Jesus who is raised to life, we are left with the 
question of what, in this case, is meant by 'life'.  Put most simply, life may be said to 
come to the crucified Jesus, as death's opposite, and from the crucified Jesus, as its fruit.   
 
Although/because: forgiveness and the logic of kenosis. 
 
A recent study within Pauline scholarship provides another way into an exploration of 
what may be involved in a fundamental change of perspective, such as the one Girard 
perceives in the gospel narratives.  Here, through a creative interaction with recent work 
of Michael J.  Gorman, I wish to suggest that conflict between different perspectives 
                                                             
47I believe that a very similar phrase appears in one of John Milbank's essays; however I have been 
unable to trace it.  It is also possible that it was a phrase used in a lecture.   
48In particular, a fuller treatment would need a discussion of the way that Alison  - using the work of 
Margaret Barker - tries to articulate in more detail the way that the violent perspective of sacrifice is 
subverted through an understanding of God as unthreatened creator.  Alison argues - following 
Margaret Barker - that the First Temple, and the rites of atonement associated with it, should be seen in 
terms of a receiving of divine life, that sustains creation, so the violent aspects of sacrifice are already 
being re-interpreted.   
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towards the same reality (whether it is the death of Christ, or the possibility of 
forgiveness) may contain more opportunity than some of the tendencies to attain a 
'completed perspective - shown above - acknowledge.  This point will, in turn, be the 
basis for an interaction with debates concerning the meaning of the gift contained in the 
next chapter. 
 Michael J.  Gorman argues that the most basic structure of Paul's theology can be 
found in Philippians 2: 6 ± 11.49 The voluntary self-humbling and self-emptying of 
Christ is held by Paul to demonstrate not only the essentially 'cruciform' character of 
God, but also the basic shape of life in Christ.  However, this shape does not appear 
from a simple description of what or how God is, but emerges from an ambiguous 
textual dynamic, found in the first lines of the Philippi hymn, which the NRSV 
translates as follows: 
Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, 
who, though he was in the form of God, 
did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, 
but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. 
 
The interpretative difficulty Gorman is interested in concerns the participle hyparchon 
in the phrase en morphe theou hyparchon ('being in the form of God') and whether this 
should be understood primarily concessively ('although he was in the form of God' ± 
favoured by the translation above) or causatively ('because he was in the form of God').  
Gorman argues for both, and argues that the text has a surface structure ('although he 
was in the form of God'), and a deep structure ('because he was in the form of God').  
However, these have very different theological implications: '[o]ne implies that Christ's 
condescension was a contravention of his true identity, while the other implies that it 
was the embodiment of his true identity.'50  This movement from surface to depth is 
crucial, otherwise one misses the full import of what is being said: 'God, we must now 
say, is essentially kenotic, and indeed essentially cruciform.  Kenosis, therefore, does 
not mean Christ's emptying himself of his divinity (or of anything else), but rather 
Christ's exercising his divinity, his equality with God.'51 
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 Michael J Gorman, Inhabiting the cruciform God: kenosis, justification and theosis in Paul's 
narrative soteriology, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009), pp. 10. 
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 Gorman, Inhabiting the cruciform God, pp. 26. 
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 Gorman, Inhabiting the cruciform God, pp. 28.  See also N.  T.  Wright, Climax of the covenant: 
Christ and the law in Pauline theology,  (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991), pp.  86 - 87 on this point. 
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Gorman argues that a similar dynamic is found at important junctures of Paul's 
letters, and summarises it in terms of a formula: 'although [x], not [y] but [z]' or 
'although [status], not [selfishness] but [selflessness]';52 this, he says, is Paul's basic 
storyline.53  This structure is seen most clearly in Paul's words about his rights as an 
apostle: although Paul has the rights of an apostle, he does not use them, but rather 
gives them up in order to serve, but in doing so, he actually expresses his identity as an 
apostle and shares most fully in the gospel. 
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that can be either exploited for a selfish gain or not.  Moreover, the evidence of 
truly possessing such a status is in the refusal to exploit it selfishly and thus to 
use it in such a selfless way that its use seems to be a renunciation of the status 
but is in fact a different-from-normal-manner of incarnating that status.54 
 
 The renunciation of the status actually affirms the status, but in a way that changes 
forever what this status now means, and therefore what it always meant.  The text, it 
seems, expresses, or speaks out of a transformation of understanding, but it is not 
obvious that it is a transformation that ever yields a completed perspective, or rather, 
whether it is a transformation that is somehow endlessly in progress.   
In one sense, this structure appears to undo itself; if being an apostle means not 
acting from a sense of what one is and is not due, refusing to insist upon one's rights, 
etc., then in what sense were those rights ever the rights of an apostle? Surely, the most 
apostolic apostle would no longer even think in terms of rights? And yet, Paul is not - 
somewhat embarrassingly - ashamed to insist on the rights that he forgoes, and flag up 
his forgoing of them.  It is as though the conscious holding back from full potency itself 
demonstrates potency more fully.  Similarly, if the divinity of Christ is most fully 
expressed in the refusal to hold onto divinity, in what sense is it divinity that is thereby 
let go of? 
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 Gorman, Inhabiting the cruciform God, p22.  This also seems to be the logic of John 13: 3 ± 4. 
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 See 1 Thess 2:7; 1 Cor 9:12-23; 2 Cor 8:9; Rom 15:1-3 for statements expressing a similar logic.  
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perhaps the most profound of all Jesus films, Monty Python's The Life of Brian.  After hearing the 
beleagured Brian vigorously and explicitly denying that he is the Messiah, an avid follower declares, 
after an awkward pause: 'Only the true Messiah denies his divinity!' To which an exasperated Brian 
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The common-sense that is assumed by the surface structure and the new 
understanding hinted at in the deeper structure seem to be opposed, and yet they depend 
on each other.  On this reading, the text somehow articulates, and presupposes, two 
perspectives at once, and the difficulty is in knowing how these are related.  There seem 
to be two possibilities here.  If one understands the text to speak from the emergent 
perspective, which sees humility as expression of divinity, then perhaps the 'although' is 
a concession to the less enlightened, subversively using their assumptions to produce a 
new understanding ± like the healing of a lame man being used to demonstrate the 
authority to forgive sins (in Jankelevitch's terms, this would be the sad necessity of 
finding retrospective causality in one's groundless generosity).  One can understand that 
God actually is cruciform, so that humility and service flow naturally from the divine, 
but nevertheless seek to draw those who do not understand this truth up ± or rather 
down ± into this more profound understanding, where this truth is not scandalous, but 
simply, although remarkably, how things are.  But in this case, one would perhaps 
expect that the first perspective could in time be left behind, so that it is no longer a 
scandal that one who had equality with God should also take the form of a servant, no 
longer unusual for an apostle not to insist on being given their due or for freedom to be 
expressed through self-limitation.  Once it is understood that real divinity is found, not 
in power and success but in service and humility, a continuing emphasis on the 
paradoxicality of kenosis may start to seem misplaced, and in bad faith.   
Perhaps, then, the dynamic of the text keeps alive the interaction of the two 
perspectives ± permanently - and is therefore written out of a continual undergoing of 
this movement rather than a settled point of view.  This seems better, in that one can 
then understand this movement as one that is not simply a matter of replacing one set of 
conceptions with another, such that it could be completed, but about a more 
fundamental change in ways of evaluating - ways of perceiving what true wealth 
consists in.55  In this case, one might say that as long as anything has 'the form of God' 
it is never finished, the movement is never complete.   But here too there is a problem.  
On Gorman's reading, the movement of the text is only in one direction; from the 
'although' of a scandalous kenosis, to the 'because' of an expressive kenosis.  Once 
kenosis is understood to express divine identity, and the giving up of rights to 
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essentially characterise a true apostle, this understanding does not give way again to 
renewed shock at divine condescension.  For the movement to be genuine, a real 
journey, the direction has to be respected.  And this would seem to mean that one cannot 
hold on forever to the moment of transformation; if one learns something, one cannot 
seek to endlessly replay the moment of enlightenment.  That is, if the moment of 
transformation is really something like an eternal moment, a continual interplay 
between two perspectives - one in which kenosis is paradoxical, one in which it is 
expressive, then in a sense what one has is no longer a transformation, because its 
temporal reality is compromised; nothing really happens.   
 Perhaps the point here is that the thought expressed here cannot be articulated in 
terms of one perspective superseding another, nor by finding a way to let the 
perspectives co-exist.  If a real change of mind is possible, then the change is a change 
of depth, or to use Weil's terms, of levels; the perspective of the 'because' is true at a 
certain level; it is somehow important how the insight arises, as if the trace of its 
development were part of its content.  In a sense, Gorman portrays the tension between 
the 'although' and the 'because' in the Philippi hymn as a crucible in which a 
fundamental change in perspective, evaluation and expectation occurs.  It involves a 
moment of challenge, an overturning of expectations, but it also involves real, positive 
learning, where scandal opens out onto a more enduring perspective.  In this sense, the 
'although' sense of the text is allied with iconoclasm or negative theology, it opposes 
and suspends a particular way of thinking about God, about rights, status and fulfilment, 
whereas the 'because' sense of the text is allied with more constructive, positive 
theological affirmation.  Richard Rohr makes a similar point about the logic kenosis, in 
a far simpler way: it is not simply that 'we must go down in order to go up', but that 'we 
have to go down before we even know what "up" means.'56 
 For Gorman, Paul's understanding of holiness should be thought in terms of  
participation in the cruciformity of God, or in his paraphrase of Leviticus, the command 
to 'be cruciform as I am cruciform'.57  We can make a few suggestions, then, about how 
forgiveness, as an aspect of holiness, might be seen to be animated by a similar tension 
to kenosis, when understood in this way.  The scandal of kenosis disturbs a presumed 
stability; namely, that God is thought of in relation to power and prestige, command and 
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authority.  This understanding is suspended by the moment of 'although', which invites a 
contemplation of divinity and self-emptying at the same time.  Similarly, it is possible 
for forgiveness to be understood in reference to a stable moral order, so that it is 
deserved in some cases, undeserved in others, possible under certain circumstances, not 
under others.  The act of forgiveness is then seen as simply one component of an 
ordered moral sphere, subject to similar norms of reciprocity that govern the whole.  
But wherever forgiveness is affirmed in extreme cases, in the face of its apparent 
injustice or impossibility, then as an imperative or invitation it enters into opposition to 
this stability, it causes surprise or outrage, it is seen, felt and lived as disruptive of 
reciprocal norms.  Hence to affirm forgiveness in the extreme cases always involves a 
suspension of judgement and evaluation, it involves what appears to be a giving up of 
reciprocity, measure and even justice.  One can only forgive 'although', not 'because', 
because there is no 'because' that has enough weight (and in this sense, I think that 
Derrida is right to say that forgiveness lives by the unforgivable).  But if Gorman is 
correct, then for Paul the logic of kenosis pushes further than a simple moment of 
suspension or reversal, so that the opposition between divinity and the cross gives way 
to a sense of continuity, or expression; God is cruciform.   
 Can one say something similar about forgiveness - for example, that forgiveness is a 
virtue because it is unconditional, excessive, undeserved, just as for Paul Christ took the 
form of a servant because he was in the form of God?  In fact, this is one way in which 
forgiveness is construed (as will be shown with Derrida).  But this move is subject to 
similar difficulties to those outlined above: should one then entirely abandon the moral 
background and the expectations associated with it, against which forgiveness appeared 
counter-intuitive, potentially dangerous and unjust?  Or is this background kept as a 
concession, so that the appeal to what is 'deserved' in the  appeal to forgive those who 
do not deserve even though they don't deserve it has a way of taking root in the 
unforgiving minds of most of us?  But then, if one begins to be more convinced by the 
sometimes counter-intuitive goodness of forgiveness than by the background against 
which it appears counter-intuitive, perhaps one will want to re-sketch the background, 
to fit with the new foreground.  Is this possible?  Once again, if forgiveness is often 
found to involve a challenge to existing modes of evaluation, measure, and reasoning, 
then it is difficult to see how the forgiving perspective can be expressed 
straightforwardly without moving a long way from ordinary human experience.  
Someone who has always already forgiven everyone for anything they suffer may seem 
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emotionally disconnected or diminished as a person; perhaps one might say that they 
have attempted to bypass the moment of conflict between forgiveness and 
understanding; they want to understand too soon.  Equally, one might feel that someone 
who assumes in advance their own right to be forgiven, and lacks understanding 
towards the fierce resentment of their victim needs reminding of the way that to be 
forgiven is an exception, not a rule.  In other words, forgiveness opens out from the 
'although' to the 'because' only with difficulty, and perhaps very slowly.   
 This difficulty is seen in Charles Griswold's discussion of the murder in 2006 of ten 
young Amish girls by Charles Roberts, a local milk truck driver, who then committed 
suicide.  'With stupefying speed - I believe it was within 24 to 48 hours - the families of 
the murdered schoolgirls announced that they had forgiven the killer.' Griswold 
expresses his suspicion that this is not really forgiveness, since it appears that 
resentment is simply refused, rather than given up or let go of: '[i]t would seem that the 
Amish ideal is the proleptic, universal and unilateral forswearing of anger altogether, 
such that not only all past evil but all future evil is forgiven.'58  But if forgiveness 
promises a more enduring form of understanding that is born through moments of 
embrace of paradox and difficulty, then we might ask how we would evaluate this act?  
According to Griswold, several Amish men went to the home of the shooter's family to 
console them, they attended the burial of the killer and set up a charitable fund for the 
family in the name of the murderer, and finally burnt the schoolhouse in which the 
atrocity took place to the ground.  Perhaps these actions do indicate an almost perverse 
commitment to an ideal that is inhuman and cold, and perhaps there lingers tremendous 
unacknowledged rage as a result.  But then, perhaps this response reflects something 
deeper.  Griswold suggests that this kind of forgiveness emerges from a failure to aim 
high enough, because it does not experience the crime as intolerable.  But what if this 
forgiveness emerged, on the contrary, from people who had aimed very high indeed?  
Perhaps these people, when contemplating the victims of violent crime on previous 
occasions (a news story watched in quiet moment, the memory of something once 
witnessed), had  begun to feel these sufferings more deeply, each one intolerable in its 
own way.  Perhaps they had spent long periods perplexed and grieved, and had prayed, 
as Weil suggests that we must, 'my god, why have you forsaken them?'  And perhaps 
they had also gradually accepted the reality that these things are possible where some 
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people nurture deep and malignant resentments (which they do) and have access to 
deadly weapons (which they do).  And here again, perhaps this possibility had been 
allowed to conflict and challenge their conception of God, and of the command to 
forgive, so that having contemplated the horrors others have suffered, they were no 
longer able to conceive of the mercy of God as they did previously, despite not having 
undergone these things themselves (for as Weil also says: what is the difference?).59  
Perhaps, through this experience, a deep commitment emerged - not always 
comprehended, and subject to doubt - that despite everything, there is a merciful 
presence that shines, like the sun, on the just and unjust.  Painfully hidden, maybe, but 
real nonetheless.  Finally then, perhaps, on the dreadful day, when time was violently 
divided into 'this' and 'everything before', there arose a deep and fearful conviction - 
almost as if it came from another within them - that this man, even this man, whose 
trigger finger was unjustly and incomprehensibly allowed the power of causing utter 
ruin, could be forgiven, and his family comforted.   
 Perhaps, perhaps not.  But this, I think, is the 'perhaps' of forgiveness.  There is not a 
single principle that guarantees that forgiveness can be embraced as a good, such that 
we could always forgive 'because'  it is just, or wise, or safe to forgive.  But equally, 
there is not the possibility of an 'although' that simply suspends understanding for the 
sake of a daring moment, since whenever it is a case of the incomprehensibility of evil, 
this temporary and insubstantial 'although' will collapse (just as the fiercest cynics are 
the chastened optimists).60 But perhaps there is the possibility of a forgiveness that has 
been formed in the real and never finished movement from one to the other.  In other 
words, perhaps there is a deeper 'because', a perspective that appears fleetingly, but in a 
way that provokes real learning.  If the Amish families recounted above really forgave, 
then it can only be because of a 'because' that they did not fully know, but only 
glimpsed, dimly, and hoped for.   
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60Here I echo Gillian Rose's description of postmodernism as the refusal to consider the ratioanlity of 
the exertion of power as 'despairing rationalism without reason.' See Gillian Rose, Mourning becomes 
the law, pp.  5-6, and the whole of chapter one.  I find it far easier to comprehend what Rose is 
opposing than to comprehend what she is proposing.   However, there are certainly resonances with 
what I am suggesting here, as for example in her description of a legal and rational authority which 
would be 'alive to its implication in both nihilism and reason, and which does not know the outcome in 
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Conclusion 
 
It should be admitted that what I provided above is largely suggestive.  Nevertheless the 
resonance between the dynamic that Gorman argues is written deeply into the Pauline 
text and the conflict within forgiveness seems to be important.  Both suggest a 
conflictual and yet fruitful co-existence of perspectives, and this, in turn, I have argued, 
is apparent, but not always acknowledged within discussions of scapegoating and 
sacrificial violence within atonement theology.  The arguments above should not be 
taken as a shrugging of the shoulders in the face of real confusions, but rather, an 
assertion that if, after serious examination, the confusions remain, then perhaps they are 
significant in some way.  The description of forgiveness above is, on my account, a way 
to understand what it would mean to commit to live a life of forgiveness in a way that is 
not easy acceptance, indifference, or despair, but is - indefinably but genuinely - a way 
of continuing to desire.  Or put differently, a way of embodying the love that bears all 
things, and yet hopes all things.  This suggestion points forward to the next chapter, 
which interrogates Jacques Derrida's work on ethics, particularly as concerns the 
meaning of decision and gift.  In my description, above, of the attitude that perhaps 
animates the seemingly incomprehensible forgiveness offered by the Amish families, 
forgiveness might be said to involve to a certain posture: not just acceptance, but a way 
of accepting; not just hoping, but a way of hoping.  This notion of posture will be an 
important part of my encounter with Derrida.
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Chapter four 
 
Jacques Derrida: forgiveness, decision and gift 
 
As has been argued, forgiveness can be understood in terms of a posture that suffers the 
tension between hope and acceptance, understanding and mystery.  In this chapter I will 
examine closely the way that Jacques Derrida describes the resistance that some of our 
most important notions offer to thought.  Not only has deconstruction proved to be one 
of the most influential streams of philosophical thought in recent decades, Derrida's 
work on forgiveness has become an important touchstone in the public discussion of 
forgiveness, not to mention a critical influence upon the shape of postmodern 
theological thought.1 
 My argument will be that Derrida's work on decision, gift and forgiveness can be 
viewed as implying a notion of redemptive suffering.  Only through the adoption of a 
certain posture, one that suffers the perpetual indeterminacy that haunts language and 
thought, do we enter the ethical realm.  In view of this, I then compare this aspect of 
Derrida's thought with that of Simone Weil, in a further discussion her work.  However 
different these thinkers are (it is very difficult to imagine Weil reading Glas) there is 
nevertheless a shared concern for cultivating an exposure to that which exceeds 
thought, and a shared concern to demonstrate the way in which experiences of 
intellectual paralysis become a point of entry - for Weil into an awakened spiritual state, 
for Derrida, into a traumatic form of ethical responsibility.  What I hope to draw out  is 
the way in which for all its idiosyncratic features, Weil's work allows for a more 
convincing account of the importance of the experience of conceptual impasse, because 
of the way she allows for the possibility of learning.  Whilst Derrida implies that the 
undergoing of aporia is repeated identically, Weil suggests that one's understanding 
continually affects the tonality of these experiences.  This discussion is intended to 
further explore the nature of 'the moment', which in is a central part of this 
understanding of forgiveness.   
 After this comparison, I go on to engage in the discussion concerning the gift with 
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Jan-Olav Henrickson, Desire, gift and recognition: Christology and post-modern philosophy (Grand 
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reference to John Milbank's work on reciprocity, which is formed partly in response to 
Derrida's notion of the 'impossible' gift.  Here the concern is with the relationship 
between the rupture involved in forgiving, and the task of forming understanding and 
expectations concerning the reciprocal norms that relationship.  John Milbank provides 
a convincing account of why it is that Christianity encourages trust in reciprocity, rather 
than complete abandonment of self in unilateral giving.  However, my interest in the 
interaction between Milbank and Derrida is more to do with their assumptions about the 
character or tone of ethical life: is the generous life allied to confident trust, or traumatic 
exposure? Here I continue to utilise Charles Taylor's analysis to highlight the 
ambiguities in the position Milbank arrives at through interaction with Derrida. My 
argument here will be that there is, in John Milbank's critique, rather more of 'the 
moment' than might be obvious at first glance.  Overall, this chapter should be seen as a 
further development of the approach suggested at the end of the last chapter. With 
reference to Michael J. Gorman, I attempted to show how the understanding of the cross 
involves both confrontation with existing norms or expectations, and the need to 
reconstruct those norms in its light.  I conclude with some suggestion of what this 
approach would mean in the case of forgiveness. 
 
 
Derrida and the posture of ethics 
 
From his earliest work, Derrida was concerned with articulating a moment of openness 
that allowed real re-thinking; deconstruction as 'that fragile moment when the question 
is not yet determined enough for the hypocrisy of an answer to have already initiated 
itself beneath the mask of the question.'2  Throughout his work, Derrida will be 
concerned with similarly fragile moments, situating himself within them, taking up the 
particular posture they require.  It is his assumption that there is an intimate link 
between this kind of genuine questioning and a commitment to ethics, to the extent that 
he can claim that deconstruction is justice.3  Rather than being an amoral deferral of 
responsibility, deconstruction, as Derrida sees it, is driven and made possible by 
                                                             
2Derrida, 'Violence and metaphysics' in Writing and difference, tr. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 
2003), p. 100. 
3See, for example, Derrida, Acts of religion, ed. Gil Anidjar, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 243. 
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justice.4  On this account, the deconstructive suspicion towards straightforwardly 
present meanings, stable oppositions, etc, is not evidence of a destructive or anarchic 
impulse, but is linked to an ethical vigilance concerned to uncover the hidden violence 
of certainty and good conscience.  And ultimately, the ethical vigilance that is said to 
drive deconstruction is linked itself to something that sounds intrinsically mystical, that 
is, to an excessive desire for 'the impossible', the pure gift, unlimited hospitality, and 
unconditional forgiveness.5 
Throughout this chapter I intend to explore these three aspects that seem to make up 
Derrida's ethics, namely; deconstructive suspicion, ethical vigilance, and impossible 
desire.  Each of these may be taken to be a way of opening, and remaining within, the 
'fragile moment' that is necessary for a real change of mind.  Or, more theologically, we 
might say that for Derrida these are the moments that make up repentance, the changing 
of mind.  The question of how useful or coherent Derrida's ethical project is can then be 
seen in terms of whether these three aspects cohere, whether they add up to a 'posture' 
that includes each of them, a stance or movement that they are each a necessary part of, 
and of whether this posture is a genuinely human posture.  It is difficult to describe 
exactly the sense the word 'posture' has here, but it seems the easiest way to express the 
way in which I want to approach Derrida's work.  It is not simply a question of 
particular arguments made concerning the gift, hospitality or forgiveness, but of an 
underlying approach that is sketched out and implied by the various discussions, one 
that links a certain kind of thinking with the possibility of ethics.  In the same way that 
Weil articulates 'waiting' as a spiritual, intellectual and ethical posture, the gateway to 
any real learning, goodness or mystical experience, my assumption here will be that 
Derrida is trying to articulate something similar through the examination of ethical 
problematics that he finds operative within the concepts of gift, justice, forgiveness and 
hospitality.  Hence, although there are ways in which one could deconstruct Derrida's 
own work, showing, perhaps, that it fails on its own terms or is based on faulty 
assumptions, this is not the purpose here.   I want to describe and explore the posture 
                                                             
4Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 364, Negotiations: interventions and interviews, 1971-2001, ed. and tr.  
Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 104, and Questioning ethics, ed. 
Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (London and New York, Routledge, 1999), p. 77. 
5
 See, for example Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 244, and 'On the gift: A discussion between Jacques 
Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion' in God, the gift and postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley 
and Michael Scanlon,   (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 72. 
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that emerges from these analyses, and ask what this may have to do with the position of 
someone facing the test that is forgiveness.6  Although this could be approached from 
many different directions, here I want to explore Derrida's notion of forgiveness as 
related to two other themes; decision and gift. 
  
 
I 
The undecidable 
 
In a sense, the whole thrust of Derrida's late work is to demonstrate that an awareness of 
the fundamental indeterminacy which haunts any attempt to speak, to make sense, is 
crucial if one is to maintain a genuine sense of the gravity of responsible decision.  As 
Richard Bernstein has said, Derrida is, in the most complimentary sense,  an 'obsessive 
thinker', and his obsession is undecidability.7  Although on the whole, Derrida aimed to 
work from within the structures and tensions of other texts, rather than as an 
independent voice asserting a well defined positive vision, in a number of late 
interviews he gave surprisingly clear descriptions of what a decision has to be, if it is to 
be a genuine moment of responsibility, and it is from these comments on decision that I 
wish to work back to his earlier explorations of gift.8   
For Derrida, a decision is suspended between two possibilities, which, although 
seemingly opposite, are complicit in taking away the burden of the moment of decision. 
On the one hand, the sense that a reliable body of knowledge provides one with a 
guarantee that one is making, and will have made, a right decision; on the other, the 
sense that the lack of reliable ethical knowledge or principles relieves one of the burden 
of responsibility, or allows one to defer it (his main target is more obviously the former; 
the latter is the interpretation of his early work he attempts to distance himself from).9  
                                                             
6
 See Derrida, Acts of religion, p380 for a discussion of hospitality as an ordeal or test. 
7Richard Bernstein, 'Aporias of forgiveness?' in  Constellations vol. 13, no. 3, 2006, p. 398. 
8See in particular Derrida, 'On the deconstruction of actuality' and 'Nietzsche and the machine' in 
Negotiations, and 'Hospitality, justice and responsibility: a dialogue with Jacques Derrida' in 
Questioning ethics. 
9In fact, as early as Of grammatology Derrida indicated something similar in his description of two 
approaches that deconstruction differs from: on the one hand, a 'doubling commentary' which is content 
to elucidate the meaning of a text as if it spoke with a unified voice, and on the other, a more suspicious 
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In other words, in order for there to be responsible decision, the responsible subject 
must be somehow suspended between these two possibilities, so that one does not 
disappear into the certainty that knowledge promises, nor the ease that unprincipled 
spontaneity appears to offer.  As we have seen in previous discussion, a very similar 
problem attends descriptions of forgiveness, which are subject to a similar tension.  
Where forgiveness is presented as an obvious response given certain given principles, it 
appears that forgiveness becomes simply a moral duty, and there is no moment of 
suspension or gratuity - no 'give' in the moral framework.  This means that the 
theoretical descriptions seem to move a long way from experience, and the intuitive 
sense that forgiveness is a free response to another.  However, it appears that if 
forgiveness is presented as simply a kind of  choice or exertion of the will, with no 
deeper reason or grounding, once again, forgiveness seems to be lost, somehow, in 
insignificance. 
As Derrida presents it, if a decision is taken to be the mechanical application of a 
body of knowledge to a specific case, then the moment of decision is simply the point at 
which a cause produces an effect, an effect which was already pre-existent as theory. If 
this is the case, then nothing really happens: 
As to a decision that is guided by a form of knowledge ± if I know, for example, 
what the causes and effects of what I am doing are, what the program is for what 
I am doing, then there is no decision; it is a question, at the moment of 
judgement, of applying a particular causality. When I make the machine work, 
there is no decision; the machine works, the relation is one of cause and effect. If 
I know what is to be done, if my theoretical analysis of the situation shows me 
what is to be done ± do this to cause that, etc ± then there is no moment of 
decision, simply the application of a body of knowledge, of, at the very least, a 
rule of norm. For there to be decision, the decision must be heterogeneous to 
knowledge as such. Even if I spend years letting a decision mature, even if I 
amass all possible knowledge concerning the scientific, political, and historical 
field in which the decision is to be taken, the moment of the decision must be 
heterogeneous to this field, if the decision is not to be the application of a rule.10 
 
But if decision necessarily means the emergence of something new, unforeseen, it does 
not mean that a decision is simply anarchic, ultimately arbitrary and disconnected from 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
reading that too-quickly finds the deeper meaning of a text by inscribing it within some alien structure 
(say, psycho-analysis) without the initial rigour of an accurate reading. See Of grammatology, corrected 
edition,  tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) 'The 
exorbitant. Question of method', especially p. 158. 
10
 Derrida, Negotiations, p. 231. 
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any knowledge; if the notion of responsibility is a civilised veneer over the top of an 
essentially random event, then either the moment of decision would lack any real 
seriousness, or could be deferred at one's leisure.  For Derrida, a decision consists in the 
fact that one must always make it without knowing enough, and at the same time, with 
acceptance of the responsibility to know a much as one can.  A decision is suspended 
between normativity and creativity, not at some kind of meeting point, or combination 
of the two, but rather through a double injunction: to decide on one's own, without the 
cover of legitimating discourse; to decide responsibly, justly, well.11   Already the 
relevance of this problematic to the discussion of forgiveness should be obvious; the 
forgiving subject faces a similar dilemma.  To forgive is to be motivated by concerns 
that do not, of themselves, show obviously that they can be harmoniously combined. 
This structure, in which the burden of responsibility always exceeds the actual 
means there may be to ensure that one can carry it, is expressed in the essay 'Force of 
law' which announced most clearly the ethical intent of deconstruction: 
Law is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be 
law, but justice is incalculable, it demands that one calculate with the 
incalculable; and paretic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they 
are necessary, of justice, that is to say moments in which the decision between 
just and unjust is never insured by a rule.12 
 
The need to do justice does not itself guarantee that one can do justice; 'ought' does not 
imply 'can'.  More than this, it is essential that it does not, for where this is taken for 
granted, then the desire to keep a good conscience will determine what justice is and is 
not allowed to demand.  And so, on Derrida's account, a just decision will never appear 
as such, one will never have a guaranteed way of knowing whether one has been just or 
unjust. One's justice will never appear unambiguously, as a subject of any knowledge.  
The important point here is that Derrida is not proposing that there is an underlying 
arbitrariness to any talk of justice, or advocating a cheap relativism in which the stakes 
are lowered by the lack of clarity.  The tension of a moment of decision is maintained 
by the desire to be just.  The desire for justice leads naturally to a concern for law - 'it is 
                                                             
11
 It is interesting that when discussing this theme, Derrida appears to present a kind of 
phenomenology of the decision, rather than simply bringing forth the inner tensions of a particular 
discourse. In this sense he comes close to speaking as if there is an essence of decision, so delicately 
poised between complicit opposites that it continually risks being lost, but nevertheless glimpsed in the 
tension between these losses. 
12
 Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 244. 
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just that there be law' - which is to say, to be just is to want justice to be done, to be put 
into practice, become possible.  But law also offers protection from criticism, refuge 
from the risk that enacting justice always involves, and so can be desired not simply for 
the sake of justice, but as a reassurance: '[i]f I were to be content to apply a just rule, 
without the spirit of justice and without in some way and each time inventing the rule 
and the example, I might be sheltered from criticism, under the protection of law, my 
action conforming to objective law, but I would not be just.'13  To act responsibility 
involves a moment of what might be called tragic awareness; that is, desire maintained 
in the full awareness that what is desired has not come, and perhaps will never fully 
arrive. 
The relation between justice and law, then, takes a shape that appears throughout 
Derrida's late work: the two are heterogeneous yet indissociable.  Justice is always 
beyond the law, and yet justice demands law.  Justice demands that it be exercised in the 
name of a legitimate authority, and law always claims to be acting in the name of 
justice.14  The moment of decision is intimately related to the moment when justice and 
law meet, or when their meeting is attempted, the moment when laws are made (or 
broken) in the name of justice.  In both cases need, demand and urgency exceed 
capacity, there is no mediating principle that guides the emergence of decision from the 
sense of responsibility, or the law from the call for justice; the moment has (or must 
have) 'a certain madness' about it.15 There is an imperative to refuse to allow law to be 
dissociated from justice, and justice from legality, one must negotiate their relation, but 
this 'must' is not straightforwardly allied with either: '[t]he order of this il faut does not 
properly belong to either justice or to law. It only belongs to either realm by exceeding 
each one in the direction of the other, which means that, in their very heterogeneity, 
these two orders are undissociable: de facto and de jure.'16   
The moment of decision is related to the position of the judge, who must not simply 
follow the law, 'but must also assume it, approve it, confirm its value by a reinstituting 
act of interpretation, as if, at the limit, the law did not exist previously - as if the judge 
himself had invented it in each case.'17  It is as though Derrida is attempting to think 
                                                             
13
 Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 245 
14
 Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 251. 
15
 Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 257. 
16Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 258. 
17
 Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 251. 
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together extremes of creativity and duty, such that in a decision, I must be entirely 
passive, accepting the burden of responsibility, with no choice to defer it, and entirely 
active, creatively interpreting the demands of justice as if one is founding the law at that 
moment. The time of decision is both passively suffered and actively constituted by the 
self.  The decision is an unfounded making of the future, as absolutely new, and yet the 
decision is that which arrives in me: '[t]his relation to the future is active, it is 
affirmative; and yet, however active it is, the relation is also a passive one. Otherwise 
the future will not be the future.'18  In fact, for Derrida, there is a sense in which the 
crucial ethical question is not of the content of a decision, but rather of the form; a 
decision as such is constitutive of ethics, the question is whether one will engage with 
the aporia of decision, or else elude the aporia either through deferment or by taking 
refuge in a principle.  It is as if, to put it crudely, if one gets the form right, the content 
looks after itself. 
 
 
Aporia, contradictory virtues and tragic conflict 
 
Before continuing, it is worth noting at this point the structural similarities between this 
account of the moment of decision, and Simone Weil's account of continuing to love in 
suffering, to desire the good in the knowledge of its impossibility.  In both cases there is 
the sense that the certainty of knowledge acts as a way out of full commitment to a 
particular moment, a refusal, in some sense of the passage of time, and therefore that 
acceptance (of undecidability, in Derrida's case; of suffering and contradiction in Weil's) 
purifies.  A series of thoughts in the Marseilles notebooks explores this in relation to 
'contradictory virtues'. A naturally sensitive and gentle person may lack courage, and 
vice-versa; both are virtues, yet they seem, naturally, to exclude each other.  In human 
terms, the only way to move beyond this is through violence to one's nature: the gentle 
person suppresses their sensitivity to produce courage, and so 'amputates' their 
sensitivity.19  Real progress, progress that does not amputate, is only made through 
grace, through an ascent to another level where these virtues do not exclude each other.  
But this level is inaccessible.  The first step, therefore, consists in knowing this, and so 
                                                             
18Derrida, Negotiations, p. 233. 
19Weil, Notebooks, pp. 345-6. 
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in realising that 'God alone is good', because at the level at which we find ourselves, 
certain virtues in fact exclude and conflict with each other.  In this sense, Weil already 
assumed what Derrida states explicitly, that ethics begins with the impossible.  
However, Weil also assumes that if used in the right way, contradiction and 
impossibility can become stages on the way: 
The simultaneous existence of contrary virtues in the soul as pincers for 
reaching up to God; the simultaneous conception of contradictory truths 
for the same purpose.20 
 
Correlations of contradictories are like a ladder. Each of them raises us to 
a higher level where resides the connexion which unifies the contraries; 
until we reach a spot where we have to think of the contraries together, 
but where we are denied access to the level at which they are linked 
together. This forms the last rung of the ladder. Once arrived there, we 
can climb no further; we have only to look up, wait and love. And God 
descends. . . .21 
For Weil, then, conflict has to be acknowledged and felt, in the same way that the 
intellect contemplates the paradoxes of Christian doctrine, rather than resolving them: 
The impossibility of having together the incompatible forms of behaviour 
necessary for the accomplishment of good ± or, more briefly, the 
impossibility of good plays the same role for the will as the absurdity of 
religious dogmas does for the intelligence. The experience of this 
impossibility brings about the transmutation of the will into love.22 
Finally, mysticism is essential for any real virtue, and real virtue is itself a mystery, not 
exhausted by a description and impossible to fully understand: 
A man inspired by God is a man who has ways of behaving, thoughts and 
feelings which are linked together by a link impossible to define.23 
 
The recognition that 'God alone is good', combined with the willingness to continue to 
desire goodness nonetheless, constitutes the posture Weil understands as 'waiting'.  The 
pain of waiting, the willingness to be torn by this tension, liberates the energy of desire, 
it 'transmutes' the will into love.  To continue to desire then becomes itself an act of 
faith, which elsewhere Weil compares to a little child who wants an object so badly that 
their whole body is focused on gaining it, but lacking the power to do so, they simply 
                                                             
20Weil, Notebooks, p. 395. 
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 Weil, Notebooks, p. 412. 
22Weil, Notebooks, p. 410. 
23Weil, Notebooks, p. 412. 
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continue to want, and cry.24 
 Some comparison may also be drawn here to Martha Nussbaum's discussion of 
ethical conflict in Greek tragedy, particularly in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles. 
Tragedy does not simply present good people being ruined by situations out of their 
control, but something more disturbing: 'good people doing bad things, things otherwise 
repugnant to their ethical character and commitments, because of circumstances whose 
origins does not lie with them.'25  On rare occasions, life presents situations in which 
one is forced to choose between the bad and the bad, or in which the limits of one's 
character become impossible to avoid.  For Nussbaum, the significant thing about these 
situations in tragedy is the sense that the characters are blameworthy not primarily 
because of what they did or did not do in a situation involving some kind of ethical 
conflict (for example, being torn between the one's duty to the gods, and one's duty to 
one's family), but rather because of their refusal to recognise this situation as tragic, and 
to remain within it tragically.  Agamemnon is told that the whole Greek expedition is in 
grave danger that will only be averted if he sacrifices Iphigneia.  He is horrified initially 
at this terrible decision, but once he has accepted the necessity, he 'now begins to co-
operate inwardly with necessity, arranging his feelings to accord with his fortune. From 
the moment he makes his decision, itself the best he could have made, he strangely 
turns himself into a collaborator, a willing victim.'26  It is for the failure to recognise the 
depths of the conflict, to remain conscious of it and feel it whilst acting, that the Chorus 
reprimands Agamemnon.  For Nussbaum this suggests a broadening of the horizon of 
ethics beyond individual action and decision, so that ways of dwelling within and 
feeling ethical conflict are themselves the subject of ethical discussion (which as we 
have already seen suggests the importance of viewing narrative as vital in forming 
ethical sensitivity because it is through the empathy engendered by narrative we learn to 
feel tragic conflict).  And again, it is, in a sense, desire that is the crucial factor in this 
kind of dwelling or feeling of tragic conflict:  to continue to let one's desire (for 
example, Agamemnon's fatherly desire for ,SKLJHQLD¶V well-being) be at odds with the 
confines of the situation, rather than accommodated to the possibilities on offer. 
 The similarity, then, is something like this: all three presentations show how in 
                                                             
24See Weil, 'Some thoughts on the love of God' in Science, necessity and the love of God. 
25
 Martha Nussbuam, The fragility of goodness: luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy, 
revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 25. 
26
 Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness, p. 42. 
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certain situations the irreducibility of experience to knowledge (whether Derrida' 
aporia, Weil's affliction, or Nussbaum's tragic conflict) becomes a form of suffering, 
and the willingness to undergo this suffering honestly is in some sense crucial for 
ethics.  But there seems to be a key difference, which is highlighted by a further 
comment of Nussbaum's: 
An honest effort to do justice to all aspects of a hard case, seeing and 
feeling it in all its conflicting many-sidedness, could enrich future 
deliberative efforts. . . . It is, of course, possible to work towards such a 
just appreciation of the complexity of the claims upon us in the course of 
ordinary life, without tragic conflict of tragic suffering. The tragedians, 
however, notice that often it takes the shock of such suffering to make us 
look and see.27 
 
Failure to consider one's manner of bearing oneself within tragic situations may be to 
miss an important dimension of how progress is made.  The ability to feel the 
helplessness of a tragic situation fully may, on this account, actually be a vital part of a 
learning process that could aid one in future conflicts, or lead to a richer understanding 
of one's existing relations and the duties they include.  Nussbaum is not proposing, as 
Weil seems to, that the illumination gained through suffering is the essential truth, 
merely that its importance has been overlooked in western discussions of ethics, but the 
point is that for both, undergoing suffering in a particular way teaches; that is, the 
before and the after are different, the suffering of the moment reorients one in some 
way. 
 Although, as the second chapter tried to show, the attempt to articulate the truth that 
'grace fills the void' is fraught with difficulty for Weil, there is the clear sense that one 
can learn how to undergo suffering redemptively, or, put differently, one can somehow 
speak from the perspective of  'grace' rather than simply 'the void'.  Both Derrida and 
Weil share the assumption that ordinarily, the experience of 'void' or aporia is covered 
over in various ways, and it is the task of their thinking to uncover it.  For both, the 
experience of void/aporia is a kind of pre-condition: in the case of Weil, for any real 
spiritual insight; in the case of Derrida, for any worthwhile ethics or politics. However, 
if we ask the question of how this conviction is arrived at by each, the situation is quite 
different.  In Weil's work, the moment of learning that the experience of void has this 
hidden significance is consciously included and reflected upon within her work.  
However much it still remains a mystery, it is because she has learned in practice that 
                                                             
27Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness, p. 45. 
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there is grace that fills the void that she can say 'grace fills the void'. Obviously, for 
Weil, the undergoing of suffering is linked to a mystical closeness to Christ, and Christ 
is in turn seen primarily as the one who shares or makes available the secret of 
suffering.  Contemplation of the cross, of innocent suffering not turned away from, 
enables one to face the void, and it through this that one learns.  This is partly why the 
language of ascent permeates Weil's notebooks; it is not primarily a result of a 
hierarchical metaphysics, but is rather linked to the way in which her religious thought 
is a reflection upon the conditions of learning. In this sense, Weil's own life is 
inseparable from her religious writing, her writing is seen as a kind of explication of her 
experiences.28 
 For Derrida however, the conviction that it is the experience of aporia, above all, 
that is the most important condition for the thinking of ethics, is largely assumed, not 
shown to have been learned in time.  It is the background assumption of all of his work 
on gift, hospitality, forgiveness, justice, etc; that the willingness to undergo aporetic 
experiences, to dwell in this posture, is, for want of a better term, purifying, such that 
we 'begin by the impossible.'  There is something like a belief in redemptive suffering in 
the background here; aporia is a form of suffering, and the 'ethics of the impossible' is 
in a sense a form of redemptive suffering.  His work in these areas can understood as an 
assault on any certainty that allows a good conscience on the assumption that if a good 
conscience is bad, a bad conscience must therefore be good.  But the goodness of a bad 
conscience is largely assumed, not shown.29  But this sense that confidence in decision 
making is definitively negative is linked to the sense that, for Derrida, each decision 
appears to be formally identical, and as a result, unrelated to other decisions.  One does 
not learn, gradually, how to take up the posture required to honestly undergo a moment 
of decision, or allow the aporia to be uncovered in experience; it is identically troubling 
and undecidable each time.  Although Derrida obviously intends his explorations of the 
                                                             
28It seems to have been her intention to present the thoughts in the notebooks in this way, given that 
both are have the same short story as a prologue, which narrates a very austere mystical experience. See 
Joan Dargon, Simone Weil: thinking poetically (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 
pp. 51 - 65 for an excellent analysis of these prologues. 
29Derrida's response to John Milbank's (very long) question at the Questioning God conference is 
particularly instructive on the question of bad conscience. See 'On forgiveness' in Questioning God,  ed. 
John D Caputo, Mark Dooley and Michael Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 
p. 69. 
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undecidable to articulate actual experience (and it seems that Derrida is at his closest to 
pure phenomenology at this point), the result is that 'the undecidable' is almost entirely 
detached from human life; it arrives, identically each time, leaving the human person to 
negotiate some double injunction or other, but is not itself affected by the life of the 
particular human person who receives or endures it.  There is no give and take between 
the two, and it is not a moment that teaches, it is somehow mute.  There is no 
transference from the experience of deciding under conditions of undecidability and 
future occasions of decision, as if one had no possibility of reflexive consideration of 
what one is undergoing, even while one is undergoing it.  Weil's realisation of this 
possibility is one of the things that motivates her talk of levels, the 'secret architecture' 
of the soul, and so on. 
 The objection here is that there is not  a single aporia of 'the undecidable', 
indifferent to the particularities of those who find themselves undergoing it; there are, 
rather, human persons engaged in different ways with the difficulty of making 
responsible decisions, in different ways.  Of course, Derrida wants to avoid claiming 
that there is a concept of aporia under which a certain range of experiences are 
included, so that there is strictly speaking, no concept of aporia, the aporia is always 
singular.  But despite this protestation, the formal nature of the experience of the double 
injunction misses something basic: if this experience is as important as Derrida claims it 
is, then one would expect one's understanding of this to affect the tonality of the 
experience itself.  Simply put, if one understands aporia to be the first step on the way 
to ethics (even if one thinks that this is a first step that will have to be taken over and 
over), this understanding changes the experience, and one's way of negotiating the 
experience.  Although Derrida presents experiences of the undecidable almost as if they 
had the significance of a spiritual practice, a preparation for ethics, he actually describes 
these experiences in a way that forbids any real learning or integration into life. 
 
 
Forgiveness as decision 
  
The isolated nature of the instant of decision has an important impact on the way that 
forgiveness is understood.  Like the decision, forgiveness is said to pass through the 
impossible: it is 'not merely difficult for a thousand psychological reasons, but 
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absolutely impossible'.30  For Derrida, in the same way that decision lives by the 
undecidable, forgiveness lives by the unforgiveable. It is only the unforgiveable, the 
instance when forgiveness seems unjustified and unthinkable, that allows one to ask the 
question of forgiveness.31  The lack of knowledge that constitutes a decision, and the 
lack of justification that constitutes forgiveness, both imply a basic isolation in these 
moments.  One has no access to the sphere of universality, to principles that appear to 
one and all.  The ordeal of forgiveness as a moment of decision cannot be made 
comprehensible to the public sphere, and the wisdom of the public sphere is of no use in 
making the leap that is required.  Like Johannes Silentio's Abraham, one facing this 
ordeal cannot speak, cannot make their decision publicly comprehensible, or even make 
the dilemma clear in the first place.  In this sense, for Derrida, the burden of decision is 
almost a figure of God, in that God demands obedience without giving reasons, just as 
responsibility demands that one decide from within the undecidable.  God remains in 
the darkness, without one's responsibility being diminished as a result of this lack of 
vision, and it is God who 'hands down' decisions without being seen.32 
  We will return to Kierkegaard shortly but first we can note that, as Derrida 
recognises, this means that there is something potentially terrible or amoral about a 
decision, and so about forgiveness.  On this account, both are difficult to distinguish 
from a moment of arbitrary, sovereign choosing.33  If there are no principles that 
                                                             
30Derrida, Acts of religion, pp 385. Derrida's account of the impossibility of forgiveness is heavily 
indebted to Jankelevitch's book.  As we have seen, for Jankelevitch, forgiveness needs the final 
simplicity of evil to finally get to work, otherwise it is either just another form of the gradual forgetting 
of things, whereby everything seems less serious over time, or a form of excusing, which claims that 
nothing and no-one is ever simple enough to judge in the first place.  Forgiveness, therefore, is allied 
with the last word of judgement, so that can replace its finality (in this sense, a condemning judgement 
and the act of forgiveness are formally similar; they impose a perfectly simple verdict). However, as 
Derrida shows, in his actual treatment of the question of forgiveness in the wake of the Shoah, 
Jankelevitch backs away from the implications of his position.  The Shoah is unforgivable, in that its 
scale is inhuman, it is beyond any possible punishment or reparation. How can we forgive that which 
we cannot begin to understand, or punish? Derrida then takes the logic of Jankelevitch's notion of 
forgiveness, and pushes it so as to say that forgiveness is by definition concerned with the unforgivable, 
it is the unforgiveable that raises the question of forgiveness as forgiveness. 
31Derrida, 'To forgive: the unforgivable and the imprescriptable' in Questioning God, p. 30. 
32See Derrida, The gift of death. tr. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), chapter 
3, especially pp.  56 - 57. 
33Derrida, 'To forgive', p. 22. 
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guarantee the rightness, the wisdom, or the justice of forgiving, and if in this sense it is 
moment of undecidability, what it is that makes the leap an ethical one (or, in Derrida's 
terms, a moment of 'ethics beyond ethics'), rather than simply a moment of arbitrary 
madness? When dealing with this issue, Derrida is at his most mystical.  If a moment of 
decision were the work of a subject, of a self-present 'I', there would be no way to mark 
it out as responsible, and so he alludes to an 'other in me': 
If I forgive in my name, my forgiveness expresses what I am capable of, 
me, and this decision (which is therefore no longer a decision) does no 
more than deploy my power and abilities, the potential energy of my 
aptitudes, predicates, and character traits. Nothing is more unforgivable, 
more haughty sometimes, more self-DVVXUHGWKDQWKH³,IRUJLYH\RX´
What must be, therefore, is that I forgive what is not mine to forgive, not 
the power of giving or forgiving: what must be is that I forgive beyond 
me (this is close to what Levinas says, that I must welcome the infinite, 
and this is the first hospitality, beyond the capacity of the I ± which is 
obviously the impossible itself: how could I do what I cannot do? How to 
do the impossible? Only the other in me can do it, and decide ± this 
would be to let him do it, without the other doing it simply in my place: 
here is the unthinkable of substitution). . . . And that this, this gift, this 
forgiveness, this decision, would be done in the name of the other does 
not exonerate in any way my freedom or my responsibility, on the 
contrary.34 
 
Forgiveness is not something in my power, so that forgiveness, if there is forgiveness, 
takes place within me, rather than being something I do.  It is in this sense that Derrida 
wants to talk about forgiveness as 'the becoming possible of the impossible as 
impossible'.  It is very tempting to see the trace of something Christological here: 
forgiveness is the impossible, but it takes place nonetheless through an other within, and 
in this sense the impossible becomes possible as the impossible - this has a similar 
shape to Paul's phrase 'it is not longer I who lives, but Christ who lives in me' and to 
Jesus' words in the gospel: 'what is impossible for humans is possible for God.'  In a 
sense, at this point Derrida actually comes close to confirming John Milbank's point 
namely, that the lone individual is not authorised to forgive, since they cannot represent 
all the victims of any wrongdoing, even if they are themselves the primary victim. 
Hence, for Milbank, Christ makes forgiveness possible by being, in some way, a 
'sovereign victim', able to represent the multitude of victims.35  But Derrida, here, is 
                                                             
34
 Derrida, Acts of religion, p. 387.  See also 'To forgive', p. 62. 
35See John Milbank, Being reconciled: ontology and pardon (London, Routledge, 2004), chapter 3, 
especially p. 50. 
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hinting at something very similar; that unless the decision to forgive that is in some way 
the work, not of the self-present subject, but of an 'other' within, it is haughty, assuming, 
and ultimately violent. 
 Regardless of this speculation, however, the tension I want to highlight here is that 
on the one hand, one is fundamentally alone in the moment of forgiveness, and yet at 
the same time, forgiveness as a decision is not accomplished through my own, self-
present will. On this point Derrida is suggestive but unclear. I cannot explore these 
issues fully, but this briefly invoked mysticism can be tied, again, to the question of 
learning, and to the formal, identical nature of the moments of aporia that Derrida 
wants to uncover.  Because the 'I' and the 'other-in-me' remain other to each other, there 
is no question of the 'I' being affected by the taking place of decision, or of the other 
within, who considers forgiving the unforgiveable, affecting the 'I' who only conceives 
of the possible.  The two can never get to know each other, and so one does not learn to 
forgive by forgiving. Or at least, Derrida seems to leave no room for this. It is not a 
mysticism that gives any lasting understanding, because the moment can never unfold, 
or teach us what it meant. 
 It is interesting to note that although Derrida takes on almost uncritically 
Kierkegaard/Johannes Silentio's presentation of the inner tension of Abraham's journey 
to Mount Moriah, he does not take on the sense, which seems crucial in Fear and 
trembling, that Abraham, and his relation to Isaac,  is transformed by the near-sacrifice.  
For Kierkegaard, the before and the after are irreducible to each other. The faith of 
Abraham lies not in his willingness to sacrifice the finite for the sake of the infinite, but 
in his willingness to hold to the finite whilst raising the knife, so that the mark of 
greatness is Abraham's ability to receive Isaac back with joy after having given him up: 
'it is great to give up one's desire, but greater to stick to it after having given it up; it is 
great to grasp hold of the eternal but greater to stick to the temporal after having given 
it up.'36  The relation between Abraham and Isaac after Mount Moriah is externally the 
same, and yet all is different, and it is this difference that makes the story so difficult to 
communicate, to pass on.37  The difference itself is secret, like the command and the 
moment of decision it produces.  And the faith that receives Isaac back,  that hopes for 
                                                             
36Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and trembling: a dialectical lyric by Joannes de silentio, tr. Alastair 
Hannay, (London: Penguin books, 1985), p. 52. See also p. 77. 
37Kierkegaard, Fear and trembling, p. 62. 
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the impossible to be possible, is said to affect Abraham, to keep him young: 'he who is 
always prepared for the worst becomes old prematurely: but he who has faith retains 
eternal youth.'38  Silentio's Abraham is kept young by the willingness to continue to 
desire in circumstances that seem to forbid this desire, or render it meaningless. 
 At the end of the last chapter I suggested that part of what is missing in Charles 
Griswold's criticism of 'instant' forgiveness is the sense that the command to forgive 
may itself produce a destablisation of thought in advance, so that the paradoxical 
demand to love justice and yet show mercy has already begun to be incorporated into 
one's life.  This is one of Weil's motivations, and it is an ambiguous one: because torture 
is a possibility, one should form one's conception of God through consideration of 
torture.  Even if Weil is too demanding here, there does seem to be a kernel of truth.  
Our ideals, whatever they are, are likely to produce a process of rehearsal, in which we 
ask 'yes, but what if...?'  One counts the cost in advance, because one cannot help but 
anticipate difficulty of one kind or another. In this sense, one can see ideals as 
opportunities to shape this process of rehearsal, as Walter Wink suggests regarding the 
practice of non-violence.39 Active non-violence is so counter-intuitive that one must 
rehearse it internally, for the simple reason that any exposure to violence produces in us 
the question 'what if...?  We will be rehearsing in any case, the question is how. On 
Wink's account, the command to turn the other cheek invites a process of rehearsal 
through which to let re-shape our instinctive responses to aggression.  Similarly, one 
might say that the gospel sayings on forgiveness encourage a similar process. The 
sayings in Matthew and Luke concerning how often one should forgive deliberately 
encourage an anticipation of victimhood. But perhaps the point here is that this kind of  
anticipation is almost inevitable, as evidenced by the question it is a response to: 'Lord, 
how many times...?¶ In fact, it may even make up a reasonable percentage of one's 
conscious thought, in which case the saying is concerned to utilise this tendency so as to 
nourish the capacity to forgive. And it does so through extremity, and through an 
exposure of one's sense of justice to outrage. One must forgive, but without ceasing to 
expect repentance and reform, in conditions that seem to forbid these expectations.  The 
account of the experience of aporia that Derrida offers is, in contrast, so formal that 
                                                             
38Kierkegaard, Fear and trembling, p. 32. 
39See Walter Wink, Engaging the powers: discernment and resistance in a world of domination 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 231-242. 
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there is no sense that these experiences occur within lives. 
 
 
II 
The gift 
 
As well as being a further example of the way in which aporia is held to be a form of 
suffering essential to ethical life, the figure of gift is also in a sense the more positive, 
substantive content of Derrida's ethics, in contrast to the more formal articulation of 
ethics as responsibility and decision. More than this, the relationship between the free 
gift and forms of reciprocity underlies his approach to forgiveness as a 'relation without 
relation' between a purely unconditional moment and a reasoned, conditional process.  
The question of desire will prove crucial in assessing Derrida work on gift, and the 
logic of gift within forgiveness. 
 The 'posture' alluded to earlier, and the three aspects or moments involved, can also 
be seen more clearly through Derrida's discussion of gift, in something like the 
following way.  The concept  'gift' is deconstructed, its inherent instability exposed, so 
that the difference between gift and exchange becomes problematic: gift always hides 
exchange, and one cannot finally differentiate reliably between the two.  We say 'gift', 
but this meaning never becomes present, the promise made with this word is never 
made good, never delivered.  Whenever anyone says 'here it is' or 'there it is', one can be 
sure that there will be something other than gift.40  At the same time, this suspicion 
towards simple conceptual identity or presence is also linked to an ethical vigilance, 
because by appearing to be a charitable gift, exchange may become secretly coercive, 
and so the task of exposing gift as always exchange is also that of uncovering hidden 
violence and its victims.  Finally, though, despite being impossible to locate, 
conceptually or practically, the gift remains for Derrida that which is to be desired; to 
desire the gift is to desire something beyond exchange, in fact, it is the desire for the 
pure gift that is said to drive the deconstructive vigilance.41 
                                                             
40John Caputo frequently uses this turn of phrase to get at the ethical import of deferral. 
41Theodore Jennings points out that there is an importance difference between the discussions on 
justice and gift concerning the 'excess' of justice. Whereas in the discourse on gift, the sense is that gift 
is unconditional by way of excess, in the case of justice, this aspect is almost entirely absent. This is 
perhaps part of the difficulty in seeing the continuity between the discourse on gift and 'early' 
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 The importance of this last aspect has been elaborated, with a fair amount of 
breathlessness, by John Caputo: 
There is in Derrida what one might call a certain overreaching, 
trespassing aspiration, what I have been calling here, all along, a dream, 
or desire, a restlessness, a passion for the impossible, a panting for 
something to come. This passion is not a determinable wish or will for a 
definable goal, or foreseeable objective, however hard any such goal may 
be to attain. It is not a search for something planable and foreseeable, the 
fulfilment of which can be steadily approximated, our progress toward 
which regularly measured. Over and beyond, beneath and before any such 
determinate purpose, there is in Derrida, in deconstruction, a longing and 
sighing, a weeping and praying, a dream and a desire, for something non-
determinable, un-foreseeable, beyond the actual and the possible, beyond 
the horizon of possibility, beyond the scope of what we can sensibly 
imagine.42 
 
Caputo takes deconstruction to be a movement of excessive desire for what remains 
outside of the circle of exchange that constitutes both human behaviour and thinking. 
And so the gift, as the thought of this beyond, is like the thought of God, 'it has not so 
much a semantic content as a restless force or desire; it is a promise, or even a sigh.'43   
In Derrida's words, the impossibility of the gift is that through which 'we continue to 
desire, to dream'.44  In Caputo, then, the implication of Derrida's talk of 'undecidability' 
becomes clearer: it is the desire for the impossible that mediates between the 
conditional and the unconditional, or one might almost say that it is the experience of 
the lack of mediation that mediates.  The lack of mediation is only felt because of the 
'desire for the impossible'. Put more simply, Caputo says, following Derrida's trajectory, 
gift never really appears, but somehow this recognition itself is a force for good, 
because without the sense that real gift always eludes us, and the desire for the 
impossible 'outside', we have no way to 'slacken the circle' of exchange.45  The gift may 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
deconstruction; there is a more positive sense of excess in the idea of impossible gift. See Reading 
Derrida/thinking Paul: on justice, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 91-3. 
42John Caputo, The Prayers and tears of Jacques Derrida: religion without religion, (Indiana, Indiana 
University Press, 1997), p. 333. 
43John D Caputo, The weakness of God: a theology of the event, p6. The importance of desire for 
Derrida's ethical work is also emphasised by Mark Dooley and Liam Kavanagh in their recent 
introduction to Derrida, Derrida's philosophy (Stocksbridge: Acumen 2007). 
44Jacques Derrida, 'On the gift: A discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion' in God, 
the gift and postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University 1999), p. 72. 
45Caputo, The prayers and tears of Jacques Derrida, p. 161. See also Hent de Vries account of 
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never appear, but it somehow makes its absence felt. 
Perhaps the easiest way to say what Derrida is trying to do in Given time is to say 
that he is exploring 'what giving wants to say';46 that is, he is teasing out the tensions 
and contradictions that appear as we try to articulate what a gift is, or should be.  As 
Derrida discusses Marcel Mauss' essay The gift (which inaugurates the interdisciplinary 
discourse on gift and exchange), Levi-Strauss, Heidegger, and a prose-poem from 
Baudelaire's collection Paris spleen, Derrida finds that giving can never say what it 
wants to say.  Given time, like many of Derrida's books, is difficult to subject to 
straightforward criticism, because although there are moments of very close reading and 
deconstructive rigour, there are a number of more obviously speculative and playful 
detours which are also used to carry  the argument forward.  However, since Derrida 
has discussed the central claims of this work in interviews, and in an important 
conference published as God, the gift and postmodernism, it is fair to assume that 'the 
impossibility of the gift' can be treated as a fairly unified thesis.  Firstly, Derrida claims 
that this aporia appears, inevitably, and secondly understands that it is constitutive of 
ethical life, and the form of thinking it requires.  My concern here is not primarily with 
whether there is, or is not, finally, an aporia of gift, but rather of the way in which the 
moment of aporia is taken to be important.  However, some consideration will be given 
to the validity of the first claim, that the thought of gift is necessarily 'impossible' in 
some way, through interaction with John Milbank's work, which presents one of the 
most penetrating criticisms of Derrida's work on gift to date. 
 Derrida builds towards a sense of the impossibility of gift from a number of 
directions.  Firstly, there is the problem of recognition.  For a gift to be given, there 
must be one who gives, that which is given, and one who is given to; these are 
structural requirements, one might say.  But for that which is given to be given as gift, 
there are what we might call ethical requirements: a gift must be given freely, above or 
beyond obligations and expectations, and with no conditions attached to its receipt.  It 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Derrida's relationship to Levinas. On de Vries' account, Derrida's aim is not to produce an entirely non-
violent discourse, since this will always mean a certain blindness to the violence that is inherent in all 
discourse. Rather, the aim is to avoid the worst violence, which means acknowledging one's inevitable 
complicity in it. See Religion and violence: philosophical perspectives from Kant to Derrida 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 133 - 138. 
46Derrida, Given time: I. Counterfeit money (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press 
1992), p. 30. 
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must be a surprise, and it must not impose any indebtedness.  The gift must be 
excessive, asymmetrical, unconditional, disinterested, and alien to all economy; this is 
what we find that giving 'wants to say'.  Except, for Derrida, if this is what we want a 
gift to be, then we should admit that this desire is continually frustrated, because 
something always returns; no act of giving can lift itself out of economy.  This is not 
simply because of the human tendency to seek some way of returning to equilibrium 
after the imbalance of giving, nor because human relations are always involved in some 
kind of power dynamic, such that giving may always emerge from a mixture of motives 
(a gift may be a means to gain approval, win influence or pay tribute, etc).  It is not 
even because real generosity tends without any coercion to produce further generosity; 
the desire to give as one has received. It is rather because a gift is always already its 
own payment, its own return, and therefore its own annulment.  Even the most 
simplistically generous act, given with no strings attached, and no end in view is always 
re-inscribed in economy through its very meaning.  One who gives always receives the 
meaning of their gift, 'the gratifying image of goodness or generosity',47 as a return, so 
that one always takes by giving.48  For there to be real giving one must not only give 'in 
secret' from others, but one's giving must also be a secret from oneself.  A gift, as such, 
can appear to no-one.  But this means that as soon as a gift appears as a gift, as soon as 
this meaning is given at all, its gratuity is betrayed.49   The impossibility of gift, then, is 
closely linked to the impossibility of presence.50 
                                                             
47Derrida, Given time, p. 23. 
48Derrida, 'To forgive' in Questioning God, p. 22. 
49
 Derrida, Given time, p. 81.  After hearing these ideas, a perceptive undergraduate student noted that 
on this account, a victim of credit card fraud, where the fraudsters accidentally transferred the stolen 
money to a charity bank account, might be classed as having given an authentic gift. 
50There appears to be a lack of fit between the role that absence plays in Derrida's later work on gift, 
as compared to the role that it plays in the earlier work on signification. In both cases, there is the sense 
that the search for pure presence (gift without exchange, self-sufficient intelligibility) is what drives a 
circular movement (of reciprocal exchanges, of the play of signifiers). However, the whole movement 
of the early work is to affirm this condition: the absence of a transcendental signified is pronounced as a 
kind of liberation, so the real nature of meaning (deferral, difference, play, etc) can be affirmed as what 
it really is. The desire for a final, self-sufficient intelligibility not corrupted by differing and deferral is 
linked to suppression of real human difference; violence. In contrast, the desire for the impossible gift is 
affirmed as that which has the potential to produce a less violent economy. In other words, the desire for 
an 'outside' is framed in contradictory ways at different times. Both are 'impossible', but the desire for 
an outside of signification (one that grounds signification) is taken to be oppressive; the desire for an 
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 Another issue concerns the force of giving.  Giving is seen as a form of 
benevolence, it is for the one given to, not for the one who gives.  And yet precisely 
because a gift is uninvited, it is always potentially an unwelcome imposition.  One can 
never guarantee that one's giving will be received as a blessing, rather than as an 
unwelcome intrusion, or even as violation.  Every moment of giving exerts some kind 
of force, it does something, alters things, but since one never knows how, or when, or 
what to give, one will always need to be forgiven for one's giving.  In a sense, the 
thought of gift is of a force that is not violent, but there is no way that this non-violence 
can appear definitively, or be guaranteed, because the non-violence of the gift depends 
on it being received as non-threatening.  This relates in turn to the question of 
indebtedness; since the imposing of obligations is one way in which the gift could come 
with a certain force, as a means of control of the future, and since the non-obligatory 
character of gift never appears straightforwardly, there is no way to guarantee that a gift 
does not, or will not threaten in this way.  A gift may always be violent, because it is by 
definition not invited, paid for, or demanded. 
  If, then, Derrida still wishes to speak of a desire for the gift, a desire linked with 
the impossible, then it goes along with something beyond subjectivity and the capacity 
for knowledge, in a similar way to the way decision takes place in me, without being 
made by me.  At this point, again, Derrida is pointing to something beyond the 
difference between activity and passivity, or between intention and chance. There is no 
gift without a wanting-to-give, but there is no gift with clear, conscious intention, for 
the reasons already outlined: 
This is the paradox we have been engaged from the beginning. There is 
no gift without the intention of giving. The gift can only have a meaning 
that is intentional - in the two senses of the word that refers to intention as 
well as intentionality. However, everything stemming from the intentional 
meaning also threatens the gift with self-keeping, with being kept in its 
very expenditure. Whence the enigmatic difficulty lodged in this donating 
eventiveness. There must be chance, encounter, the involuntary, even 
unconsciousness or disorder, and there must be intentional freedom, and 
these two conditions must - miraculously, graciously - agree with each 
other. 51 
 
Needless to say, these two conditions never coincide, hence the gift remains 'the 
impossible'. It is difficult to pin down, exactly, the sense in which Derrida uses the term 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
outside of economic give-and-take is held to be liberating. 
51Derrida, Given Time, p. 123. 
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'the impossible'; it is not that he believes 'gift' to be a word with no reality to signify, or 
that each human attempt to give somehow falls short of 'pure' gift through inadequate 
intention.  The following comments provide the beginnings of a description of what it is 
like to think 'the impossible': 
The gift as such cannot be known, but it can be thought of. We can think 
what we cannot know. Perhaps thinking is not the right word. But there is 
something in excess of knowledge. We have a relation to the gift beyond 
the circle, the economic circle, and beyond the theoretical and 
phenomenological determination. It is this excess which interests me. It is 
this excess which puts the circle into motion.52 
 
I am looking for another possible experience of truth, through the event of the 
gift, with all these conditions of impossibility. What I am interested in ± and I 
repeat often that the deconstruction I try to practice is impossible, is the 
impossible ± is precisely this experience of the impossible. . . . What I am 
interested in is the experience of the desire for the impossible. That is, the 
impossible as the condition of desire. Desire is not perhaps the best word. I mean 
this quest in which we want to give, even when we realize, when we agree, if we 
agree, that the gift, that giving, is impossible, that it is a process of 
reappropriation and self-destruction. Nevertheless, we do not give up on the 
dream of the pure gift, in the same way that we do not give up the idea of pure 
hospitality.53 
 
It is statements like those above that have been found particularly tempting for 
theologians, in that if Derrida's interpretation of the human phenomena of giving is 
correct, it may prove to be a trace of transcendence; transcendence in the form of a 
desire for what is absent, the effects of which can be seen in certain disturbances within 
language and thought.54  If we briefly follow this theological temptation, we might say 
that Derrida is hinting at something very similar to what Weil writes about the absence 
of good 'here below': the gift is never present, but its absence is somehow experienced 
through desire; it is a defining and significant absence.  But then, following Weil, one 
might expect to push this further and say that despite being utterly absent, that 
somehow through desire, when the absent gift is desired as such, this absence becomes 
a mode of presence.  However, despite his reputation as a destabliser of binary 
                                                             
52Derrida, 'On the gift' in God, the gift and postmodernism, p. 60. 
53Derrida, 'On the gift, p. 72. 
54As Sarah Coakley has put it, the discourse of the gift, when seen in this light, appears to provide a 
way to 'keep the notion of the divine afloat', hence its appeal for postmodern theology. See 'Why gift? 
Gift, gender and trinitarian relations in Milbank and Tanner' in Scottish journal of theology, no. 61 vol 
2, 2008, p. 226. 
164 
 
oppositions, it appears that the difference between presence/absence is fixed much more 
firmly in place for Derrida than it is for Weil.  Weil has more to say about this seeming 
transformation, in which hunger becomes a form of nourishment, and about why the 
recognition of the absence, or impossibility, of good 'here below' is a starting point for 
all virtue, compassion and genuine religious insight. The following comments from her 
notebooks on attention, beauty and desire, demonstrate this: 
A poem is beautiful to the precise degree in which the attention, whilst it 
was being composed, has been turned toward the inexpressible. 
The world is beautiful. God has composed the world whilst thinking on 
himself.55 
 
Good is 'produced' not through working towards appropriate ends with effective means, 
but through a law of attention: one reproduces the quality of that to which one is 
attentive.  But the process is not reversible; that is, one cannot be attentive for the sake 
of this imitation, since this is not attention.  Attention can only really be learnt through 
contemplating without 'approaching', whether the lack of approach is through necessity 
or conscious restraint: 
To contemplate what cannot be contemplated (the affliction of another), without 
running away, and to contemplate the desirable without approaching ± that is 
what is beautiful56 
 
What produces good is the attention turned lovingly toward the non-
representable form of good, which one is unable to approach.57 
 
The only way to learn how to contemplate the desirable without approaching is if that 
which is desired is inaccessible.  So for Weil, some kind of absence, inaccessibility or 
suffering is essential if one is to learn to attend, just as for Derrida the impossible is the 
condition for desire; for both, some kind of rupture is crucial.  The difference, however, 
is that Weil conceives of this in terms of a transformation of ordinary desire, so that as 
the desire for the good is painfully formed through absence, one's relation to actual 
present objects of desire is also transformed.  More than this, one's attitude towards the 
most mundane of things (a geometry problem) can become a spiritual practice, so that, 
in a sense, one intends God not through the content of attention but through the form 
and quality of attention ('God is attention without distraction').  Learning to attend to 
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56Weil, First and last notebooks, p. 71. 
57Weil, Notebooks, p. 354. 
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transcendent goodness in its absence involves the same posture as learning to attend to 
the finite as finite; that is, to love the world as the world.  To love the world as the 
world is to love God as God, and vice-versa ('praise to God, and compassion for 
creatures, it is the same movement of the heart').  It is possible to believe in God in such 
a way that one's thought of God emerges from the need to avoid the thought of void; 
that is, unredemptive and destructive suffering, desire without satisfaction, absence of 
any final good, etc.  It is a terrible thing for a gambler to love their game as the saint 
loves their God, but still more terrible for the saint to love God as a gambler loves their 
game.58  In this sense our usual ways of responding to the absence of final good in the 
world corrupt our perspective of both God and the world, and our manner of giving 
attention to each, so that God is thought of or loved dishonestly, as part of an escape 
from the reality of the world, and the world is grasped at desperately, loved as 
something it can never be. 
 However, this emphasis on absence, on desire maintained through absence, runs 
alongside a sense of shift in perspective such that absence and presence are no longer 
simply opposites.  In fact, there is a sense that the oppositions God/world, 
presence/absence are actually the product of thought-as-compensation.  If God is 
present through absence, then one no longer knows exactly what 'presence' and 
'absence' mean, or meant.  This ambiguity is closely related the possibility of a lasting 
change of perspective, or real learning.  And yet, as already explored in the previous 
chapter, this does not operate simply according to a logic of reversal; that is, it is not 
that poverty is wealth, weakness strength, and absence presence, but rather that neither 
poverty nor wealth, weakness or strength, absence or presence are seen in the same way 
on the other side of a shift in perspective. They are 'read' differently: 
If we want only the absolute good, that is to say, if we reject all the 
existing or possible, sensible, imaginary or conceivable good that is 
offered us by creatures as being insufficient; if we prefer to choose 
nothing at all rather than all that, then, (with time), being turned toward 
that which we cannot possibly conceive, a revelation of it comes to us ± 
the revelation that this nothingness is really the fullest possible fullness, 
the main-spring and principle of all reality. Then we can truthfully say 
that we have faith in God.59 
 
Finally, the revelation of 'the fullest possible fullness' leaves open the possibility of a 
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perspective from which desire for what is absent ceases to be traumatic in the same 
way, since desire is already on the way to  possession: 
It is in respect of false goods that desire and possession are different 
things; for the true good, there is no difference.60 
 
Although there is a sense here of a final unification of desire and desired, this does not 
necessarily entail suggesting that absence becomes presence in Weil's understanding.  
For Weil, the point seems to be that there is a 'level' at which desire and possession, 
absence and presence, are different, hence the difficulty of truthful speech, the need for 
a 'secret architecture' which allows one to know without knowing.  In other words, there 
remains an internal fluidity (as opposed to instability) to these kinds of expressions; 
since one does not know whether the good one desires is truly the good - that is, to what 
extent one's desire is compensatory - one can only continue to desire the presence of 
what is absent, which means to maintain the sense that desire is an intentional 
movement, and meaningless as a self-sufficient state without an external aim.  The 
space in between accepting that there is a desire for good which cannot be satisfied and 
the revelation that somehow this hunger itself satisfies (that desire is possession) proves 
essential for Weil, because it is a space in which the form of our love, desire or attention 
may be transformed, rather than simply redirected or inverted.  However, as already 
noted, the emphasis on learning in Weil means that this space - the experience of 
absence, void, etc. -  is not identically repeated, it is felt differently depending on how it 
is construed, so that the difference between presence and absence becomes less and less 
clear as one learns to 'read' the world differently.  Here there are parallels with the 
structure Michael J. Gorman sees in the Philippi hymn.  On Gorman's reading of Paul, 
the conception of God is fundamentally challenged by the servant form of Christ, so 
that an initial experience of challenge issues in a more lasting form of understanding.  
But as we have seen, there is something perpetually unfinished about the movement 
from the 'although' to the 'because', in that some sense of paradoxicality remains in the 
new form of understanding of Christ, or the rights of an apostle, or the behaviour of a 
Christian. The difference between the norm and the overturning of the norm does not 
disappear, just as for Weil, the difference between presence and absence is neither fully 
reversed, nor fully dissolved, although both are suggested. 
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Forgiveness divided 
 
To examine these issues further I want to return to Derrida's discussion of the presence 
of two orders of meaning within the discourse of forgiveness. corresponding to two 
obligations, within the heritage of forgiveness: 
It is important to analyse at its base the tension at the heart of the heritage 
between, on the one side, the idea which is also a demand for the unconditional, 
gracious, infinite, aneconomic forgiveness granted to the guilty as guilty, without 
counterpart, even to those who do not repent or ask forgiveness, and on the other 
side, as a great number of texts testify through many semantic refinements and 
difficulties, a conditional forgiveness proportionate to the recognition of the 
fault, to repentance, to the transformation of the sinner who then explicitly asks 
forgiveness. And who from that point is no longer guilty through and through, 
but already another, and better than the guilty one. To this extent, and on this 
condition, it is no longer the guilty as such who is forgiven. One of the questions 
indissociable from this, and which interests me no less, concerns the essence of 
the heritage. What does it mean to inherit when the heritage includes an 
injunction at once double and contradictory?61 
 
There are two essentially different logics at work under the same word, one that 
gestures towards an entirely unconditional moment in which forgiveness is given as a 
gift without regard for rational grounding or moral justification, and one in which 
forgiveness is part of a norm governed life, so that it is given responsibly, according to a 
pattern (apology, repentance, reconciliation, etc). In this sense, the term 'forgiveness' 
refers not to a single coherent meaning, but is rather the site of a conflict between two 
heterogeneous meanings.  But in another sense, for Derrida, 'forgiveness' refers properly 
only to the unconditional moment, so that really, under one heading, there is forgiveness 
and pseudo-forgiveness.  Or rather, there is forgiveness, and there are other human 
movements that are what forgiveness collapses into as it becomes.  So there is apology, 
pardon, repentance, reconciliation, mourning, forgetting, excuse, understanding, and 
acceptance;  all these involve exchange, or are linked to particular conditions (e.g. 
reconciliation is possible if there is repentance,  acceptance might be easier if there is 
understanding) and in any particular case, when one talks about forgiveness, one is 
talking about some kind of suspension of these elements.  These are all forms of 
interaction or processes that take time, that can be seen to start, progress and even reach 
some kind of completion, and one can observe to a certain extent when they are present.  
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But pure forgiveness,  according to the logic of the gift, is something essentially alien to 
all of these, even though in a sense it is the desire for pure forgiveness that sets in 
motion all these other  movements. 
 In another essay, Derrida comments further on the relation between the conditional 
and unconditional, repeating again the formula 'heterogeneous yet indissociable': 
We thus dissociated on the one hand unconditional forgiveness, absolute 
forgiveness ± I am not saying absolution in the Christian sense ± 
absolutely unconditional forgiveness that allows us to think the essence of 
forgiveness, if there is such a thing ± and which ultimately should even be 
able to do without repentance and the request for forgiveness, and on the 
other hand conditional forgiveness, for example, that forgiveness which is 
inscribed within a set of conditions of all kinds, psychological, political, 
juridical above all (since forgiveness is bound up with the juridicary as 
penal order). Yet the distinction between unconditionality and 
conditionality is shifty [retorse] enough not to let itself be determined as a 
simple opposition. The unconditional and the conditional are, certainly, 
absolutely heterogeneous, and this forever, on either side of a limit, but 
they are also indissociable. There is in the movement, in the motion of 
unconditional forgiveness, an inner exigency of becoming-effective, 
manifest, determined, and, in determining itself, bending to 
conditionality.62 
 
Two things are of particular interest in this version of the relationship.  Firstly, it is the 
unconditional sense that 'allows us to think the essence of forgiveness'.  It is the 
unconditional, the impossible, that produces a thinking of what we cannot know,  as 
suggested above - this forgiveness signals 'another possible experience of truth'.  As 
such, it is the thought of the unconditional that most truly 'is' forgiveness,  that is what 
forgiving 'wants to say'.  The thought of a forgiveness that did not in any way depend on 
someone being deserving - whether this worthiness came from the past in the form of 
mitigating factors, the present in terms of apology and remorse, or the future in terms of 
reconciliation and reform - is the real force of forgiveness.  Secondly, although the 
conditional and the unconditional are 'forever' on either side of a limit, they should not 
be thought of as straightforwardly in opposition.  The unconditional is linked to 
'movement' and 'motion' (the unconditional 'bends' towards the conditional), and as 
such, to a destination; unconditional forgiveness needs to become manifest and 
determined.  In this sense, the unconditional is already orientated towards the 
conditional, to determinate presence, reality made possible by particular conditions, etc.  
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In this sense, again, there is a parallel to the notion of kenosis, and to the tensions 
already highlighted, in that it is the nature of the unconditional to become conditional. 
The thinking of the unconditional is not without a certain trauma, then, because it 
involves the burden to become effective, just as the call for justice demands the 
effectiveness of law, but this becoming is inevitably a loss of essence, a loss of self.  
The unconditional is destined, in a sense, for a loss of self that is also betrayal.  For 
Derrida, recognising this inner tension, or inner incommensurability is crucial if one 
wants to get the best out of our discourse on forgiveness.  A number of statements 
indicate why this point is so important for Derrida: 
I shall risk this proposition: each time forgiveness is at the service of a 
finality, be it noble or spiritual (atonement or redemption, reconciliation, 
salvation), each time that it aims to re-establish a normality (social, 
national, political, psychological) by a work of mourning, by some 
therapy or ecology of memory, then the forgiveness is not pure - nor is its 
concept. Forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, normative, 
normalising. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face 
of the impossible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical 
temporality.63 
 
It is not in the name of an ethical or spiritual purism that I insist on this 
contradiction at the heart of the heritage, and on the necessity of 
maintaining the reference to an aneconomical and unconditional 
forgiveness: beyond the exchange and even the horizon of a redemption 
or a reconciliation. . . . Because if I say, as I think, that forgiveness is 
mad, and that it must remain a madness of the impossible, this is certainly 
not to exclude or disqualify it. It is even, perhaps, the only thing that 
arrives, that surprises, like a revolution, the ordinary course of history, 
politics and law. Because that means that it remains heterogeneous to the 
order of politics or of the juridical as they are ordinarily understood.64 
 
 On the one hand, the absolute difference between the unconditional and  the 
conditional is necessary to maintain, to keep pointing out, because it is only by not 
being in the service of any 'finality' that forgiveness can be a real interruption, 
something that surprises the 'ordinary course of history'.  It is the unconditional sense of 
the heritage that must be preserved because it possesses or produces the real force of 
forgiveness; forgiveness is an interruption, and interruption is necessary if there is to be 
any real space for change.  However, at the same time, the difference must be tirelessly 
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flagged up not simply to preserve the force of the unconditional aspect, but so as to 
protect against the use of the 'mystique' of forgiveness for politically expedient ends: 
In all the geopolitical scenes we have been talking about, the word most 
often abused is 'forgive'. . . . There is always a strategical or political 
calculation in the generous gesture of one who offers reconciliation or 
amnesty, and it is always necessary to integrate this calculation in our 
analyses. . . . It is always the same concern: to see to it that the nation 
survives its discords, that the traumatisms give way to the work of 
mourning, and that the Nation State not be overcome by paralysis.65 
 
When the language of forgiveness is not properly distinguished from notions like 
amnesty, forgetting, healing, reconciliation, and so on, forgiveness can be co-opted,  and 
as result, must be severed in its concept from any other kind of telos. To forgive, to 
desire to forgive, is not to seek any particular outcome, or protect any current state of 
affairs; to forgive is simply to forgive. 
 Forgiveness is dangerous for two reasons, then; firstly because it upsets or interrupts 
an order - it is out of joint with the usual sense of what is deserved, what is reasonable, 
what is sensible, possible, and so on. Secondly, however, this appearance of exceptional 
grace, extreme generosity or interruption carries along with it a sort of mystical aura, 
linked to the height of the sovereign power that pardons whenever it pleases, and this 
aura can cover over the actual power dynamics involved in ensuring the stability and 
health of any political body.  The very fact that at times it may be prudent to forgive 
means that the unconditional 'aura' can be co-opted, the sense of goodness associated 
with the forgiveness abused. Once again, the deconstructive impulse that sees otherness 
in every presumed conceptual simplicity is linked to the capacity to recognise real 
abuses in practice: if one can see that forgiveness is never itself, one might be able to 
see the hidden exchanges, forms of coercion, complicity, etc, that may go along with a 
seemingly gracious discourse.  And these two capacities are both linked to a desire for 
what is always beyond. 
 At this point we can briefly refer back to the 'cross-pressures' that Charles Taylor 
believes characterises contemporary ethical reflection in order to understand more of 
the concerns that shape Derrida's presentation.  For Taylor, ethical reflection is pulled in 
a number of different directions, which I have characterised in terms of the relationship 
between aspiration and affirmation.  Firstly, in the background to all western thinking 
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lies the sacrificial logic of Christianity, which paradoxically attempts to combine 
incarnational affirmation of the ordinary with transcendent aspiration and obedience.  
The highest ethical moment is not the stripping away of the insignificant so as to attain 
the significant, but rather the giving up of what is already precious for the sake of 
something higher.66  Secondly, there is the growing  awareness in the modern era that 
transcendent references, or ethical targets that are outside of the ordinary human sphere 
may mutilate life, and conversely, therefore, there is held to be a liberating power found 
in the affirmation of ordinary life; the peace that comes when strenuous ascetic  
demands cease being made.  The affirmation of ordinary life then begins to become a 
kind of criteria for ethical discourse; if a particular injunction, or the affirming of a 
particular goal does not cause ordinary life to flourish then it cannot be ethical.67  
Finally, there is, in conflict with this, a sense that something about the modern, 
humanising trajectory is profoundly dissatisfying, and crushes the most powerful 
human drives, so that life becomes flattened, weak and therefore toxic.  The affirmation 
of life, from this perspective, may also include affirmation of potentially destructive 
drives and impulses.  Peace is not necessarily normative or 'natural', and, just as for the 
religious perspective, the fullest realisation of human potential does not necessarily 
include a promise not to do any harm.68 
 Derrida's 'impossible gift' could then be understood in relation to these latter post-
Christian trajectories, or as an attempt to negotiate all three.  In relation to the latter, 
what Taylor refers to as the neo-Nietzschean current, the impossible gift points beyond 
the human, and humanism; it is not a product of sovereign subjective intention, nor is it 
an idea the understanding of which promises to produce more  human flourishing.  If 
ethics 'begins by the impossible' - with the madness of decision, the desire for a gift 
without return, with an unconditional hospitality, etc -  then ethics can make no 
promises to safeguard ordinary human living. Derrida's insistence, as de Vries puts it, 
that the very best is close to the very worst, is in this sense a defence of danger.69  The 
very stability of the conditional realm, in which there is measured giving, careful 
application of law,  reasonable expectations concerning hospitality, and so on, is itself 
put into motion by a thought, or the experience of a thought, that has about it a certain 
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madness, and a definite danger. 
 Except at the same time, the whole impetus of deconstruction could be said to be 
developed as a response to the dangers of transcendent aspiration; every fixed meaning 
naming an ideal that might demand some kind of sacrifice of ordinary life can be 
deconstructed, and therefore stripped of its power, and disarmed. The 'negotiation' 
between the unconditional imperative or desire (to welcome, to give, to forgive) and the 
realm of conditional necessities (to maintain one's home, to keep cycles of reciprocity 
turning, to protect oneself) is never made presentable, it is always hidden by fear and 
trembling, and shown to be itself pre-ethical and pre-rational.  But at the same time, this 
obscurity acts as a buffer between the two, in the sense that the moment of decision, in 
which the two are negotiated, is essentially private and incommunicable.70  Although 
the insistence on a purified unilateral gift could be taken as a classic example of an 
ethical aspiration that mutilates ordinary human life - in which giving is always 
accompanied by some concern for oneself, awareness of oneself, of one's connectedness 
and reciprocal ties - the very sense that pure gift is 'the impossible' could also be taken 
as a kind of protection of ordinary life from the demands that some higher ideal of 
giving might impose. 
 So if Taylor's analysis is at all correct,  Derrida's  'desire for the impossible' (which 
in many respects is crucial for the unity of Derrida's work, and yet somewhat under-
theorised) becomes the way in which one pays one's dues to the humanist imperative to 
do no harm, and the neo-Nietzschean imperative to affirm the highest, however 
dangerous.  Desire for the impossible tries to reach beyond the stifling moderation of 
modern humanism, whilst the gap between this excessive desire and real possibilities 
attempts to ensure that this excess can do no harm.  Taylor writes that ethical reflection 
is caught between these competing currents, so that it is far too easy to accuse one 
perspective of being, e.g., a failure to affirm the reality of bodily existence, or of 
imposing mutilating demands upon human life, without recognising the great difficulty 
there is in living up to 'the maximal demand'.  The maximal demand is for an 
harmonious combination of aspiration and affirmation: 'how to define our spiritual or 
moral aspirations for human beings, while showing a path to the transformation 
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involved which doesn't crush, mutilate or deny what is essential to our humanity.'71  In 
Taylor's sense, then, we might say that Derrida attempts to fulfil the maximal demand 
by acknowledging its impossibility. That is, there is the consciousness of the 
incompatibility of aspiration and affirmation, but the way in which this incompatibility 
is presented itself is an attempt to negotiate them. 
 This evaluation is not intended to invalidate Derrida's presentation, but rather to 
highlight something which seems crucial to discussions of forgiveness as such, namely, 
the management of risk.  The idea of forgiveness immediately produces a sense of 
danger - it produces 'yes, but what if...?' thoughts.  The gospel sayings and stories 
associated with forgiveness seem to consciously include and negotiate this tendency, 
presenting unfair situations, provoking and then problematising one's judgment of them; 
for example, the parable of the unjust servant. The story draws forth one's sense of 
justice, so as to encourage the practice of forgiveness, which may be difficult precisely 
because it does not always appear to be just.  Although, as will be further explored 
below, there are problems with Derrida's approach,  to gift in particular, his account is 
extremely sensitive to the way in which forgiveness is necessarily concerned with an 
ambiguous, potentially dangerous idea.  His insistence that forgiveness 'lives by the 
unforgivable' may in some respects artificially exaggerate a problematic (why not 
simply say that forgiveness lives by the inexcusable?), but it may also be taken to assert 
that forgiveness will always remain something to be learned; that is, part of what we 
mean by 'forgiveness' is a situation in which our capacity to continue to give is 
stretched.  However, the way that the 'explosiveness' of forgiveness is linked to isolated 
moments of time that are not themselves acknowledged to be sewn into more ongoing 
patterns of desire, anticipation and expectation, means that forgiveness is presented as 
that which always remains to be learned, without also being that which is actually 
learned. 
 
 
III 
Reciprocity 
  
As we have seen previously, there is a great difficulty in saying that one 'wants to 
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forgive', for if what one wanted all along was 'to forgive', there would be nothing to 
forgive in the first place, no opposition to one's desire,  no disfigurement of one's 
deepest hopes.  Someone who wants to forgive is never, in this world, disappointed, and 
so never needs to. If forgiveness can be understood in terms of a desire that exceeds and 
opposes circumstance, what is it a desire for? What do I want, if I want to forgive?  A 
sophisticated, yet fairly common-sense answer, has been outlined by John Milbank, in 
large part as a response to Derrida's work, but drawing upon many sources. For Milbank 
forgiveness is the desire for the renewal of reciprocity.  The discussion that follows is 
largely sympathetic towards Milbank's critique.  However, what I hope to show is that 
there is a sense that this affirmation of reciprocity when seen through the lens of Weil's 
emphasis on the acceptance of void, contains an element that is something rather more 
like an unconditional, or unilateral, giving that might be supposed.  In this sense, I want 
to try to try to show that the 'asymmetrical reciprocity' that Milbank proposes is, in one 
sense, at least, less starkly opposed to Derrida's 'impossible gift'. 
 In 'Can a gift be given?', Milbank takes note of Pierre Bordieu's suggestion that the 
non-contractual obligations of giving can be described in terms of two requirements: 
that one give back after a suitable delay (after visiting a new friend for dinner, one waits 
for a certain amount of time before inviting them in return), and that one give back 
differently, but with equivalence and difference (one invites them for a meal, not simply 
a cup of tea, but one does not cook exactly the same meal).  For Bordieau, these 
requirements maintain the appearance of gratuity, whilst remaining within the safety of 
a rule bound system; one appears generous whilst minimising the risk of losing, or 
being exploited. Delay and non-identical repetition, then, are the way in which the 
phenomenon known as giving differs from contractual obligations or market exchange; 
it is a different way of exerting influence.  For Milbank, though, this is not necessarily 
an indication of any sinister hidden coercion or attempt to accumulate virtue, but rather 
it indicates that the phenomenon of gift exchange is something beyond the modern 
difference between free, individual action, and regulated contract.  When one gives, one 
is neither simply free, nor simply bound, and when one gives in return, the 'return' is 
both a real response to an initiating moment, and a new act of giving in its own right.  
This, for Milbank, is the paradox that is pointed to by such seemingly mundane 
practices as buying rounds in a pub, or tipping, and it is a paradox that can only really 
be expressed in an ethic which is based on the paradox of a command to love, which 
construes indebtedness as opportunity rather than burden: 'let no debt remain 
175 
 
outstanding, except the ongoing debt to love one another.'72 
 In this way, a purified giving would not be a gift that imposed no obligation, but 
rather one that gave opportunity to give in turn, and so as to establish relationship, 
which ultimately, as familial and erotic love suggest, is based on expectations of 
ongoing giving and exchange.73 Whereas for Derrida, one senses that a perfect gift 
would be given almost unconsciously, with an impossibly light touch, hardly noticed, 
barely there, for Milbank, the perfect gift would be one that was perfectly suitable, and 
this perfection is one that can never be guaranteed by rule, as it depends on judgement 
irreducible to knowledge.74  Hence, for Milbank, the non-violence of the gift is never 
simply guaranteed formally, but rather depends on an aesthetic agreement between 
giver, gift, and recipient; that is, the peacefulness of giving, in which a gift turns out to 
be blessing rather than curse, is in the whole movement. In this sense, 'gift' refers to the 
whole movement or sequence, and it is an intrinsically temporal concept: a gift is not 
(truly) gift unless it is received as such.  The art of giving is cultivated through 
understanding of the whole sequence, not simply the initial moment. It is allied to a 
gradual learning of the particularity of the other, and as a result is better suited to the 
peculiar distance of intimacy, where it is essential that the loved one remain apart and 
other so that I can continue to approach them and so that they may give in return, rather 
than the distance of disinterested charity, where the distance safeguards the purity of my 
own intentions, allowing my giving to remain outside the circle of exchange.75 
 So, although Derrida assumes that he is following a trajectory began by Christianity, 
for Milbank, Derrida's attempt to be 'more Christian than Christianity' entirely misses 
the sense that the Christian elevation of agape above and beyond the law is made 
possible by the advent of the church, a new relationality constituted and governed by 
giving and receiving.76  Agape is not affirmed simply by advocating an even more 
rigorous set of conditions for giving, an 'ethics beyond ethics', but through the giving of 
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a new context for action.77  The 'purifying' move of Christianity, for Milbank, does not 
concern the stripping away of reciprocal expectations, returns, and recognition so as to 
reveal pure, unmotivated, undemanding gift (as, for example, might be thought in 
certain interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount sayings concerning secrecy).  It is 
rather, a purifying, freeing or heightening of reciprocity, and this is enabled not through 
learning, somehow, to give into the void with an accompanying loss of self, but through 
the consciousness of having always already received, through receiving one's own being 
as already a gift, waiting to be given in turn.  In other words, generosity is made 
possible not by the trauma of severing one's giving from any expectations concerning 
reciprocal relationship, but rather through faith and hope; that one has received, and 
will continue to receive, oneself. 
 As already suggested, this picture is inseparable from a particular re-interpretation 
of Christian metaphysics, and this is not a intended to be a metaphysical discussion, so 
there is a limit to how far into these issues we can go.  However, a brief look at how 
Milbank construes the significance of this understanding of gift exchange at a 
metaphysical level may be instructive.  Just as Derrida wants an 'ethics beyond ethics', 
so Milbank advocates a 'metaphysics beyond metaphysics': 
Such reciprocity would be consonant, not with a metaphysical circularity, 
but with a broken circularity between a relatively fixed, ontological 
theatre for events on the one hand, and events which constantly exceed 
the theatrical stage of their performance, and yet thereby extend this 
stage, on the other.78 
 
This reference to a spiral, broken circularity or 'strange loop' is repeated in a number of 
places, and is closely tied to the notion of non-identical repetition referred to already.  
Because each moment of giving is in some sense an echo, or reply, it means that the gift 
is not, and should not be removed from a certain kind of circularity; one has always 
already received, and so giving is always a reply, a return, never an entirely new 
beginning. Even if one gives to one who is unable to reciprocate, one has already 
received their presence as, in some sense, a gift.79  However, Milbank also wants to 
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insist that to respond to having received by giving in return is not simply to give back, 
but is rather to give again.  This, then, is held as a paradox, in that the gift that is given 
out fully returns home only by a further moment of going out into new territory; the 
'tick' of giving is completed by another variation of 'tick', not by the 'tock' of a resolved 
ending.80  Giving is a rule-bound performance, through which one takes part creatively 
in a pre-existent scenario, rather than an individual, heroic madness, but in a certain 
sense it is also a continual extension of the rules of the game, and 'exceeding of the 
stage'.  The requirements of return (to wait before giving back, which allows giving, for 
a certain period, to seem to be, or actually become, loss; and to give back differently, so 
that there is always surprise in receiving, and therefore potentially intrusion), mean that 
there is a certain openness about this reciprocity. There is a necessity to risk being 'off-
stage'. Or put differently, there really is a moment of indeterminacy, when a gift is given 
but not received, when giving is loss, before the stage is extended to incorporate the 
performance, or the broken circularity continued.  Simply put, if giving 'is' reciprocity, 
then it is also the case that giving 'may not be' reciprocity - it is that which may fail to 
become reciprocity, that which may fail to become itself.  What is gift, when it does not 
become itself?  Or, if giving is an endless spiraling movement, in which each moment is 
both outward extension and further reception, what happens what the movement is 
interrupted, perverted, or comes to a dead halt? In other words, how does one give in 
the absence of reciprocity? 
 
 
Giving, forgiving and loss 
  
What I wish to do now is to explore the question of giving and loss in Milbank's work, 
primarily through a close reading of two important essays, 'Can morality be Christian', 
and 'Grace: the midwinter sacrifice'. 
 A major thrust of Milbank's work is concerned to critique the sacrificial emphasis in 
modern and post-modern ethics, the sense that the highest virtue is always linked with 
the loss, in some way, of oneself, and in its place to suggest that ethics is unavoidably 
eudaemonistic, concerned neither with pure interiority through assessment of motives, 
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nor pure exteriority through recognition of sheer otherness of the other, but with the 
'festive between' of love - a real state of affairs, not simply an intention or affective 
state.  The valourisation of self-sacrifice is shown to be  in complicity with a modern 
understanding of the human as an isolated and self-sufficient subject.  In  contrast, and 
alongside the affirmation of reciprocity rather than unilateral gift, Milbank aims to 
recover a concept of soul which is opposed equally to the notion of an enclosed 
interiority that passively receives, and to the concept of radical self-loss or donation.81  
On this account, the 'straight line' of an unilateral gift, disinterested and given without 
reference or regard for reciprocal norms, supports what appears to be its opposite, the 
closed circle where one goes out, and gives out, only so as to return more securely.82  
The articulation of a completely 'purified' ethic, defined by the gesture towards an 
entirely one-way movement of giving, stripped of all expectations,  in fact supports the 
notion of an isolated, self-sufficient self: I do not need anyone else in order to give 
unilaterally; I do not need anyone else to be good; I do not need anyone else to 'gain 
myself'. 
 Properly interpreted, Christianity is distinct from this modern and post-modern 
tendency firstly in its refusal to define ethics in relation to death, and secondly in the re-
imagining of the ethical in terms of an acting out of faith in and hope for the 
continuation and transformation of reciprocity beyond death, and in excess of death.  
This produces a very different picture of forgiveness; the nature of the act, and the 
context within which it might make sense.  To forgive is necessarily linked with the 
conditions of interpersonal life - with what is actually possible in human interactions - 
since it is concerned with the renewal of giving and receiving, which found and 
constitute human relationships.  Forgiveness does indeed have its own particular 
'reason', both in the sense of a ground or motivation, and in the sense of an animating 
principle or rationale. 
 In his essay 'Can morality be Christian?' Milbank outlines the way in which 
morality, as usually understood, is predicated upon scarcity and death. The first mark of 
virtue is its reactivity; the virtuous person is marked out by the way in which they ward 
off some danger, whether it is a threat to the body, the soul or the city. Morality is 
always a secondary movement that responds to some intrusion, contamination or risk: 
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virtue 'always secretly celebrates as its occasion a prior evil, lives out of what it 
opposes.'83  Since virtue is always concerned with response to a threat, whether internal 
or external, it requires effort, the giving up that which would otherwise be enjoyed 
peacefully - it is necessarily strenuous.  But this also means that virtue always maims in 
some way, it defines what shall count as the lower so that it can be given up for the sake 
of the higher, it introduces hierarchy through the assumption of threat.  And as a result, 
there is never any entire good, and only a remnant (of the self, of the social body) can 
be saved.  It is the perception of threat which introduces the need to prioritise, to decide 
what is to be protected, and what sacrificed.  The reactive and sacrificial nature of 
morality means that the virtuous are always in complicity with death.  Without the real 
threat of death, there is no danger, and equally, without the possibility of death, no way 
for sacrifice to appear and prove itself; 'ethics must covertly celebrate death, for only 
our fragility elicits our virtue.' 84  All this adds up to a logic of scarcity: because life is 
in short supply, measures must be taken to protect what little there is, and generalised 
rules or norms established to ensure this.  Not only is morality in league with mortality, 
it is ultimately indifferent to particularity, since the need to protect life is learned from 
the universal situation of life's scarceness, not from the particular value of individual 
human lives. 
 In contrast to the five 'marks' of virtue - reaction, sacrifice, complicity with death, 
scarcity and generality - are the five 'notes' of Christianity: gift, end of sacrifice, 
resurrection, plenitude and confidence.  For Milbank, Christianity's moral vision (if it 
can be called 'moral') is  based on plenitude, on confidence in life as the gift of God 
which exceeds death and continues through it, a confidence made possible by the event, 
in time, of the overcoming of death in Christ.  As a result, Christian ethics is 
inextricably linked to belief in resurrection, and therefore to expectations concerning 
oneself.  This does not simply concern the belief in a particular doctrine, but more of an 
altered perspective toward death: to see in death not a threat but further evidence of the 
way in which one's entire being is excessive gift that cannot be possessed, only 
continually received and returned: '[r]resurrection in fact does not simply negate fallen 
death, but reinstates a fully human and natural death, namely the offering of ourselves 
back to God in recognition of our own absolute nullity and entire derivation from 
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him.'85  Drawing heavily on Luther's 'On good works', Milbank suggests that virtue is 
first of all faith, and the specific details of a virtuous life flow naturally from this 
trusting attitude (all 'sins' being rooted in some way in fear, the sense of one's life being 
threatened).  Since the goal of human life is reciprocal relationship, giving and 
receiving, it now follows that one moves towards this not through a painful purification 
in which giving is severed entirely from receiving (in thought, as well as practice), but 
through trust in this reciprocity, despite the present distortion of it.  Whereas for Derrida 
the enemy of gift is the circling back motion, the gravitational pull of the subject, for 
Milbank, the enemy of gift (exchange) is mistrust, a suspicion that the delay and 
openness involved in gift-exchange may reveal an underlying scarcity, or potential 
threat.  In consequence, there is a 'bad conscience' that is necessary for the Christian, 
but it is not the bad conscience that is alert to the possibility of 'return' in every possible 
guise, eternally unsatisfied in the absence of pure gift.  It is rather the bad conscience of 
a growing disregard for morality in favour of a new confidence in a goodness of 
'improvisation': 'the Christian man is not a moral man, not a man of good conscience, 
who acts with what he knows of death, scarcity and duty to totalities. He has a bad 
conscience, but a good confidence: for he acts with what he does not know but has faith 
in. In absolute faith he gives up trying to be good, to sustain a right order of government 
within himself.'86 
 One ambiguity in this account is the view of death it supposes.  On the one hand, 
Milbank suggests that a Christian morality, if there be such a thing, must, if it is to 
follow the risen Christ, envisage an overcoming of death, not simply human evil.  In 
this sense, sin and death are partners, as the New Testament suggests, and one learns to 
give not simply through an intensification of one's concern for others in their mortality, 
but through a confidence concerning one's own being, which is identified with Christ 
who is beyond death. However, at the same time, it is death as interpreted which is 
complicit with sin, and which in a sense, is sin. It is to perceive finitude as scarcity, 
rather than dependence. In this sense, death must be reinterpreted, received differently, 
so that it no longer indicates scarcity, but rather passage and dependence.  It is this point 
which distinguishes Christianity from Nietzsche's vision of eternal return: the re-
interpretation of death is not made through a private resolution to affirm everything, 
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however terrible, but on the grounds of actual transformation, magically given in the 
resurrection.  Death can only be taken as more than, or other than, simple loss and 
negation of life, if it is, in fact, more than this. This paradox is expressed in the 
following point about meaning and event: 
'[t]here are no events outside the assignment of meanings, and there are 
no construable meanings not ultimately including some reference to an 
active rearrangement of things in time. . . . Thus in the case of new 
legends, ideologies and fictions, one legitimately asks after the real 
occasions that have helped to give rise to such novel configurations of 
sense.'87 
 
There is no 'death' prior to interpretation, but equally, no re-interpretation without 
'active rearrangement'.88   
  Forgiveness, therefore, has a telos beyond or in excess of death; the unbroken 
restoration of mutuality and reciprocity, the ongoing ecstasis which is love. The 
moment of forgiveness, the time of forgiveness, is conceived of as a time of trust, not of 
trauma.  The command to forgive, from this perspective, is not the command to act 
entirely without regard for conditions that would frame the act of forgiveness (the 
repentant heart of the wrong-doer, the possibility of healing, the prospect of 
reconciliation).  It is, rather, an exhortation to trust in the eschatological promise of 
restored community - to trust that there will be, and is now, a context in which 
forgiveness makes sense. Only when seen in this context and motivated by this hope is 
forgiveness possible, and non-pathological. These two points are closely linked, 
because for Milbank, if forgiveness remains one-sided but is nevertheless endorsed or 
held up as a good, it can only signal a diminishment of life, or consent to such 
diminishment.  If one 'forgives', and moves beyond resentment without hope of 
response from the wrongdoer, then one is simply complicit in evil, accepting 
malevolence and abuse.  Similarly, if one 'forgives' without hope of reconciliation, one 
is simply confirming the breakdown of trust, accommodating oneself to it.  In other 
words, forgiveness is distinguished as such by being bound up with hope; without hope 
there is no forgiveness, simply complicity, apathy or despair.  The presence of faith and 
hope mark the attitude of the forgiving person out from the attitude of someone who 
simply wishes to forget for the sake of convenience, or someone who finds acceptance 
easy because their expectations of what human life could be, and should be, is so low. 
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But clearly, faith and hope are themselves subject to the same interpretive difficulty: is 
faith willful naivety, is hope blinkered optimism? 
 This approach is taken further in 'Grace: the midwinter sacrifice.' Drawing heavily 
on Robert Spaemann's discussion of virtue, happiness and time in Happiness and 
benevolence,89 Milbank examines the question of receptivity, grace and fortune.  There 
is a tension within the New Testament concerning stability and virtue.  In one sense, 
since love is dependent on one's receiving of grace, and linked therefore to one's 
openness - to God, to others, to what time brings generally - there is a sense in which 
virtue is unstable, by definition not secured.  The life of the Christian is, from this 
perspective, one that is continually trusting and dependent - 'do not worry beforehand 
about what you are to say; but say whatever is given you at that time' 90 -  rather than 
one that is in confident possession of a principle.  And yet, at the same time, the highest 
command - to love - can be seen as radically non-context dependent, in that love can 
continue even in entirely passive modes (patience, humility, forgiveness).  If the law is 
summed up in one command, and there is never a situation in which this command 
could not be obeyed, then the aspect of self that is constituted by this orientation would 
appear to be completely safe from any unforeseen developments.91   
 What Milbank proposes is a delicate combination of these aspects: the Christian 
command to love goes along with a sense of security, but one based on reception, rather 
                                                             
89See Robert Spaemann, Happiness and benevolence, tr. Jeremiah Alberg (Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2000), chapters 1- 6, particularly 'The antimonies of happiness' on this point. For 
Spaemann,  'life's turning out well' must be thought of as both subjective and objective, concerned both 
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the modalities of anticipation and memory, which necessarily contain an element of instability by virtue 
of their intentionality, their concern with reality. One is happy if one expects to be, and to continue to 
be, happy, and unhappy if worried that something awful awaits in the future. Equally, if some previous 
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If the turning out well of life is linked exclusively with subjective pleasure in the present moment, then 
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conception of happiness, so that what is aimed for is more a sort of painless contentment. See pp. 35, 38 
- 9. 
90Mark 13:11 (NRSV) 
91Milbank, Being reconciled, p. 141. 
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than the guarantee of infallible principle.  In this sense, it is hope that links happiness 
and benevolence; one cannot be good or happy without hope, since all action is based 
upon some kind of anticipation, whether fearful or trusting, and most, if not all, 
affective states are related to one's thoughts concerning the future - however pleasant 
one's present circumstances, it is difficult to enjoy them if one expects disaster the 
following week.  And so the capacity to give, or forgive, in the way that agape requires 
is not nurtured through pre-emptive exposure to the prospect of absolute loss - a kind of 
bracing of oneself - but through contemplation of the plenitude of divine giving that 
exceeds and continues through death.  Insofar as it is described as an excessive giving 
(forgive not seven times, but seventy times seven), forgiveness is an exhortation to trust 
in a deeper reciprocity, not to simply disregard receiving altogether. Happiness and 
benevolence are indeed unthinkable without each other: there is no deep happiness 
without some objective sense of a life lived well.  And there is no goodness without the 
desire for happiness - for oneself or for another - only a sterile moralism tending 
towards self-obliteration.  At the same time, however,  they are only thinkable together 
through hope, the form and content of which is mystically presented through the 
Christian notion of resurrection in Christ.  The fundamental ethical posture, then, is not 
one of traumatically maintained desire, but rather of trusting anticipation: 'a total 
exposure to fortune, or rather to grace.'92 
 As a result, the relationship between giving and loss is ambiguous.  On the one 
hand, to really give, one must be willing to accept what giving entails - delay, an 
element of unpredictability, an openness to the unexpected return, and, inevitably, to the 
risk of exploitation or rejection.  The affirmation of reciprocity as the ethical ideal also 
involves the acceptance of risk and unpredictability, the refusal to interpret these as 
threat or scarcity of gift.  It is also an acceptance that the good unfolds over time, not 
instantaneously; since gift is gift-exchange, it is not found whole in a single intentional 
moment, but in a perpetually open-ended movement.  A further implication of 
Milbank's emphasis on 'delay' and 'suitability' can be drawn out here.  Gifts can be 
refused, or their intentions mistaken, so that in order to give one must be open to 
rejection, and in being open to receive, one must be open to harm or exploitation, but 
more than this, the 'gift-character' of a gift is not instantaneously apparent; one has to 
receive a gift for it to be a gift.  How long does this take to receive? 'Receiving' is not 
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necessarily an instantaneous process, in fact on Milbank's account, it is necessarily 
temporal. If this is the case, then just as there is no guarantee that the delay it is 
necessary to leave before responding appropriately to a gift is not simply blank 
unresponsiveness, so there is no guarantee that the 'suitability' of a gift - its gift 
character - will be apparent without delay, or ambiguity. In other words, loss appears 
very closely woven into the business of giving-receiving by virtue of the necessity for 
interpretation (interpretation as a form of active reception). 
 On the other hand, Milbank also states that giving is only possible, can only be held 
out for in hope, if loss can be surmounted, and if, in some sense (i.e., eschatologically), 
gift is destined to become unending reciprocity, by divine promise.  And so, holding to 
reciprocity as the highest, rather than unilateral gift, also means holding to the hope for 
a horizon that exceeds death, and therefore for an 'answer' to the passive modes in 
which goodness 'waits' - humility, patience, forgiveness, and so on.  Without the 
eschatological hope for a reciprocity beyond death, these modes simply cannot be 
ethical, since they would then only represent the gradual diminishment, or even 
obliteration of the person.  In that case, affirmation of patience, humility, forgiveness, 
etc, would simply be a will to non-existence, as Nietzsche diagnosed. These modes of 
virtue can only be affirmed if the hope that charaterises them appears: 
[T]hey can only assume an ethical complexion as a waiting on God - in 
other words, as a kind of meta-ethical trust that it will (beyond perpetual 
postponement) be given to us to be ethical, given to us to again to receive 
and again to give in such a way that a certain 'asymmetrical reciprocity' or 
genuine community will ceaselessly arrive (for now in part, and 
eschatologically without interruption).93 
 
 But what this also means is that in some sense, and this is only briefly hinted at, the 
sheer impossibility of reciprocity in conditions governed by death must be accepted.  
And this would also be to say that we do not yet know reciprocity.  It is interesting, 
then, that the phrase 'waiting on God' is used here, since the acceptance of the 
impossibility of goodness 'here below'  is a large part of what Weil means when she 
uses this phrase.  The passage that immediately follows confirms this sense that 
goodness is paradoxically linked to the recognition of its impossibility: 
It ceases, on this perspective, to be the case that the Christian is the 
person who knows that he can be good in any merely given situation. On 
the contrary, the Christian can rather be seen as the person who 
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recognises that there is no apparent good to be found or performed in any 
given situation. Original sin and death (the results of the Fall) are 
perceived as locked in a complicity which prevents the ethical from 
coming to pass. . .  Death, the experience of loss, contaminates our wills: 
this leads in turn to more barriers, more wars, more loss. Loss is 
ineradicable, and so we tend to assume that ethics is a sort of maximum 
possible minimization of loss. Yet I have shown that so long as there is 
loss, there cannot be any ethical, not even in any degree. 
 
It appears, then, that for Milbank ethical life is linked to a certain acceptance of futility - 
a full recognition of death -  and it is against this backdrop that hope appears as the most 
important aspect of the posture of giving, the characteristic that ensures that there is no 
virtue without mysticism, as Weil would put it (because, in a certain sense, one has to 
'see' hope before one hopes; or hope is a kind of seeing). Hence the paragraph 
continues: 
Hence hope, hope that it may be given to me in the next moment to act 
well, is inseparable from hope that there may be universal acting well, 
and at last a non-futile mourning; to be ethical therefore is to believe in 
the Resurrection, and somehow to participate in it. And outside this belief 
and participation there is, quite simply, no 'ethical' whatsoever.94 
  
What is interesting here is that the hope that 'it may be given to us to be ethical' might 
be said to have a positive and a negative side. Positively, hope is linked to intimations 
of plenitude, the sense of the 'ceaseless arrival' of a relationality unbounded by death.  
Negatively, this hope is linked to an awareness that there is no apparent good (that is, no 
simply present good) and with an acceptance that 'loss is ineradicable'.  Although this is 
not stated explicitly the implication here, which is borne out by the strategy that 
Milbank uses generally, is that one cannot have an ethical hope that has not in some 
sense passed through an awareness of the nullity of the finite in itself, the way which all 
that is, is excess that has no immanent ground.  This means that Milbank largely agrees 
with Derrida's deconstructive moves, insofar as they illustrate the way in which without 
reference to a transcendent telos beyond the ethical, ethics is subject to inner collapse 
and sterile aporia.95  Hope is not ethical if it is the hope to produce a purely human 
goodness, wholly present within time, and the passage from one to the other carries 
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with it an element of loss, and the acceptance of loss. 
 However, there is sense in which gift as such implies something like loss, or at least, 
something that can appear as loss, something that can 'develop into' loss, as already 
explored.96  Real giving, because it involves an interaction between free beings, rather 
than simply an isolated inner intention, involves a moment of limbo when a gift 'hovers 
in the desert', or, to use the image referred to earlier, the moment when the actor may 
simply be 'off-stage'.  Milbank's point is that to give may involve loss, and in that sense, 
may fall outside of exchange, but to give in this way is also to hope and anticipate a 
context which expands so as to include such giving, so that loss or imbalance open out 
to be seen to have been delay, or non-identical return.  In other words, hope is the hope 
that loss will have been delay.  Without the hope for such an unveiling or an extension 
of the 'stage' of exchange to include moments of self-giving, to accept or affirm loss in 
giving (as in excessive generosity) or imbalance in relations (as in humility) is simply to 
passively accept diminishment or damage, or isolation.  But if this hope is held in the 
wrong way - or perhaps at the wrong 'level', in Weil's sense - it is simply a looking away 
from the reality of loss, finitude, imbalance, and so on.  Hope requires a change in how 
we see and feel the significance of instability, openness and risk, it is to trust that there 
may be given a way in which what it will have been is not quite what it appears as now.  
But as we have already seen, this is why concrete beliefs that are associated with hope 
are, for Weil, so ambiguous; perhaps this change of perspective is simply evasion, or the 
injection of purpose into purposelessness.  How do we affirm loss in the right way; in 
such a way that loss is not celebrated perversely for its own sake, but is accepted as a 
potential moment in any self-giving? Milbank continues: 
Of course, one's celebration of such an encounter [between the specificity 
of the other and myself] may require one in certain circumstances to 
sacrifice oneself, even unto death, and one can go further to say that in a 
fallen world the only path to the recovery of mutual giving will always 
pass through an element of apparently 'unredeemed' sacrifice and 
apparently sheerly unilateral gift. But the point is that this gesture is not 
in itself the Good, and indeed I have argued is not good at all outside the 
hope for a redemptive return of the self: albeit that this is an 
eschatological hope which never permits us to expect a return at any 
particular place or specific moment of time, or to elicit any specific mode 
of return. 
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We can note here that on Weil's account, to admit the presence of a desire which does 
not correlate to any particular object may seem to be a consent to a kind of death, or 
giving up of desire, rather than any kind of fulfillment. For Weil, this transition is from 
imagination to reality, and as it passes through something like atheism it is only made 
through shock of some kind, so that, no longer being able to look ahead, one waits, and 
looks up. Similarly, insofar as one's expectations are shaped by the sense of an 
exchange continually balanced and restored in time, one might say that to maintain hope 
for reciprocity - or negatively, to refuse despair - without concrete expectations may 
necessarily appears as an abandonment of expectation as such.  Indeed something 
slightly similar appears in what follows: 
To speak of such a return is not at all, however, to surrender to the lure of 
contract, because it is not the case that actual, self-present life is a mode 
of self-possession which we then surrender in the sacrificial gesture unto 
death. Quite to the contrary, it is when we are giving, letting ourselves go, 
at certain times or always in fallen time with unavoidable sacrificial pain, 
that we are always receiving back as ever different a true, abundant life 
(this is the Gospel). Therefore the resurrection hope preserves this logic at 
the limit: we do not hope (as Patocka and Derrida allege) for an extrinsic 
super-added reward for our giving up of an illusory self-possessed life; 
rather we take it that a final surrender of an isolated life, a life indifferent 
to the pain of others, issues of itself - dare one say automatically - in a 
better more abundant life . . .97 
 
A hidden principle ('dare one say automatically') connects the unavoidable sacrificial 
pain of giving with the receiving of an abundance of life, and of oneself.  The 'gospel' 
here is essentially the purification of gift exchange: giving purified of self-securing 
hesitancy; receptivity purified of suspicion and the fear of obligation; generosity made 
possible through trust; endurance of loss made possible though excessive divine giving. 
The progression is from reciprocity to reciprocity; redemption is a transfiguration of 
ordinary human life, rather than a leap away from it.  But how does the reciprocity of 
the gospel appear as reciprocity, if the receiving that giving is intimately linked with is 
not found anywhere in particular?  And how is the eschatological hope that 
distinguishes forgiveness from despair and resignation itself distinguished; how does 
hope appear as hope? 
 What am I suggesting is that within the reciprocal ethic which forms, for Milbank, 
                                                             
97Milbank, Being reconciled, p. 155. 
188 
 
the context for forgiveness there is rather more ambiguity that is at first obvious.  What 
I have tried to show is the way in which the treatments of decision, gift and forgiveness 
explored above are in large part determined by a desire to preserve the right character, 
or tone.  Or put differently, the posture that is presumed be at the heart of ethical exerts 
an important influence on the shape of the arguments.  For Milbank, the sense that 
Derrida's ethics drives one towards an inhuman preoccupation with an abstract 
otherness that provides the most important impetus towards the articulation of  
reciprocity, and equally, it is the concern that one remain exposed to what in 
undecidable that drives him to continually 'uncover' underlying aporias.  Milbank's 
work on the gift is very persuasive, since, it appears more attentive to the deep 
ambiguities of actual practice than does Derrida's: it is far more perplexing that my 
giving should be both obliged to be creative than that I am always on the lookout for a 
recuperation, even on my selflessness.  However, it appears that there remains a 
moment in which giving and forgiving are indeed an exposure to death, even within the 
more affirming reciprocal ethic that Milbank describes. 
 
 
Conclusion: forgiveness as loss; loss as gain 
 
The discussion of the Philippi hymn in the previous chapter suggested that the desire for 
elevation - to be equal to God - is assumed, but then suspended, and transformed. Paul 
introduces the hymn by encouraging imitation of Christ ('let the same mind be in you 
that was in Christ Jesus') which is already to utilise the desire to be like God, for Christ 
is not just another who possesses a particular characteristic, but one who has the form of 
God.  But the hymn uses the force of this desire to suspend it; one's desire to be like 
God passes through Christ, who desires differently - a difference that is first felt as 
opposition.  This change can be described both as a sharp cutting-off of ambition and as 
a relearning of what this ambition meant; it is neither a condemnation nor a 
straightforward affirmation of this desire.  But, in Weil's terms, this transformation is 
possible through a space in which there is nothing for this desire to attach to.  Both 
negative and positive construals of forgiveness can be described in terms of desire. To 
forgive might be to cease to desire: to stop wanting revenge or exact reparation for 
wrongdoing, to allow the desire to put another down so as to raise oneself up to die; in 
this case, forgiveness is a kind of death, as has been noted. But equally, one might 
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construe forgiveness as the painful continuation of desire: to persist in wanting peace 
when hostility has been offered, to continue to want reciprocity when one's openness to 
others has proved dangerous, etc.  In both cases, one might say that forgiveness consists 
in a desire that the circumstances seem to restrict, or make difficult, even in some cases 
unthinkable. 
 For both Derrida and Weil, in different ways, the lack of fit between desire and 
context is understood as a trauma, a form of redemptive suffering, and more 
specifically, a trial in which one is isolated from universal forms of understanding. This 
isolation is also some kind of prefiguring of death, or loss of self: for Derrida, because 
pure gift, or unconditional forgiveness can only be thought negatively in relation to 
ordinary human life; for Weil because to desire the good is to anticipate the 'decreation' 
of the self, the consent not to be. It is this sense that the highest good can only be 
thought through opposition to exchange or the stripping away of illusory desire, that 
Milbank so strongly rejects, in favour of an account that stresses analogy between the 
goodness of ordinary life and transcendent goodness. Although the ethical hope 
described above is in a sense only apparent after an acceptance of the universal sway of 
death, at the same time, it is held to be implicit within the 'mundane, everyday hope that 
community is possible, that people and objects can analogically blend beyond identity 
or difference'.98  On the one hand, hope, and therefore ethics, is only possible with and 
in the particularity of the Christian gospel; on the other, this hope is already 
everywhere.  But this leaves the problem of how to interpret optimism: is it the denial 
of finitude, a futile holding out for an ethics not dependent on the irruption of eternity 
into time, or is it an inchoate glimpsing of an eschatological peace, trust in the vague 
outline of a promise?  And if the answer is 'both', then question of the character that 
ethics should have, the posture one should adopt, becomes more problematic. 
 A similar issues arises in relation to 'everyday forgiveness' from Milbank's 
perspective.  Should the Christian teaching of forgiveness function so as to force a 
realisation of the impossibility of forgiveness within a 'purely immanent' framework, so 
that the command forces open the self-enclosed person, forces hope, expectation, 
receptivity?  Or, on the contrary, should it shed light on what is already practiced, so as 
to bring it to fulfillment? In one sense one might point to the frequently economic 
nature of what passes for forgiveness, noticing that it may often be a careful process of 
                                                             
98Milbank, Being reconciled, p. 148. 
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negotiation, such that risk is minimised (I forgive once I am satisfied that to do so will 
not leave me too vulnerable), balance guaranteed (I forgive once I am satisfied that I 
will not be left definitively lowered), propriety ensured (I forgive those whom I am  
expected to forgive) and my interests secured (I forgive those whom in it is in my 
interest to forgive).  Or, perhaps more seriously, forgiveness may be practiced as an 
acceptance of what should not be accepted, so that I forgive in despair or self-hatred, 
with an accompanying loss of belief in human dignity.  If forgiveness is only possible as 
an opening out onto eternity, and immoral, corrupt or poisonous apart from this hope, 
then perhaps such forgiveness is not forgiveness at all.  In this case, forgiveness comes 
into conflict with forgiveness, just as reciprocity comes into conflict with reciprocity. 
But then, these attitudes and behaviours might be described as a distortion of a truly 
open and trusting reciprocity, or an immature beginning, and therefore as not entirely 
alien to a genuinely 'asymmetrical' reciprocity.   Perhaps even the most calculating, 
economic and self-interested 'forgiveness' is, in fledgling form, the beginnings of 
something more trusting, open and risky. 
 If, as in the case of optimism, 'everyday forgiveness' can be understood, from 
Milbank's perspective, both in terms of a false attempt to ground the possibility of 
ethical interaction within time, and in terms of an inchoate reaching for what is 
promised in the Christian gospel, then the question is of how the one is transformed into 
the other; through a sudden shock, or a gradual refinement?  It may be important to 
remember that in the Christian tradition, forgiveness begins as a command, or more 
specifically, a command and promise at the same time: forgive, and you will be 
forgiven.  The question then concerns what this command gives: shock and purging, or 
refinement and strengthening? One's expectations concerning how giving and receiving 
should be conducted may be such that the command to forgive is felt as an invitation to 
entirely abandon reciprocity, rather than as an invitation to continue to give, trusting in 
an eschatological gift-exchange.  Refinement might be felt as shock. Even if 
forgiveness is described as a renewal of gift-exchange - sewn in to the logic of ordinary 
life - so that to forgive is simply to choose to continue live and give, it may appear as 
more akin to dying, or, in Derrida's terms, an embracing of the impossible. Forgiveness 
may follow the logic of gift-exchange, rather than suspending or opposing it, but we 
may not be at the level at which they are united.  And if this is the case, if may well be 
that the command to forgive is felt primarily as a negative, emptying moment ± a 
ceasing to desire (balance, revenge, guarantee), rather than a continuing to desire 
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(mutuality, reciprocity, freedom). 
   It appears that even if forgiveness is seen as inscribed within a horizon of 
reciprocity, so that it is thought of as implying a hopeful, trusting posture rather than the 
fear and trembling of the impossible, it is nevertheless true that forgiveness remains 
subject to a certain inner tension.  In fact, the exploration above is intended to 
demonstrate that to conceive reciprocity along the lines of gift-exchange as outlined in 
fact necessitates this tension, in a way that is not always apparent in Milbank's 
treatment: giving may or may not be loss; delay may or may not be rejection; imbalance 
may or may not be exploitation.  Forgiveness may be linked to promise ± it may, 
ultimately, only be meaningful and moral as a promise, for the reasons outlined in 
Milbank's essays ± but in the gospels, it is first of all command, from teacher to pupil.  
In keeping with the logic of Milbank's work, one might say this command exemplifies 
the ambiguity of gift; it is only a promise when received as a gift, rather than a threat.  It 
does not guarantee its character of promise objectively, or without ambiguity, prior to 
being received.  To command that one accept the loss of giving without recuperation, or 
the imbalance of offence without seeking redress, to command that one forgive when 
forgiveness is obviously unjustified, is neither straightforwardly to affirm an ethic of 
reciprocity, nor an ethic of unconditional giving.  The command/promise does not 
simply provide guarantee of a heavenly scheme of reciprocal activity so that one can 
ignore the gaping holes in the earthly one; rather it encourages one to act in the 
ambiguity, when one does not know what one will receive, or how, or when, when one 
does not know  all of what it means to give, or receive, to gain or lose, how far these 
terms may bleed into each other, or which of them will prove decisive.  Perhaps 
forgiveness must be re-imagined as a form of giving that patiently awaits completion; 
perhaps we must re-imagine giving as itself a form of forgiveness.  On my account, part 
of the trial of forgiveness is the lack or resolution which means we must treat both of 
these as true, and through this trial, learn what it means to give. 
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Conclusion 
 
Forgiveness as a change of mind 
 
In Jean Hatzfeld's third collection of interviews with survivors and perpetrators of the 
Rwandan genocide, Alphonse Hitayaremye (a Hutu man recently released from the 
prison at Rilima) describes the lessons the perpetrators were taught at a compulsory 
civic reconciliation course: 
"They taught us how to conduct ourselves around the families who had 
suffered - to behave humbly, to appear timid in confrontations, to avoid 
provocation when facing distraught survivors. To avoid as well the 
disorders of AIDS and suchlike illnesses. To learn how to bake bricks for 
grieving widows or abandoned children. 
 "But the number one lesson had to do with our wives. The instructors 
warned us that all the prisoners would run into epidemics of adultery, 
kids born on the sly fields sold behind our backs. They taught us that 
since the government had pardoned us, we in turn had to pardon our 
unfaithful wives, who'd had no way of knowing we would ever leave 
prison alive, and who had taken up the hoe without a strong man to help 
shoulder their burdens."1 
 
Alphonse's description reads almost like a perverse version of the parable of the 
unforgiving servant. The government pardon, given as a result of the sheer necessity of 
ensuring sufficient labour to produce food for the country, imposes upon the guilty the 
obligation to pass on a similarly self-interested pardon. The threat of being called to 
account for one's participation in a crime so immense produces a fear of judgement and 
a willingness to please that can be channelled into co-operation, just as the parable 
produces in its listeners an outrage that is subsequently turned against them: 'So my 
heavenly Father will do to you every one of you if you do not forgive your brother or 
sister from your heart.' A Tutsi man, Boniface, devoted himself to life as a priest after 
surviving the massacres, and he also notes the practical necessity of the message of 
forgiveness and reconciliation: 
"Of course, I must restrain myself: I must bear the sight, in my 
congregation, of those who hunted us down with machetes. 
 "In my sermons, I speak of God, of commiseration, of reconciliation. 
Then things go well with the singing and the lessons; the congregation 
listens attentively. But target the killings, mention the marshes - and the 
                                                             
1
 Jean Hatzfeld, The strategy of antelopes, tr. Linda Coverdale (London: Serpant's Tail, 2008), p. 13. 
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Hutus get angry: their faces scrunch into scowls and that's it. The killings 
are not acceptable at Mass, or the Hutus take offense. They can stand up 
during the homily and walk out for good. If I play the killjoy, I empty out 
my church. 
 "It's the same thing everywhere: all the priests fear the genocide. So I 
preach forgiveness, love thy neighbour, help one another during droughts. 
I persist, I teach patience, because faith has been tarnished. If I personally 
do not believe that God always redeems Himself in the end, then I saved 
myself for nothing."2 
 
In the wake of the genocide, the past is feared by both survivors and 
perpetrators.  For the former the fact that the horrors they endured remain 
inexplicable means that the fear of repetition is difficult to banish, and since they 
live amongst those whose former violence they still do not understand they fear 
the effects their own resentment might have in stirring a future eruption.3  For 
the latter, the past threatens because it cannot be gotten rid of; they know that the 
survivors cannot forget it and there is no punishment sufficient to mark a break 
from it.4  The message of forgiveness, here, seems to be a surrender to necessity, 
a fearful co-operation with the flow of time in the hope of preserving a fragile 
peace for as long as possible. But is this co-operation not exactly what is 
suggested by the words from the Sermon on the mount?  As the Father in heaven 
causes the sun rises on the evil and the good, so enemies are to be loved and 
prayed for.  The rising of the sun is an image that conveys the sense of infallible 
regularity, the indifference of time. What could be more forgiving than the sun, 
                                                             
2
 Hatzfeld, The strategy of antelopes, p. 186. Boniface's second name is not given here. Interviewees 
are referred to by their first names throughout the three volumes. 
3
 See also Innocent Rwililza's comments on this point. 'Survivors complain about injustice, but they can 
understand that they will thereby gain something in return: a sense of security and a full belly.' The 
acceptance of the part of some Tutsis of the obvious lack of justice in the aftermath, for Innocent, is a 
result of the fear of the consequences of pushing more firmly for punishment. See The strategy of 
antelopes, p. 131. 
4
 Berthe Mwanankabandi's comment is chilling in its clarity on this point: 'Delivering justice would 
mean killing the killers. But that would be another genocide, and would bring chaos. Killing or punishing 
the guilty in some suitable way: impossible. Pardoning them: unthinkable. Being just is inhuman.' I am 
grateful for a post by Brad Johnson at the philosophy blog An Und Fur Sich which drew my attention to 
this passage, and to Anthony Paul Smith for pointing out the possible double meaning of the last four 
words. 
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which shines unfailingly upon the righteous and the wicked? And yet what could 
be more unjust? 
 These problems are by now familiar. The comments above, regarding a 
particularly extreme, perhaps unprecedented situation nevertheless draw out 
deep tensions within the language of forgiveness that are felt in more everyday 
uses.  Forgiveness is concerned with release from proper judgement, and yet 
with the gift of forgiveness comes an even greater set of obligations (to 
demonstrate his goodwill, and merit the pardon retrospectively, Alphonse must 
be lenient with his wife, should she be found to have been unfaithful). Equally, 
the gratuitous aura of forgiveness may not simply cover a hidden contract or 
obligation, it may also hide a deep impotence to do anything other than forgive.  
The message of forgiveness, love of enemies and reconciliation may be a 
message of challenge, a call to a higher, perhaps difficult way of living, as is 
suggested in the Sermon on the Mount. What is more radical, gracious and 
dignified than for a priest to celebrate Mass with those who previously hunted 
him with machetes, knowing that they do not know, and can never know what 
they did? But equally, perhaps it is exactly the opposite; perhaps it is judgement 
that is the difficult demand, requiring as it does a stubborn refusal to bend the 
demands of justice for the sake of tranquillity. 
 In this thesis, rather than try to negotiate way through these ambiguities so as 
to provide a concept that is sufficiently well qualified to reduce the kinds of 
misuse illustrated here, I have instead attempted to dwell on the tensions that 
they reflect.  The reason for this are twofold: first, it seems that the obvious areas 
of conflict in the gospel material are integral, rather than eliminable.  Secondly, 
as I have tried to show, it appears that those treatments of forgiveness which 
deliberately try to eliminate the possibility of forgiveness appearing unjust or 
incoherent tended simply to compress or shift the tension elsewhere.  In other 
words, I have assumed that there is something in the injunction to forgive that 
requires a moment of confrontation, whether it be with existing conceptions of 
what is just, with expectations about what is reasonable to expect from a person, 
or with the limits of what it is meaningful to say and possible to do.  I have, then, 
attempted to articulate the significance of the fact that forgiveness is not simply 
difficult to give or receive, but difficult to think, and I have asked what this 
difficulty gives. 
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 The first task, which chapter one attempts, is to show that there is this 
'resistance to thought', as I have expressed it.  My interaction with Charles 
Griswold is intended to show that the understanding of what forgiveness is is 
shaped and determined by certain concerns.  Griswold's account is shaped by the 
concern to produce a workable and safe concept of forgiveness, to present the 
justice of acting graciously on occasion.  Given the possibilities of mis-uses like 
those indicated above, this is an understandable endeavour, and in the process 
many important clarifications are produced.  However, the limitation with this 
approach is that the concerns which shape and determine the direction that 
Griswold's account takes are themselves called into question by the notion of 
forgiveness. If forgiveness is a display of the virtue of trust, then if forgiveness 
were to be presented as unambiguously just, we would need to know that justice 
is always served through trust; but we do not.  The result is that the actual 
description of forgiveness is at odds with the qualities it is said to demonstrate: 
there is little sense in Griswold's account that one would actually learn to trust 
through forgiving, since forgiveness is defined as a response that is entirely 
accounted for by the activity of the wrongdoer.  Charles Taylor's description of 
the 'cross-pressured' situation of contemporary ethical reflection is invaluable 
here, in that it points out so clearly the competing demands that mean that the 
task of articulating forgiveness is so fraught.   
 However, Taylor's work also makes the straightforward preference for an 
account such as Jankelevitch's more problematic.  In a sense, the difference 
between Charles Griswold's forgiveness and Jankelevitch's forgiveness is the 
difference between theodicy and mystical theology: one attempts to justify the 
ways of forgiveness to men, so that its meaning and goodness do not compete; 
the other tries to capture the highest through a process of poetic negation.  But 
because Jankelevitch's account pays so little attention to the way in which one 
might, through one's life, struggle to combine the cultivation of just 
understanding with the embrace of the moment of forgiveness, one suspects that 
there is a complicity of opposites here: the perfectly simple judgement that 
provides the solid ground from which to launch into forgiveness is never 
questioned.  And in fact, as demonstrated through attention to a number of 
passages which go against the grain of the book, there is in fact the basis for a 
more nuanced way of approaching the excessive, ungrounded aspect of 
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forgiveness.  Jankelevitch already recognises that understanding, love and mercy 
are related, and that to really understand another may involve a renunciation of 
one kind or another, which may be akin to forgiveness.  The question emerges 
here of what motivates this insistence on a momentary, incommunicable 
forgiveness, given that there is a clear understanding of the way that real 
judgement must be tempered by something like sympathy, compassion, mercy or 
even forgiveness.  I take another opening in Jankelevitch's presentation as a 
suggestion here: forgiveness may well issue in repentance, reform, or 
reconciliation; however the attention of the forgiving person is not focused on 
this possibility, but is rather consumed with the present.  There is a sense here 
that an immersion in the present,  attention to the other and the moral ambiguity 
of forgiveness are linked in some way: one has to take one's eye off what might 
be in order to attend to what is now.  We do not need to conclude, as 
Jankelevitch does, that the moment of forgiveness involves an abandonment of 
desire, but instead that it involves a way of desiring, of continuing to desire. 
 Chapter one concludes that there is a necessity to hold together both aspects 
of forgiveness: its reasonability, justice, necessity and wisdom with its excess, 
ambiguity, risk and foolishness.  The question then becomes one of how this 
might  be possible. Chapter two turns to Simone Weil, who is concerned 
precisely with the experience of intellectual, ethical and spiritual conflict, and 
whose work informs the whole thesis. Here I have emphasised the way in which 
forgiveness is associated with the seemingly paradoxical character of the 
kingdom of God, as approached through the gospel saying:'[t]hose who want 
save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will save it.' 
My suggestion is that this saying does not collapse either into denial of one's 
ordinary desire for one's life, nor into a counter-intuitive way of continuing to 
desire it, but rather a paradoxical way of learning what one's life is.  My 
suggestion here is summed up very simply by phrase of Richard Rohr's: 'it is not 
that we have to go down in order to go up, but that we have to go down in order 
to know what "up" means.'  The movement of trust that is summoned here is not 
based on pure promise grounded in power, nor expressive of a principle 
grounded in given intelligibility, but somehow invokes both.  My approach to 
Weil is based on the attempt to read her work in the light of this productive 
tension. 
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Weil's explorations of the character of suffering suggest that compassion 
must involve a preparedness to encounter the unintelligible, and a resistance of 
the urge for thought to 'fly' from affliction.  In this sense, the attention of 
compassion involves an openness to perplexity, just as for Jankelevitch, 
forgiveness involves an embrace of madness.  However, Weil's work also 
suggests that the encounter with contradiction is necessarily a matter of time, an 
experience of waiting, just as attention is a matter of giving time.  The conflict 
that she sees at the centre of ethical and spiritual life is between desire and 
acceptance, or protest and compassion, and so her account is closely related to 
the tensions within the notion of forgiveness.  Forgiveness cannot be adequately 
justified because it seems to include competing virtues or necessities, and so 
Weil's work provides a way of construing the significance of this tension.  For 
Weil, this is the tension one must accept if one is to learn how to love: to love is 
to desire without approaching, that is, to desire without guarantee, to wait.  One 
only loves reality as it is through patience.  Here the relation between acceptance 
and determinate desires for justice, repentance, and real changes in relationship 
is rather different: it is a case of how one is concerned with these things, not 
whether or not one is.       
 What this also means for Weil is that through waiting one learns.  Time spent 
with contradiction does not necessarily resolve it (unless it is simply a mistake), 
but it may, through the promise and/or principle of grace, disclose a deeper level 
of reality.  Contemplation of suffering with loving acceptance does not mitigate 
it, or justify it, but it does transfigure it somehow.  Something occurs which 
enables one to say 'grace fills the void', without this thereby meaning that grace 
removes the void.  Attention, then, produces insight, but it is not insight that can 
be straightforwardly affirmed, because its truth is only true at a certain 'level', or 
put differently, is true in only a very ambiguous way.  This sense of learning 
proves important in the interaction with Derrida, because despite a concern that 
is in some ways similar to Weil's, Derrida's framework seems to disallow the 
possibility of learning through suffering.  Talk of 'levels' may seem odd, or 
unappealingly hierarchical.  However, I try to show that what Weil is describing 
can be seen more clearly in the debates over forgiveness, particularly in terms of 
the way in which acceptance is evaluated.  Certain models of forgiveness are 
rejected on the grounds that they seem to involve interfering with moral 
199 
 
responses to wrongdoing, or encourage us to accept what should not be accepted.  
Weil's account takes the discussion beyond this two-dimensional picture, in 
which acceptance is in direct competition with judgement.  Whereas there is a 
tendency for some discussions (for example, Tara Smiths's) to treat forgiveness 
as a balance or meeting point between two forces competing at the same level, 
for Weil, loving compassion somehow incorporates, in a way that is very 
difficult to demonstrate, the fullness of both protest and desire.   
 However, this introduces a problem, namely that of incompatible 
perspectives.  In her many, many attempts to articulate these ideas, Weil implies 
that the kind of attention that suffering demands is not easily described, since it 
is both acceptance and desire, both compassion and protest, and that these 
ambiguities, ultimately, emerge from the way in which God is both present and 
perfectly absent in creation.  On my account, something very similar is true of 
the goodness of forgiveness.  The sense of surprising generosity that attends Jean 
Amery's account of resentment is instructive here: perhaps Amery refuses 
forgiveness, or perhaps he expresses an inarticulate longing for it, insofar as his 
desire is for what would have first to be in order for there to be forgiveness.  If, 
then, forgiveness has a truth, it is one that is partially shrouded in secrecy, 
because the perspective from which it is true is not yet accessible; in Weil's 
terms, we are not yet at the level where the contradictories meet.   
 In order to explore the question of perspective more fully, I have briefly 
examined the debate produced by Rene Girard's work in reference to 
Jankelevitch's thought, and in relation to the theme of necessity: the necessity for 
sacrifice, the necessity for certain conditions to be met before one forgives.  In 
one sense, what Girard attempts can be seen as an attempt at purification of 
perspective, so that the sacrificial perspective which sees necessity in death is 
definitively left behind.  However, the pursuit of purity here seems to lead to a 
disavowal of what one nevertheless presumes: it was not 'necessary' that Christ 
die; and yet this realisation is somehow the fruit of his death.  In another sense, 
Girard's work leads to an interpretation of the death of Christ based upon 
discovery.  Here I have used Raymund Schwager and James Alison's work to 
show that when taken in more richly theological direction, the Girardian thesis 
produces a sense of the death of Christ as an enacting of the possibility of a 
different 'use of death'.  Here the resurrection necessarily renders the meaning of 
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self-offering through the cross and the relationship between death and life 
ambiguous: does life come to the crucified Jesus as its undoing, and so as its 
opposite, or from the crucified Jesus, as its fruit?  Here I am arguing for the 
necessity of a mingling of very different perspectives, rather than the possibility 
of a clean break between them. 
 With these issues in mind, I engage with the suggestion of Michael Gorman, 
that the Philippi hymn contains two conflicting but complementary ways of 
construing descent: as contravention of an existing order, and as expression of a 
hidden reality.  This allows another way of considering the way in which 
forgiveness involves both the conflict between different ways of thinking and the 
possibility of new insight emerging through this conflict.  Christ Jesus took the 
form of a servant both 'although' and 'because' he was in the form of God.  The 
'although' relates to the sense that radical forgiveness suspends or opposes a pre-
existing and normative order;  the way in which forgiveness may be perceived as 
a challenge to one's sense of justice, possibility and meaning, such that the truly 
forgiving person appears to forgive without reason.  My argument throughout 
the thesis is that this moment of opposition inevitably appears, however 
reasonable forgiveness is taken to be.  In this sense, I have tried to show more 
concretely  the way in which Derrida is right about the 'impossibility' of 
forgiveness: the idea of forgiveness pushes at the the edge of our moral 
landscapes, and our sense of possibility.  However, Gorman's point is that for 
Paul, the scandal of kenosis opens out into a new, yet fragile, understanding of 
how one's status or nature finds expression.  The 'because', therefore, relates to 
the way in which forgiveness may become a (perhaps fragile) new pattern of 
living, with corresponding expectations and norms, rather than simply a moment 
of confrontation.  This allows for a way of seeing the character of a life 
committed to learn the ways of forgiveness. This is in contrast to Griswold, for 
whom forgiveness is a necessarily controlled virtue that submits to what one 
already knows to be just, and to Jankelevitch, for whom the madness of 
forgiveness issues in no continuous habits, patterns or insights.  Here I attempt to 
use Gorman's template to express what Weil may mean by truths that can only 
be seen only at a certain level: a commitment to radical forgiveness, if it has 
passed through the acceptance of contradiction of love and protest may express a 
form of desire and hope, rather than a culpable resignation.  This is the heart of 
201 
 
my understanding of forgiveness; it follows the pattern of Christ, who ascends 
through descent.   
 Chapter four explores some of the ideas that lie in the background to the 
preceding discussions, and furthers articulates the conclusion reached at the end 
of chapter three.  I begin by exploring Jacques Derrida's notion of the 
undecidable. Here I try to show that Derrida's emphasis upon the way that 
decision is suspended impossibly between the responsible concern for 
knowledge and a creative embrace of indeterminacy implies something like a 
notion of redemptive suffering.  The insufficiency and indispensability of 
knowledge must be suffered honestly and without evasion if one is to enter the 
ethical realm. Here I am sympathetic to the attempt to link the difficulty of 
forgiveness with 'the undecideable'. There does not seem to be any simple way 
of showing the justice, or reason, of forgiveness, without losing something 
crucial, so that, in a sense, the goodness of forgiveness remains ambiguous, and 
to forgive necessarily means to decide in advance of 'forgiveability': forgiveness 
takes place, to a greater or lesser degree, in the dark.  Despite this agreement, I 
am nevertheless critical of the way that Derrida's construal of the suffering of 
thought seems to rely on the formality of an identically repeated moment.  There 
is little space left for the way in which the reflexive interpretation of the moment 
affects the moment itself: the growing understanding that the experience of 'the 
undecideable' may prove to be a constitutive part of one's ethical development  
must, surely, affect the tonality of the experience, just as with experience an 
athlete might learn to interpret the pain involved in their training differently.  It 
is as though there is a perpetual divide or incommunicability between the 
aporetic self and the enduring, reasoning self, so that one cannot learn from, or 
through, aporia.  Put differently, there is little sense that an encounter with 'the 
impossible' might actually stretch or challenge one's sense of what is possible, 
because although deconstruction (which is possible through the impossibility of 
justice, decision, etc.) is assumed to have a positive impact upon determinate 
conceptual structures (as John Caputo puts it, the impossible gift 'slackens the 
circle' of exchange), there is no sense that any learning takes place, just 
identically repeated collision.  My argument here is that the potential of an 
encounter with 'the impossible' is found in its duration, in the capacity to wait, in 
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Weil's terms:  in order to learn from the way that experiences exceeds 
understanding, one has to be patient. 
  This critique is developed through exploration of Derrida's work on gift.  
Many of the concepts Derrida engaged with in the later part of his career may be 
thought of as implying a common posture: deconstructive suspicion, ethical 
vigilance, impossible desire.  The notion of gift is the main way in which 
Derrida incorporates desire for the impossible into his framework, and in turn 
provides the basis for his understanding of forgiveness.  The difference between 
ZKDW,DPFODLPLQJDQGWKHNLQGRIµLPSRVVLEOHIRUJLYHQHVV¶HVSRXVHGE\
'HUULGDLVVKRZQPRUHFOHDUO\WKURXJKP\GLVFXVVLRQRI-RKQ0LOEDQN¶V
UHVSRQVHWR'HUULGD¶VZRUNRQJLIW:KHUH'HUULGDXQGHUVWDQGVWKHDPELJXLWLHV
found in gift-language to be evidence of an impossible desire for a 'pure' gift, 
which would escape the cycle of reciprocity, a gift that neither invites or 
demands any return, Milbank argues that these ambiguities reveal that 
reciprocity ± always already in motion, aiming at no final moment of balance or 
imbalance ± underlies all human exchange, however distorted they may be by 
contractual relations, or abusive and controlling giving.  For Milbank, this 
understanding frees Christian ethics from the stultifying ideal of pure altruism, 
or 'self-less' generosity.  Because goodness (which is neither simply aesthetic nor 
simply moral) is fundamentally concerned with relationship, it includes 
receptivity, and where it appears that goodness demands a unilateral movement, 
this should be understood in terms of trust, patience, anticipation, rather than an 
'impossible' acceptance of absolute loss or final imbalance.  However strenuous 
generosity, grace, patience, or forgiveness may appear to be in conditions of risk 
and scarcity, God promises the advent of a genuinely peaceful gift-exchange, 
that is not limited by the horizon of death.  For Milbank, then, despite the 
appearance - in the extreme cases - of an intimate link between forgiveness and 
loss, imbalance ('void', in Weilian terms), forgiveness is still, essentially, a 
moment of reception, possible through hope.  Because there is no such thing as a 
'pure' gift outside of exchange (even the gift of creation by God makes possible a 
'return' of creaturely gratitude), for-giving must equally be reciprocal: possible in 
human relationships because of the prior receipt of divine forgiveness, and the 
hope and possibility of future restoration of relationships.   
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 My account differs from Milbank's only insofar as I am concerned to stress 
the ambiguity of forgiveness, and to develop the theological significance of this 
ambiguity.  Put differently, I am concerned to show that if forgiveness reveals a 
deeper, riskier reciprocity ± one that continues even in the absence of mutuality 
± so it may also be that just as gaining one's life through following Christ may 
first be perceived and received as loss, so forgiveness may first appear as an 
embrace of giving without hope of return, giving into a void.  In fact, what I 
argue is that precisely because real giving involves the willingness to receive the 
unexpected, and to endure delay in return, it can appear as, be experienced as, 
loss.  On my account, there is a fundamental ambiguity in the gospel sayings 
concerning where and how, exactly, 'reward' is to be found, and indeed, whether 
it is to be sought, and it is this ambiguity that allows for a change of perspective: 
one must first learn to act in secret, without thought of reward before one learns 
that the Father who sees in secret rewards differently.  As a result, despite my 
appreciation of Milbank's critique of the ethics of altruism ± 'moral heroism in 
conditions of scarcity' ± I am more sympathetic to the idea that forgiveness must 
appear, at times, as a direct contradiction of the law of reciprocity, rather than a 
fulfillment of it.  As a result I have stressed the way in which even in the 
conception of Christian ethics offered by Milbank, there is, nevertheless, a 
moment which is not entirely dissimilar to Weil's notion of acceptance of void: 
Christian hope is found after, or along with, a recognition of the universal sway 
of death.   
 My suggestion in this thesis is that there is, as Derrida tries to show, 
something perpetually and ineliminably problematic, disturbing, or excessive 
about forgiveness ± something unfinished, or irresolvable.  However, I also want 
to show that if one sees a permanent divide, and unchanging relationship 
between the economic, reasonable forgiveness that has its proper place in a 
social order, and the aneconomic, impossible forgiveness that only ever disturbs 
and confronts the social order and the rationality that upholds it, then one 
actually has an impoverished sense of the 'impossibility' that surrounds 
forgiveness.  More than this, I have tried to show that there are hints that 
Christian theology offers a way to understand the relationship between these two 
faces of forgiveness, and so a way of construing the difficulty of thinking 
IRUJLYHQHVV,QWKH3KLOLSSLK\PQLWLVDVWKRXJKRQH¶VSULRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
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God is both reversed and completed, because the desire to be like God is neither 
condemned or affirmed, but rather made to pass through the humility of Christ: 
one should strive to be like God, insofar as one should strive to be like Christ, 
who had equality with God.   Similarly, in the synoptic saying quoted above, the 
desire to save one's life is made to pass through the trauma of loss through 
IROORZLQJ&KULVWVRWKDWRQH¶VGHVLUHIRURQH¶VOLIHFRXOGEHVDLGWRKDYHEHHQ
given up, but somehow equally to have been fulfilled.  In both cases, one only 
learns what it might mean to become like God, or what might mean to truly 
possess 'life', through giving up one's conceptions of each.   
 My argument is that forgiveness follows a similar logic, and that both aspects 
± the reversal, or renunciation; the completion, or fulfillment ± are part of the 
business of understanding what forgiveness means, and, perhaps more 
importantly, what it might demand of us.   As a result, I have tried to argue that 
forgiveness is conflicted because it challenges our way of expecting, hoping and 
desiring, not because it dispenses with them.   The command to forgive may be 
difficult because it asks for something other than justice, or because it refuses to 
guarantee its final position in relation to justice: no promise is given to the 
concerned disciples that their daily practice of forgiveness will produce a more 
effective repentance in their sinful brother, no guarantee is given that the radical 
love with which one loves one's enemies will miraculously produce friendship 
out of enmity.  However, the difficulty of forgiveness may also lie in the 
injustice of our existing conceptions of justice, so that the command to forgive is 
an invitation to give up a perspective that distorts one's vision, so as to be more 
just: one takes the plank out of one's own eye so as to see more clearly to take 
the speck out of another's eye; the practice of forgiveness will be rewarded justly 
and fittingly with divine forgiveness.  In other words, forgiveness may be 
difficult both in its comprehensibility and its incomprehensibility, both in its 
transcendence and in its immanence, its possibility and its impossibility.  Or put 
differently, forgiveness is difficult ± to live and to think ± both because it is 
human, and because it is divine: it may involve both an expansion and a 
shattering of one's limits.   
 On my understanding, then, forgiveness is a changing of mind ± metanoia - 
that we find ourselves within.  It is not so much that we repent in  order to be 
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forgiven, or repent of our unforgiveness in order to forgive, but more as though 
we forgive, and are forgiven, so that we might repent. 
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